Today I’ve written our third bi-monthly newsletter “Bi-Focal” here at @focaldatahq. We explore three themes. 1/ “Brand polling” of the two main UK parties 2/ The fading influence of Brexit on our politics and 3/ What “back to economics” politics looks and feels like. It’s startling how pessimistic Britain is - 69% of the public think we are going in the wrong direction vs 14% right. This isn’t normal - and away from the political cycle it’s one of the key metrics for checking in on the societal health of a country.

Small thread on the Tory leadership contest, and a few polling / non polling observations. The @IpsosUK leader ratings data is some of the best data out there. The difference between the PM and LOTO ratings has correctly predicted the direction of every election since 1979. Leaders can recover, maybe once or twice, but never beyond a certain point at a level of c.-40 points approval ratings. That point was definitely reached for Cameron, May, Johnson and Truss. The Johnson of 2019 has gone - and in any event he was flattered by Corbyn’s ratings

Today our friends @UKOnward publish their report State of the Union with polling @hanburystrategy carried out across all 4 nations of the UK, with a sample of 6,500 and a huge range of issues covered, this is one of the most comprehensive surveys on the Union since '14 (1/18) One note. We ran a 2nd poll to understand if vaccine rollout/ongoing inquiries had changed dynamics. We found a drop in support for independence from 56/44 to 53/47. This was initially reported in the Sunday Times as a drop to 50/50 due to a tabulation error on our part (2/18)

We’ve (@HanburyStrategy) calculated ward level EU Referendum estimates in England/Wales. Mapping 1000+ real results and 7000+ modelled ones. The picture by ward (RHS) shows a much more complex picture than local authority results (LHS) of Leave rural areas vs Remain cities. (1/3) We can see that 200 seat Wessex is highly contested on this axis. The degree of leave dominance across the East coast is utterly remarkable. The red wall is also much more divided then a blanket leave vote, and the eradication of the liberals in West Country explained (2/3)

Fascinating poll out today from @IpsosMORI on Right/Left identification. The poll provides further evidence that Right Wing support looks like a "Nike tick" by age (and Left Wing support the inverse) (1/8) ipsos.com/sites/default/… This is a trend we spotted back at Populus in 2015. It's completely fascinating, and is normally obscured if polling is done by age buckets are too large and sample sizes too small unlike the poll below. (2/8)

Small, niche thread on (political) polling and whether we need to start having BAME/ non-white cross breaks as a standard in public polls, inspired by various conversations from @election_data, @MattSingh_ and @sundersays and others... (1/14) In theory I’m sympathetic. We measure UK public opinion, and segment by a host of critical markers that drive voting patterns such as age, education, working status, and region. Showing how the UK votes and thinks by ethnicity should in theory be straightforward (2/14)

Lots of discussion about the beginning of the end for mega cities, and the hollowing out of them post COVID, with a premium given to space and size. If this does happen I think the political consequences are huge. Small thread on imaginary UK scenario if we’re to happen (1/7) Firstly, the relationship between economic growth + density could decouple. This matters because cities getting richer and countryside getting poorer is part of the reason behind rise of populism + a globalist ideology amongst city elites which has rotated our politics (2/7)

I've been mulling on how freedom (civil & political) has across the world become decoupled from prosperity, and what the implications are. I've framed this as the breaking of Fukuyama's Curve™. I'm sure many will disagree with the following thread (1/12) Lots of people are writing about COVID. I am not qualified to do so. I am interested in what kind of Global inflection point we are at. As a child of the late 80s, the shift from optimism to perpetual crisis is something my, and younger generations are getting used to (2/12)

I've been quiet this election, so a small thread. This feels like if the electorate had the choice they would elect a Conservative President and a Centre-left parliament. Denied that choice they are muddling their way to a conclusion. (1/9) Corbynomics is popular. YouGov generically polled Labour policies, and they were popular. Being likeable/popular is different though to being credible/possible. Corbynomics has been been partially neutralised by the Tories shifting sharply to the left on economics. (2/9)

Thread on #GE2019. Labour polling likely to increase from low/mid 20’s. Current polls driven off those give a voting intention. These DK voters disproportionately include women, 2017 Lab voters + younger voters. When they break it will be to the advantage of Labour (1/10) Lib Dems and Labour resemble Romulus and Remus - punching it out with lots of net switching. Almost none of which achieves strategic goal of eroding Tory majority. Remain voters will need signals and steers on how to vote. Public MRP could provide this albeit with noise (2/10)

16 part thread on where the U.K. Conservative party has historically, and is still, under-performing, and why that's interesting for any upcoming election…(1/16) Around 80-90% of why certain seats vote for certain parties is explained by the demographics of the area e.g. – how many graduates are there, how rich is the seat, how many people have gone to university, what is the ethnic composition and what type of jobs do people have? (2/16)

Lots of extraordinary political polling numbers coming from @MattSingh_ and @roger_scully. Parties ⬆️ and ⬇️ double digits. We are currently in the middle of a phase of extreme political volatility. Best not to construct grand and final narratives in this climate (1/n) We won’t know the shape of things until the end of October, and probably some time after this. Political commentary should focus on Brexit mechanics, not wildly fluctuating numbers. Since 2014 every triumph has proved shallow, and defeat only temporary. Kipling politics. (2/n)

Dire Tory performance with young voters is I think driven by 8 factors. 1) % of electorate which is BME 2) Expansion of Higher Education 3) Changing av age of areas 4) ⬆️House price/income ratios 5) Tuition Fees 6) Financial Crash 7) Brexit 8) Rise of Social Liberalism (1/10) #1 Any one of these factors would be a problem. Their combination is creating a conveyor belt towards oblivion for the party. Younger people are disproportionately BAME, and older voters white – part of the reason the age curve is dramatic is a direct ethnicity effect (2/10)

I'm not convinced that the political parties understand where "Middle England/Wales" exists. Analysis indicates Ipswich, Sevenoaks, Broxtowe, Wrexham, Newark, Preston, C.Croydon, Basingstoke, Blackley & Broughton + Warrington South are the best seats to understand #EURef (1/7) This collection of seats represent (by that order) the closest reflection to the average distribution of the Leave vote in England/Wales. It's not the same as picking a seat made up entirely of smaller areas all of which voted 53 Leave 47 Remain (2/7)

Twitter thread coming based on my modelling of the Leave and Remain 2016 vote by postcode (1/10) Commentators have struggled to find what the “average” UK political place to visit is on Brexit–the places that voted in line with the country are more likely to strongly Labour or strongly Conservative - creating a confusing narrative (2/10)