Thread by @WhereisRussia

THREAD:🧵
Partners in Crime: Russian and Chinese cooperation in drone production and sanction evasion.

Our latest investigation in the series on Russian Drone operations.

The fact Russia uses third parties to avoid sanctions when acquiring drones is not a new phenomenon, however, a pertinent example in this area is the rapid rise of Aero-HIT, a previously obscure Russian drone manufacturer headquartered in Khabarovsk, near the Chinese border.

Aero-HIT has evolved into a key supplier of tactical drones for Russian forces operating in occupied Ukraine. The company secured Russian state funding with ambitious plans to produce 10,000 drones per month in 2025, including sophisticated variants beyond its current models.

Aero-HIT’s success is linked to covert cooperation with Chinese companies, despite denials from Beijing. Aero-HIT’s name is actually a contraction of ‘Aero’ and HIT, the elite Harbin Institute of Technology, in China, an institution sanctioned for ties to China's defense sector.

Evidence reviewed from corporate memos, procurement correspondence, and government letters indicates that Aero-HIT has partnered extensively with entities such as Autel Robotics, a leading Chinese drone manufacturer, and Shenzhen Huasheng Industry Co. Ltd.

Since early 2023, Aero-HIT has engaged Autel engineers to facilitate the potential localization of the Autel EVO Max 4T, a civilian drone with strong electronic warfare resistance features. The aim is to fully domesticate production of this platform within Russia.

Also key to Aero-HIT’s product line is the Veles, a First-Person View (FPV) drone which has been deployed extensively by Russian forces in Ukraine. The Veles drone has been cited in both combat operations and alleged attacks on civilians.

Drones like the Veles have become a signature feature of modern warfare on the Eastern front, allowing for cheap, scalable battlefield surveillance and strike capabilities.

The procurement method employed by Aero-HIT and partners illustrates clear patterns of sanction evasion. Rather than engaging in direct defense-sector trade, Russian entities utilize fronts in unrelated sectors, such as airline catering and food transport as intermediaries.

These entities operate under innocuous commercial designations while funneling critical drone parts into the Russian military-industrial base. This method enables Russia to obfuscate the origin and destination of dual-use technologies while bypassing Western export controls.

The scale of this operation has not gone unnoticed by Western governments. The United States and United Kingdom have sanctioned Aero-HIT and its Chinese partners, accusing them of supplying drones or components to the Russian military.

Sanctions were met with denial from Chinese firms, which maintain they ceased Russian-related business from February 2022. However, the evidence suggests a more complex reality, with Chinese technology reaching Russia through third-party networks or unofficial relationships.

Within Russia, Aero-HIT enjoys direct links to state institutions and prominent political actors. The company is controlled by Komax, a firm owned by Konstantin Basyuk, a former KGB officer and current senator for Russian-occupied Kherson.

Russia's MOD appears to be a key client, with documented orders for thousands of drones and associated equipment. Memos indicate that Aero-HIT has received political backing at the highest level, including recognition as a priority project by Putin’s envoy to Russia's Far East.

This procurement pipeline was reinforced during a high-level visit to China in May 2023, during which a Russian delegation met with officials from the Harbin Comprehensive Bonded Zone and the Harbin Institute of Technology.

The visit laid the groundwork for a joint venture in Khabarovsk, with plans to import drone kits, establish a customs-free production hub, and integrate Chinese components into Russian drone production.

Although official Chinese export restrictions tightened in late 2023, the Khabarovsk production line was already operational, producing 200–300 drones per month and scaling up quickly.

Even after regulatory tightening in China, the Russian side adapted by leveraging lesser-known Chinese firms like Shenzhen Huasheng Industry, which signed a contract with Aero-HIT after other partners pulled out.

These arrangements illustrate Russia’s determination to maintain access to Chinese technology. Reports show components continue to be funneled into Russia via intermediaries such as Renovatsio-Invest, a firm sanctioned by the US for acting as a procurement agent for Aero-HIT.

In March 2024, operational documents indicate that 20 drones and batteries were delivered to a battalion in Kherson using a company specializing in seafood and logistics—a clear example of dual-use front company tactics.

Further documentation shows the Russian Defense Ministry planning to purchase 5,000 Veles drones, antennas, and related hardware, though it remains unclear whether this transaction was completed.

Separately, other units, such as the 76th Guards Air Assault Division based in Pskov, sought to procure drones from Aero-HIT via Aeromar-DV, a firm known primarily for airline catering services.

These cases highlight the persistent challenge of tracking and interdicting the gray-market networks that fuel Russia’s war machine. DJI drones and the Veles project with its supporting logistics are good examples of how Russia is capitalizing on its relationship with China and repurposing civilian technology for military applications, despite sanctions, export controls, and international condemnation.