1/ @alixpasquet suggested that Soros on Soros had a clearer communication of Soros's thinking than his book Alchemy of Finance, so I have been reading it. On page 93, Soros states that an investment idea he has is a hypothesis, not a prediction.
The difference will save — or cost — you money. 🧵
2/ Good investors do not make predictions; predictions are for talking heads and the sell-side. Investors have hypotheses tested by reality and are subject to rapid change based on events.
2/ A prediction sounds like “Oil will be $120 by year-end.”
It’s definitive. It’s performative. It’s meant for headlines, not portfolios.
3/ A hypothesis sounds like this: “If OPEC+ extends cuts & demand stays above 102 mbpd, Brent likely trades +$90. If cuts break or demand slows, thesis is wrong, this thesis is expected to be valid until X date. It’s conditional. Falsifiable. Updatable.
4/ Predictions lock you in.Your ego gets tethered to a point-in-time call.
When reality shifts, you defend the call instead of defending your capital.
5/ Hypotheses free you. You’re running a test. Inputs change → thesis changes.
No shame. No ego. Just probabilities.
6/ Why investors need hypotheses:
•Faster feedback loop
•Explicit risk triggers
•No sunk cost fallacy
•Decision-making rooted in what is, not what you wish it was
7/ Talking heads sell certainty.
Investors trade flexibility.
The first gets airtime.
The second gets paid.
8/ Takeaway:
•Predictions are static declarations.
•Hypotheses are dynamic frameworks.
Trade the tape and reality not your ego.
9/ If you’re in the markets:
Write down your thesis. Define exactly what disproves it. Review often.
Reality is the ultimate P&L arbiter.
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Another good thread from @criticalthreats on the Great Lakes Region and the ongoing conflict. The following is a 🧵on what their analysis of Uganda means for $AFM
1/ Uganda’s role in the eastern DRC conflict is complex and strategic. Kampala is simultaneously working with the Congolese government, maintaining ties to the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels, and activating its own proxy groups in the region-all to hedge and expand its influence
2/ Uganda justifies its military presence in the DRC as counterterrorism, targeting groups like the ADF. Joint operations with Congolese forces under “Operation Shujaa” have expanded in recent years, but Uganda also keeps channels open with other armed actors, including CODECO and M23
A thread on DRC and Alphamin. I am seeing lots of random people concerned about M23 and potential violence at $AFM. 1/N
First, remember that this is a long-standing conflict in the perpetually restive eastern provinces. There is nothing new in the news, and most of the news I see is months out of date. 2/n
North Kivu province accounts for the largest share of violent events, driven by political rivalries, disputes over land, mineral interests, etc, in the DRC. A ceasefire agreement in April 2023 with the M23, a rebel group with reported backing from Rwanda, reduced hostilities for several months last year. 3/N
1/ I went searching for a short today and this is what I found...this thread is not investment advice, it is not a full analysis, this is a first cut during the first stage of research and as such represents unsophisticated thoughts and untested hypothesis on $CMI...
2/ There has been a significant decline in used heavy truck values this year:
3/ Meanwhile, Used Class 8 inventories are increasing (although still below 10 year averages, the the direction of travel and rate of change are negative):
1/20 South American Copper 🧵1: Traditional stomping grounds of Chile and Peru appear increasingly difficult jurisdictions for big copper mines. Grades are declining and the PolRisk arising from fiscal uncertainty in both Chile and Peru are problematic. #mintwit#copper#PolRisk
2/20 I don't think searching for copper equity opportunities in the region makes sense at the current prices we see. You might be paying up for quality in a few cases ($FIL comes to mind) but I expect the next few years to be difficult ones for Chile and Peru.
3/20 PolRisk situation makes starting a project (brown or green field) hard and the projects that exist are too big for juniors on their own,, that mix creates limited equity opportunities. The following are some points to support that assertion.
Copper industry may deliver 1.5 million tons from greenfield capacity in the period 2025-30, with +50% of the potential identified supply likely to hit the market after 2030. This is not on time for a green transition.
We think there is greenfield copper projects with more than 285 million tons of resources, with the ability to produce more than 6 million tons a year in some stage of development. Bloomberg and GS research supports similar type numbers.
About 30% of projects are either being ramped up or are in the late stages of construction, and could deliver 1.9 million tons of copper annually by 2025. Beyond 2025 S/D balance probably requires ~500,000 tons of new capacity each year, by our calculations.
1/30 @CathieDWood Interview in the latest GS Top of Mind Report focused on Equity Bear Markets...I am always interested to hear what she has to say about oil as she comes to all these questions from a perspective completely foreign to me
2/30 I am also always interested in trying to unpack the underlying assumptions, so I will start with the EV growth rate assumption, which is the driver of her oil demand destruction thesis.
3/30 @CathieDWood calls for EV sales to rise from 4.8 million in 2021 to 40 million in 2026, a 733% increase. This works out to a CAGR of about 53%, seems rich to me, but lets compare it to what the car companies believe they will accomplish.