I’ve had a lot of people DM me about Ajax.
I was involved a long time ago, I’m a proper civilian now, but here’s what I learned.
There are three fundamentals to grasp and then some art of the possible.
First, and most important, we need to assess what we think “harm” is.
People were dismissive of the first KC investigation as they felt his definition of harm was unrealistic. It wasn’t.
Operating AFVs, all day, in all weathers, is hugely demanding. Noise, heat, cold, rough terrain, over stimulation. It’s hard.
All of that is expected & normal
The fundamental problem is lack of human centric, legislation aware design. When JCB design their vehicles they produce a “pod” for the operator tbat is safe to operate from a noise, vibration and vision/safety POV.
If you’ve been in a modern combine, tractor, JCB you’ll feel it
Is this realistic in an AFV?
There are always compromises. But the military has trouble with “harm”.
“All AFVs are noisy and shake” of course. We should measure the noise at ear and total vibration, not just for soldiers, but also components like sensors, wear and durability.
Defence has a very chequered past with taking hearing loss and protection seriously.
Scrapping the in-house research facility tbat looked after our ears, was probably not a good idea.
If hearing injuries has been broken legs - would people notice more quickly? I think yes.
The problem is hearing is not replaceable or repairable. Once it’s gone. It’s gone. Add to that our normal age and environmental driven hearing loss, and you have a problem.
When I left the Army I had lost 22% of my hearing. I will be a lot more deaf. A lot more quickly.
Second fundamental fixed beliefs.
“All AFVs are noisy and vibrate”
“I used to feel horrible in the back of xyz vehicle”.
Yes. All true.
BUT this is a £10M+ a copy modern AFV
It wasn’t designed in the 70/80 built in the 90s (Warrior/Challenger) this is now.
We expect more
What’s realistic?
We’ll take your pick of similar size weight AFVs. Puma, Redback, Lynx, CV90, Bradley, Warrior the list goes on.
NONE of these AFVs have a pattern of attributable harm or injury.
Disorientation - yes - injury - no.
Testing.
One of the investigations highlighted the lack of “entry standards” for land vehicles.
This means prototype builds and manufacturing can start before and without instrumented feedback.
Overlapping manufacturing before your testing and trials are complete is high risk
Is there a good root cause analysis of the source of vibration?
I don’t know. But there should be.
If that’s the case it needs to be designed out.
Not just with a more comfortable ride for soldiers, or expectations of where they should and shouldn’t put their hands and feet.
It was interesting to bounce vibration of ship engineers, F1 engineers, and some amazing design folks near Oxford.
All of them commented about resonance, conductors and transmission of vibration through such a large and heavy vehicle.
The forces involved would be massive.
The third fundamental is culture.
The reports into Ajax focussed on how difficult it was to build a joined up picture of risk hazard and harm.
That needs to be fixed.
As does the attitude of leadership tbat it’s better to be seen not to fail in programme delivery, than it is to possibly cause harm, or pay and field a vehicle that may not be for for purpose.
Continuation bias is fuelled by individual ambition, institutional reputation (for all involved) and the fear that if you turn a programme off, you won’t get the money back.
“Cost” needs a new definition along with harm. The cost of this will be huge.
The “cost” is leadership vs led.
The cost is UK, Defence, Army, DE&S, individual reputations.
The cost will be when people mobilise for legal claims for when harm is caused.
Exports? Would you but this vehicle? We haven’t even talked about its capability.
To finish. Because this is already too long. I’m left utterly disappointed that this could happen again, five six years later. Have any of the lessons and recommendations on the report been fixed? Certainly not attitudes (read on)
After leaving I had to attend MoD to sign my statements on Ajax. The Civil Servant who managed the process asked me “yeah I get the Jubillee Line every day” it’s loud, I guess I’ve got hearing loss. I commented that’s not the same.
I asked him if he wore noise cancelling earphones. He showed me his nice branded ones. See. I said. At your ear, there’s no risk of harm, is there. Then I just shook my head and left.
All tubes are noisy and vibrate. I guess.
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It’s time to talk about moral injury and the Army.
Because if it’s not fixed, I think it might fundamentally alter:
- who stays and who goes,
- how the Army is led
- who the Army attracts.
What I’m saying is - it might shift the character of the Army & service.
A thread.
Let’s start with a definition
Moral injury is distressing psychological, behavioral, social, impact in the aftermath of exposure to events.
It’s different to PTSD - which is based on trauma, processing and recalling memory, and/or the disturbance of the present by the past.
Moral injury occurs when people experience a discrepancy between the moral code they hold, in relation to how they operate within their workplace, which negatively impacts their psychological wellbeing and mental health
We can see how it plays out in a values based organisation.
Been asked by a few for analysis.
Here’s my take from Strategic to Tactical on the current crisis.
Caveat: I’m no longer serving so all this is from #OSINT
🧵
Strategically this operation is doomed.
The rhetoric Putin deployed is unravelling at home and with his friends.
The longer the conflict takes the less solidarity there will be from the East and BRIC.
Despite “fortress Russia” economy China will not like long term disruption.
Putin may have sold a rapid and devastating victory to his elites at home and friends abroad and that’s becoming less likely without deploying overwhelming force.
This type of operation would completely undermine his narrative and build further condemnation and unrest. But why?
In July 2020 I was disciplined by my 1* and 2* boss for challenging a 3* letter on the issue of racism.
In my 12 line email I urged us to move beyond activity, activism, process and hubris and immerse ourselves in the everyday where mistakes occur.
A 🧵on Op Teamwork eve.
First it’s a profoundly good thing we have problem recognition.
The Army finds it hard to act proactively on these issues, often needing an external crisis (oversight) or internal crisis (confidence/discontent) to move.
That’s the first thing to fix (return to this later)
Having had problem recognition
and the acknowledgement for the need for change
where are we then on these two graphs?
More importantly Teamwork needs to be part of this journey.
1. Context of our people 2. What we can all do 3. Tips for leaders 4. Convergence with alcohol 5. Neurodiversity 6. The most precious thing: hope.
Let’s thread
Context.
We tend to focus on location, family etc
It’s also good to understand factors from growing up, family, poverty,
exposure to trauma/grief/violence/drug/alcohol misuse,
education completion/setting/needs.
Normalise getting into that detail and what to draw from it.
2. We all have a role in promoting positive approaches and engagement with #MentalHealthAwareness
- talk about mood
- take time off/out and say so
- create psychological safety to engage & declare challenges
- avoid slurs on mental health creeping in
- use Op SMART tools
BE KIND