🌟New paper & data #openaccess #PartyPolitics. Mapping party campaigns 2010-19 I show that to understand how thin ideas play into electoral gains of anti-establishment parties, we need to look beyond just populism @GSI_Muenchen @ExtremandDem @PopulismTeam journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13… Populism has become a popular buzzword. Some approaches thus argued that we should drop the term altogether. I instead suggest that we should rather be mindful when applying it. So I don't argue that populism is irrelevant. I nonetheless show that it is not the whole story. 2/

🌟New paper #openaccess. I map two-dimensional normalisation strategies of anti-establishment parties 2010-2019 and show how this rhetoric played into their broader electoral appeal @JournalPolitics @GSI_Muenchen @ExtremandDem @PopulismTeam journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.11… 1/🧵 I argue and show that anti-establishment parties (AEPs) can actively navigate an image of both distinctiveness and ‘normality’ behind their substantive positions, and profit from their rhetorical strategies in terms of increased electoral performance, ceteris paribus 2/

Today I release my new dataset on diverse thin ideas between populism, technocracy and political vocation in party electoral campaigns 2010-2019. The Thin Anti-Establishment Supply Dataset (TAESD) accompanies my forthcoming article in Party Politics.🧵1/9 osf.io/f23hm/ TAESD measures the salience of diverse thin messages beyond just populism in 142 social media campaigns by radical right, left and ‘centrist’ anti-establishment parties + conventional competitors during 23 elections across Europe (🇦🇹🇨🇿🇫🇷🇩🇪🇮🇹🇵🇱🇸🇰🇪🇸) 2010-2019. 2/9

🎉New paper on organisation of PiS in Poland. I show it's vital to contrast what parties say and what they do about their organisational traits. I suggest we need more work on how (populist radical right) parties communicate about and perform organisation🧵doi.org/10.17645/pag.v… During its succesful electoral campaign of 2015, PiS strategically toned down its radicalism. The mask fell down immediately after the election. Since then, the party aggrandised political power to the detriment of democratic principles and constitutional norms. 2/10

My article on mainstream accommodation of radical right politics by conventional gov. parties Fidesz and Smer, as well as counter-strategies of far-right ‘originals’ after 2015 is out (in German). Here a #thread with an English summary. link.springer.com/article/10.100… I show that Fidesz and Smer did not ‘just’ adopt restrictive asylum positions but justified them with nativist narratives of defense/threat to ‘Nation’ from constructed 'Others' and ideas. RR originals, even in HU, were however able to react by ‘repackaging’ their nativist supply

1. There are two issues with the approach: as others already mentioned, the way the items were combined causes problems with contextual/empirical validity. Second, the scale doesn't reflect the authors' own definition, resulting in issues of conceptual validity as well
#thread

https://twitter.com/PippaN15/status/1094735014108033024

2. As authors themselves note in Ch.7, the populism scale (anti-elitism and salience of corruption) doesn't reflect their definition (anti-elitism and invocations of vox populi). Why "populism" scale then? Especially as the operationalisation visibly impacts empirical validity?