Russische #Kriegswirtschaft und Anpassung an Sanktionen: Seit der russischen Invasion in die Ukraine vom 24. Februar letzten Jahres hat #Russland erhebliche Materialverluste erlitten. So wurden z.B. geschätzt die Hälfte der russischen #Panzer zerstört. Wie reagiert das Land? Die #Sanktionen haben Russlands Rüstungsindustrie unter Druck gesetzt, so dass es zu Produktionsausfällen kam. High-Tech Güter aus dem Westen sind für viele Waffensysteme wichtig und standen nur begrenzt zu Verfügung.

In my latest blog for @Bruegel_org, I argue why we need EU debt to insure against the pandemic. I show that EU debt will always be an (indirect) liability to national budgets. Spending control is the central element for success. Thread bruegel.org/2020/04/eu-deb… EU debt as insurance against catastrophic shocks is in Germany's and everybody's interest as it increases the stability of monetary union and helps avoid fragmentation of single market.

Taking up the idea of @SMerler , I compare Hubei, Italy, France and Germany #COVID19 confirmed cases. The four lines look remarkably similar. The scary part of the picture is in next Tweet: Biggest part of problem is ahead, even for Italy. IF (which is a big if) the three EU countries manage like China to plateau the newly confirmed cases, plateau will be reached in Italy in ~30 days and in Germany and France in around 40 days.

Industrial policy strategy by @peteraltmaier has many positive elements. We indeed need to talk about the strength of Europe's industry. EU and Germany need to invest more in R&D, research and education and it needs to create a vibrant venture capital market. But... ... setting numerical targets for the size of the industrial sector will hardly help. Also ironic that German government simultaneously decided to cut its spending plans for broad band and digitalisation of schools. Germany will need to put its money where its mouth is. ...