Just learned yesterday by coincidence - as it has not been reported in Finland by these public organisations involved- that in May - after about two months of presidency- the Finnish president Alexander Stubb met with Shi Taifang, the vice chairman of the national committee of the CPPCC, and head of the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee. 1/

en.cppcc.gov.cn/2024-05/25/c_9… Apparently, Shi Taifang led a CPC delegation to Finland at the invitation of the Finnish parliament, and met with Deputy Speaker of the Finnish Parliament Tarja Filatov.

Following the tradition of democratic transparency, it would be beneficial to proactively & publicly report such meetings and not leave it to the Chinese readouts, as it now begs to question of whether the Finnish president truly said all this ⤵️ 2/

While the premise of this FT piece is absolutely correct — learn to understand what your opponent wants, and understand what you want — it fails to grasp other than China’s short-term achievables:

“Beijing wants a multipolar world order, which requires preventing Europe from aligning too closely with a US agenda of technological containment and “friendshoring” of supply chains. This is coupled with a domestic growth agenda premised on exporting large amounts of green tech — which requires keeping rich-country markets open.” 1/4

A missed opportunity for a China-EU grand bargain on.ft.com/4baJvK0 These are Beijing’s short-term goals. Longer term and deeper goals are more profound. It's not just the US being the adversary for Beijing, but NATO as well. What happens in Europe is mirrored in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore the endgame in Ukraine is not a bargaining chip to Xi, who wants to shape European security architecture. Confiscating Russian state assets is a horror scenario for China. 2/4

Not a rosy path ahead for China according to this Economist piece; Xi Jinping’s misguided plan to escape economic stagnation: “Blending techno-utopianism, central planning and an obsession with security, this sets out China’s ambition to dominate the industries of tomorrow. But its contradictions mean it will disappoint China’s people and anger the rest of the world.” 1/

economist.com/leaders/2024/0… “Mr Xi wants state power to accelerate advanced manufacturing industries, which will in turn create high-productivity jobs, make China self-sufficient and secure it against American aggression...Mr Xi’s ultimate aim is to invert the balance of power in the global economy. Not only will China escape dependence on Western technology, but it will control much of the key intellectual property in new industries and charge rents accordingly.” 2/

China offers to back Hungary in security matters - unusual move indeed. And by this, Hungary turns into an increasingly unreliable member of NATO and the EU. 1/ reuters.com/world/unusual-… When Xi Jinping congratulated Finland’s president elect Alexander Stubb, it was done in the context of “new type of international relations”. Same phrase was used by Chinese State Councilor, Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong in Budapest: “mutually beneficial cooperation sets an example of building a new type of international relations.” According to Xinhua, Hungary and the PRC signed documents on security cooperation. 2/

“Xi Jinping…has instructed the Communist Party to recruit ethnic-Chinese nationals of other countries in a quest to build international support and stymie political enemies. In 2018 responsibility for relations with the Chinese diaspora was handed to the same united front department that oversees the CPPCC. In South-East Asia above all, Chinese embassies and state-security organs reach out to ethnic-Chinese businessmen, clan associations and grassroots organisations. Mr Xi’s approach confers primacy to blood rather than to citizenship: no matter how long ago their forebears left China, ethnic Chinese are considered to have a duty to their ancestral land.” 1/4

economist.com/asia/2024/02/0… “This month a sweeping new law against foreign interference was invoked for the first time [in Singapore], against a Hong Kong-born Singaporean, Philip Chan.”

“Mr Chan is…a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an organ of the Chinese Communist Party. He appears to have crossed a line by trumpeting China’s interests. Last year, in Beijing, he declared that the Chinese diaspora was duty-bound to “tell China’s story well”. He added that “if you want to have a future, you must stand with the country that represents the future.” 2/4

Xi repeated pretty much his doctrine’s core points in the meeting with Scholz, but the tone was more like a teacher warning - if not almost reprimanding- a student. Xi was talking assertively and was demonstrating a position of strength. 1/ english.news.cn/20221105/bdffa… Xi stressed that “political trust is easy to destroy but difficult to rebuild and that it should be nurtured and protected by both sides.”

Xi wasn’t talking about China here, but teaching Germany. 2/

Read carefully. This is the global order blue print that China is fairly successfully already building. 1/ english.news.cn/20230913/edf25… About using nuclear weapons: although the document firmly mentions that “nuclear weapons must not be used”, it drops the usual mention that “China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances…” 2/

fmprc.gov.cn/eng./wjbxw/202…

Xi Jinping’s absence from G20 frustrates European leaders eager for time with China’s decision maker - great piece by @fbermingham

Some follow-up comments on how badly European policy makers understand Beijing. 1/ scmp.com/news/china/dip… European leaders (over-)eagerness to keep talking with Xi Jinping faces difficulties - “nailing those conversations down is proving to be difficult”. This is entirely according to Beijing’s old power play book. To make foreign dignitaries queue up boosts the importance of XJP. Access to talk becomes a concession. 2/

“China policy plays a vital role in presidential contests. On this front, the goal of each of Taiwan’s mainstream political parties is nearly identical – to preserve Taiwan’s de-facto independence and avoid conflict w 🇨🇳..the parties’ different approaches to safeguarding this… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… “The KMT prefers a conciliatory approach, judging that the best way to preserve Taiwan’s sovereignty is by erring on the side of not provoking China. Its main competitor, the DPP, rejects such pragmatism in favor of principle – insisting that Taiwan be respected as a sovereign… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

From Politico: “An Eastern European official observed that in the days leading up to Thursday’s summit, some Western European governments tried to water down even further an "already boring” draft statement — just to make sure they “wouldn’t piss off China.” 1/ “Germany is wary of upsetting its vast business interests in China, while France has been skeptical of following the U.S. approach, which has been to ratchet up pressure on Beijing and limit Western exposure to Chinese influence over critical supply chains.” 2/

The #EU (tax payers) funds #Huawei from its #Horizon RDI program: “The Financial Times identified Huawei as a participant in 11 projects under the bloc’s flagship Horizon Europe research and innovation programme, receiving up to 14 % of funding per scheme totalling €3.89mn.” 1/ “The EU is funding Huawei to run cutting-edge research on next-generation communication systems, even though several European governments have banned the Chinese tech group from their telecoms networks.” 2/

I wrote about Finland's NATO membership for @ProspectF and especially how it was taken in China and how Chinese analysts perceived it. 1/

pf.org.tw/tw/pfch/13-100… "Once Finland became a full member of NATO in early April, Chinese analyses of Finland’s membership could be summarized in three points: 1) Abandoning the rational “neutral” stance between the major powers speaks of current Finnish politicians’ lack of strategic vision;" 2/

“The measure will expand the scope of the law -now limited to state secrets- to cover all documents, data, materials or items related to nat security and interests. It does not provide further details on what constitutes national security and interests.”1/
asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China… “Chinese citizens and organizations will have to report suspected espionage. Logistics and telecommunications companies will need to provide technical support to fight espionage, while media organizations will have to educate the public on the issue.” 2/

China starts ‘surgical’ retaliation against foreign companies after US-led tech blockade: “[This]
reveals Xi’s strategy of narrowly targeting industries and companies with little risk of damage to China’s own interests.”
1/
on.ft.com/3MRMBsT “..the decision to conduct raids and detain staff from foreign companies has raised the spectre that Beijing will escalate hostage diplomacy if relations with the west deteriorate.” 2/

Xi Jinping openly advocates a new world governance and new international order. In intertwined world, he fears that unity in China alone (that is not forced gently) isn’t enough to keep the one-party rule safe. 1/4 Therefore his international order mirrors the economic development and sovereignty and security principles of China, and leaves out political and the parts of human rights where citizens would would be protected by the rule of law against those in power. Xi’s international order… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Global Times editorial about Macron’s visit: “Among Western powers, France has relatively more common ground with China. China's and France's views on supporting multilateralism, free trade, and global governance are consistent.”

France hardly shares China’s view on global… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… The headline summaries how the Macron’s baby, European autonomy plays into Beijing’s court: “Macron's China visit embodies the value of strategic autonomy.” 2/

Beijing’s strategy to crush the transatlantic alliance is highlighted in this GT piece by 🇨🇳 analysts’ voices. Reg Ukraine, Beijing starts meetings with Macron and von der Leyen from the position that it has already proposed a ‘peace plan’, now it’s EUR’s turn to push ceasefire:… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… Lack of trust between China and the EU is not really (the gullible? weak?) EU’s fault because the US controls EUR: “the US' tighter grasp of Europe in its rivalry with China, and the scarcity of China-EU exchanges at various levels as factors leading to a decline in China-EU… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

“Relax, it’s much worse than you think. We are now witnessing some of the effects of a decision made years ago by China to use every means and medium of intelligence-gathering at its disposal against the West. 1/foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/28/chi… Its [China’s] strategy can be summarized in three words: collect, collect, collect. 2/

“The reason for China’s sudden [peace plan] can be traced back to a report issued two months earlier by a top think tank in Beijing…the AMS completed a simulation on the Ukraine conflict, resulting in an astonishing finding..” 1/

asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Ukrai… “The war will draw to a close around summer 2023, the simulation indicated, with Russia having the upper hand. Both the Russian and Ukrainian economies would be too exhausted to sustain the war past the summer, the report said.” 2/

This article was published just after Russia’s attack on Ukraine a year ago expecting a quick victory. 1/4

china-arms.com/2022/02/russia… “Just as Russia’s war against Ukraine is likely to be resolved within 48h, if the “war of reunification of Taiwan” starts, the ‘highest goal’ of the PLA is to ‘reunify Taiwan’.” 2/4

Great piece by @BeijingPalmer Why China has sharpened its Anti-US rhetoric: “Anti-American language is not merely a reaction to U.S. actions; it is useful for China’s domestic politics.” 1/

foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/08/chi… “The anti-American mood will also eventually trickle down into the treatment of U.S. businesses in China, adding more regulatory barriers.[…] But it’s an open question as to how much the amped-up rhetoric will shape Chinese state actions on a larger scale.” 2/