🧵 1/15 On mining management teams. When fortunes flow to insiders who skim value instead of creating it, genuine strivers are mocked. Crony capitalism/shady entrepreneurs aren't just bad business they are an insult to the sweat that actually keeps the economy running.
2/15 Spotting a slick mining promote before it blows up your P&L is half the battle. Amir Adnani (Uranium Energy $UEC, Uranium Royalty $URG, GoldMining $GOLD, Gold Royalty $GROY) is a textbook case. Here are red flags—plus the counter-arguments for balance—to keep on your radar.👇
3/15 Serial-vehicle pattern
Since 2005 Adnani has IPO’d 4 resource names with the same macro stories (uranium or gold) and many of the same directors. Critics say: “Land the narrative, raise equity, repeat.” Fans say: “Entrepreneur building optionality in tough jurisdictions.”
4/15 Dilution treadmill
$UEC share count: 37 m at IPO → 416 m basic today. $GOLD: 8 m → 187 m. Options refresh yearly. If the commodity chart pauses, you own less of the pie. Counter: equity beats project-level debt in a downturn.
5/15 Asset quality vs sizzle
$URC Flagship Texas ISR grades: 0.04–0.09% U₃O₈ (vs Cameco’s 15%+ Athabasca). $GOLD projects mostly sub-1 g/t PEAs. They’re “real,” but tier-3. Bull case: fully-permitted assets can sprint when uranium > $90/lb or gold breaks new highs.
6/15 Cash burn, no FCF
10+ yrs in, none of the entities throws off sustainable operating cash flow. Burn is funded by ATMs and bought-deal financings. Counter: Staying production-ready yet debt-free is a feature, not a bug.
7/15 Cross-company web
Same insiders sit on each board; entities own stakes in one another. Hard to tell where arm’s-length ends and related-party begins. Supporters call it “synergy.” Skeptics call it “entrenchment.”
8/15 Comp vs performance
2024 CEO pay: Adnani $4.3 m (UEC) + C$2.1 m (GoldMining). Group exec pay ≈ US$14 m/yr—more than some small producers that actually mine. Pro tip: compare C-suite pay to free cash flow per share—if FCF is zero, the math is easy.
9/15 Premium optionality pricing
$UEC EV/lb M&I ≈$6.9, above several producers. $GOLD trades at ~$25 EV/oz vs single-asset developers at $15–18. You’re paying up front for the blue-sky scenario. (Back of envelope computed on phone)
10/15 Slippery timelines
$UEC 2011 deck: “1 Mlb/yr uranium by 2014.” 2017 deck: “PFS in 18 mo.” $URG 2020 deck: “4–6 producing royalties by 2024.” None hit. Macro tailwinds can forgive delays, but your IRR meter shouldn’t.
11/15 When could it work?
•Uranium term > $70/lb ➜ Texas ISR restart
•Gold > $2,400/oz ➜ Brazil projects move
•A major overpays for permitted U.S. pounds
Own it only if you WANT that deep-out-of-the-money call option.
12/15 Management due-diligence checklist
✅ Track dilution CAGR
✅ Map cross-links between entities
✅ Compare exec pay to FCF
✅ Pressure-test timeline realism
✅ Benchmark EV/resource vs peers
13/15 Balanced view
Promotion ≠ fraud. Building mines is brutal, especially in the U.S. uranium patch. Adnani’s companies do hold real permits and pounds/ounces. Question is whether the equity math works for you or management?
14/15 If You Must
Treat promote heavy developers as trading sardines, not freezer meat (??, whats the opposite of sardines, steak? 🥩) . Small starter positions, tight stops, scale up only once cash flow shows. Never forget the opportunity cost.
15/15 Bottom line: Promoters keep the lights on in this sector—but so does your skepticism. Separate story from economics, and you’ll avoid paying 2× NAV for a PowerPoint mine. Not investment advice—just one PM’s risk checklist.
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1/ @alixpasquet suggested that Soros on Soros had a clearer communication of Soros's thinking than his book Alchemy of Finance, so I have been reading it. On page 93, Soros states that an investment idea he has is a hypothesis, not a prediction.
The difference will save — or cost — you money. 🧵
2/ Good investors do not make predictions; predictions are for talking heads and the sell-side. Investors have hypotheses tested by reality and are subject to rapid change based on events.
2/ A prediction sounds like “Oil will be $120 by year-end.”
It’s definitive. It’s performative. It’s meant for headlines, not portfolios.
Another good thread from @criticalthreats on the Great Lakes Region and the ongoing conflict. The following is a 🧵on what their analysis of Uganda means for $AFM
1/ Uganda’s role in the eastern DRC conflict is complex and strategic. Kampala is simultaneously working with the Congolese government, maintaining ties to the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels, and activating its own proxy groups in the region-all to hedge and expand its influence
2/ Uganda justifies its military presence in the DRC as counterterrorism, targeting groups like the ADF. Joint operations with Congolese forces under “Operation Shujaa” have expanded in recent years, but Uganda also keeps channels open with other armed actors, including CODECO and M23
A thread on DRC and Alphamin. I am seeing lots of random people concerned about M23 and potential violence at $AFM. 1/N
First, remember that this is a long-standing conflict in the perpetually restive eastern provinces. There is nothing new in the news, and most of the news I see is months out of date. 2/n
North Kivu province accounts for the largest share of violent events, driven by political rivalries, disputes over land, mineral interests, etc, in the DRC. A ceasefire agreement in April 2023 with the M23, a rebel group with reported backing from Rwanda, reduced hostilities for several months last year. 3/N
1/ I went searching for a short today and this is what I found...this thread is not investment advice, it is not a full analysis, this is a first cut during the first stage of research and as such represents unsophisticated thoughts and untested hypothesis on $CMI...
2/ There has been a significant decline in used heavy truck values this year:
3/ Meanwhile, Used Class 8 inventories are increasing (although still below 10 year averages, the the direction of travel and rate of change are negative):
1/20 South American Copper 🧵1: Traditional stomping grounds of Chile and Peru appear increasingly difficult jurisdictions for big copper mines. Grades are declining and the PolRisk arising from fiscal uncertainty in both Chile and Peru are problematic. #mintwit#copper#PolRisk
2/20 I don't think searching for copper equity opportunities in the region makes sense at the current prices we see. You might be paying up for quality in a few cases ($FIL comes to mind) but I expect the next few years to be difficult ones for Chile and Peru.
3/20 PolRisk situation makes starting a project (brown or green field) hard and the projects that exist are too big for juniors on their own,, that mix creates limited equity opportunities. The following are some points to support that assertion.
Copper industry may deliver 1.5 million tons from greenfield capacity in the period 2025-30, with +50% of the potential identified supply likely to hit the market after 2030. This is not on time for a green transition.
We think there is greenfield copper projects with more than 285 million tons of resources, with the ability to produce more than 6 million tons a year in some stage of development. Bloomberg and GS research supports similar type numbers.
About 30% of projects are either being ramped up or are in the late stages of construction, and could deliver 1.9 million tons of copper annually by 2025. Beyond 2025 S/D balance probably requires ~500,000 tons of new capacity each year, by our calculations.