The main highway from the border w Russia west into southern Finland (Vt.7) will be closed for a week (22.7-30.7) for @Puolustusvoimat led multi-authority excercise. The length, duration and time of closure make this VERY unique. 2/x
Map by @iltasanomat is.fi/kotimaa/art-20…
The exercise revolves around a rapidly developing situation and includes FDF, Border Guard, police etc, and almost all readiness units, VYKS, (their readiness is measured in minutes/hour). In total some 1700 people & 300 vehicles. Ok, facts done.
What does this mean? 3/x
Bottom line: the exercise will show the main potential Russian axis of advance into 🇫🇮 can be quickly defended through joint multi-layered operation:
Combat engineering to funnel & stop attacker, land and air assets to destroy them along the length of the highway + more 4/x
The exercise revolves around a rapidly developing situation and includes FDF, Border Guard, police etc, and almost all readiness units, VYKS, (their readiness is measured in minutes/hour). In total some 1700 people & 300 vehicles. Ok, facts done.
What does this mean? 3/x
Bottom line: the exercise will show the main potential Russian axis of advance into 🇫🇮 can be quickly defended through joint multi-layered operation:
Combat engineering to funnel & stop attacker, land and air assets to destroy them along the length of the highway + more 4/x
Background: all defence relevant structures like bridges & overpasses are designed and built to enable easy demolition.
There are no preplaced mines but 🇫🇮 has many, from basic to pretty nifty ones; all 🇫🇮 soldiers learn basics of mining, combat engineers are the pros.
5/x
The reason the exercise is multi-authority is that all are needed for specific tasks, which together add layers of capability while ensuring everything done is legal. For example:
🇫🇮BG is training right at the border; likely their recon, ‘slow down’ and JTAC skills 6/x
‘Behind’ the BG @Maavoimat engineers would lay mines & do demolitions, artillery would confirm premade fires plans, @Navyfi VYKS unit would land ashore and @FinnishAirForce would do air cover and prep for A2G. 7/x
Why is this relevant for NATO?
It is 💯 % guarantee that 🇫🇮 will do what needs to be done to defend Alliance borders, not ‘fear’ defensive preparations would be considered ’escalatory’. 8/x
After formal #NATOSummit decision, ops like these would be led from new NATO Land Component Command (Corps level) in Finland and be integrated into NATO plans and FLF exercises/ rotations in 🇫🇮.
#StrongerTogether
9/x
I left out, but pointed out by many, that there is an equivalent exercise up north, with Ally Norway. 10/x
The terrain is 'made for' defence, and with some practice counter-attacks. Allies have already gotten a first experience there, during #NorthernForest24 (vid below), in effect 'concept testing' the FLF-format for Finland. 11/x
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Every now and then the idea is raised that political decision makers “don’t have skin in the game” re war.
I am 💯 % sure the president of #Finland @alexstubb will never start a war but if attacked and 🇫🇮 would defend itself his son very much would have his neck on the line 1/x
In fact, considering - well lots of things - on average there is a good chance that the younger Stubb would be in the first cohorts called in, even before formal start of war. 2/x
If you look through the 200 parliamentarians in Finland, literally every one would have a wife, husband, son, daughter, cousin, father, uncle, aunt, best friend etc “on the line”.
Everyone has “skin in the game” - this is why we prepare, hoping it’ll never come.
3/x
The views on which entities/actors have positive or negative effects on Finnish security are not a surprise. It's indicative of NATO being seen as a (military) security actor, and the EU as an economic & broader security actor (for a good reason). 2/x
Increasingly negative views of China's impact on Finnish security are not a surprise, due to (1) China's actions, (2) increased media coverage, and perhaps (3) shift by population towards the official Finnish 'great power competition' framing of global politics? 3/x
Parliament of #Finland is set to begin debate about changed security environment and needed changes regarding 🇫🇮 security policy (read seeking NATO membership).
🧵 focusing on what’s said implicitly and explicitly (follow #turpo, as other Finns are also sure to comment)
First up is @Haavisto, presenting updated government report on security:
Finnish formal conclusions: 1) Russian appetite for high-risk actions has increased 2) Russia can quickly focus large volume of mil forces against a neighbour 3) Increased loose talk of using non-conventional weapons (nukes); for which #Finland has little deterrence.
Zelenskyy starts with recounting strike against railway today, and asks for a moment of silence to remember all the victims of Russian missiles.
Ze continues to talk about Russian military continuing to target civilians...and pivots to: "I think you understand that if they got the order, the Russian tanks would do the same [in Finland] as in #Bucha.
...I've been asked almost daily whether Finnish military has done anything recently to raise readiness. My answer has always been a Kimi-like: "yes"
Now its partially visible.
Thread follows.
First a little background: Finnish security authorities like the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) or Border Guard (BG, Raja) usually follow a ‘Do. Don’t talk.’ approach to communicating.
Talking about operational details is a no-no, with a few exceptions (more below).
So, frequently lots happens ‘behind the curtain’. Why? Because it makes it harder for an adversary (read Russia) to figure out what the FDF knows, doesn’t know, and how it reacts to any given situation (or in fact doesn’t react identically to ‘the same’ situation).