Thread by @emad_badi

A brief tactical-geopolitical update on the evolving regional dynamics affecting RSF supply lines since this paper came out.

Whereas RSF supply lines were primarily shaped by endogenous developments in Libya, Chad, and Sudan from 2023 through late 2025, a set of exogenous shifts in geopolitical dynamics are now forcing significant adaptations in RSF logistics. Three interlinked factors appear to be driving this change:

1. A Turko-Egyptian rapprochement

2. An Emirati entrenchment in Ethiopia

3. The Saudi/Emirati Red Sea crisis (Yemen/Somalia)

https://x.com/emad_badi/status/1995530748447654174

First, the Turko-Egyptian rapprochement is perhaps the most consequential. By late 2025, there was evidence of growing operational cooperation between Ankara and Cairo in the defence sector. This has manifested in the first sustained Egyptian kinetic action against RSF supply convoys transiting the Mutalath (the Egypt-Libya-Sudan tri-border area) from Kufra into Darfur. These actions appear to have integrated Turkish surveillance and strike capabilities projected through Egyptian bases.

egyptindependent.com/egypt-and-turk…

A key node in this adjustment is the East Aweinat airbase in southwestern Egypt, located roughly 60 km from the Sudanese border. Open-source indicators point to extensive upgrades at East Aweinat and runway lengthening - changes consistent with enhanced sortie generation capability and, by extension, a greater ability to strike targets deep into Darfur (if not further).

x.com/EekadFacts/sta…

This has enabled a series of targeted strikes on RSF supply convoys transiting from Kufra into Darfur since late October 2025 - prompting Hemedti to threaten cross-border retaliation.

It has also prompted the first coerced tactical recalibration by the UAE and the RSF on how supply lines are routed (addressed at the end of the thread).

For now, Egypt appears to have determined that its red line is supply convoys routed by the LAAF/RSF close to its border, as it has not conducted or facilitated strikes elsewhere in Darfur (or in Libya).

sudanspost.com/hemeti-issues-…

The second factor is the UAE’s build-up in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz. Reporting around the establishment of a camp hosting a UAE-trained force - allegedly under the UAE's new “Foreign Legion”, and composed of RSF elements as well as mercenaries - suggests preparations to open a new Sudan front through Ethiopia, oriented toward Blue Nile State. The camp reportedly includes South Sudanese and Colombian mercenaries, as well as RSF troops who had fled Sudan.

sudantribune.com/article/308712

There are two reasons this is taken seriously in Cairo. The first is operational and demographic: if the RSF seeks simultaneous offensives in Kordofan and Blue Nile while maintaining its hold on Darfur, projected displacement would be mainly towards Egypt, adding a new stress vector for Cairo.

The second is geopolitical and water-security related. Ethiopian-enabled RSF gains in Blue Nile are a strategic nightmare for Cairo because they intersect with Egypt’s longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD and broader anxieties about upstream leverage over Nile flows. In other words, this amplifies the threat perception from an Egyptian standpoint.

The last factor is the recent "Red Sea crisis".

It has dovetailed with all the above, has hurt Emirati standing in the region & has materially constrained UAE resupply options.

In practice, Abu Dhabi’s overreach vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia has contributed to the closure of Egyptian and Saudi airspace to Emirati cargo flights that were critical to supplying the RSF. As a result, aerial supply patterns have become more convoluted and risk-managed.

One consequence has been reliance on routes that avoid Saudi and Egyptian airspace, including refuelling through Bosaso and onward movement toward Kufra. For Ethiopia, until recently, the camp in Benishangul was supplied through Berbera and Mombasa, with materiel routed overland through Somalia and Kenya respectively.

https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/2010054461272784928

Given the uncertainty around the UAE’s future access and freedom of action in Bosaso now that Somalia has cancelled Emirati contracts, the premium Abu Dhabi places on retaining leverage in Sudan is higher.

These factors have already reshaped RSF resupply dynamics - both in terms of where materiel enters the theatre and how it is moved onward.

This helps explain why Abu Dhabi is fast-tracking the Benishangul-to-Blue Nile option now, including airlifts to Harar Meda, even as its long-term presence in Ethiopia also remains uncertain. The operational logic is straightforward: opening a new axis in Blue Nile would stretch and overwhelm the SAF, while diversifying the routes through which the RSF can be supplied.

See this article by @AfriMEOSINT on the airlift: richtedd.substack.com/p/uae-launches…

On the ground, the RSF’s main node of supply via Libya has also shifted. The traditional supply point via Darfur - now disrupted by Egyptian interdiction - has been reconfigured.

Emirati supplies that routinely land in Kufra are increasingly routed into Chad through a renovated LAAF checkpoint in southeast Libya (Gate 17), where there is a heavy RSF-aligned Mahamid mercenary presence operating under the LAAF’s 676 Brigade. Via Gate 17, supplies are subsequently routed into northeastern Chad, and then transit via East Ennedi into RSF-held North Darfur.

facebook.com/story.php?stor…

What is notable is there is no longer a fixed supply corridor through Eastern Ennedi. The fluidity is deliberate: it reflects growing friction inside Chad, particularly between N’Djamena and the Zaghawa.

This is partly why there is increased reliance on Tebu to manage the movement of UAE supplies and, crucially, to avoid inflaming tensions within Chad in ways that could catalyze ethnic mobilization of Zaghawa against Déby.

This - for now - is also why Emirati cargo flights have not directly landed into Chad despite it reverting to being the main node for RSF resupply in Darfur.