The package that the Standing Committee of China’s NPC approached is substantial, but to be mostly used for debt swaps. This will help consolidate local government debt levels, but does not seem to result in additional spending room this year. The total package is RMB12 trillion for the next 5 years, most of it the next 3. 6 trillion earmarked for hidden debt resolution, and another 800bn per year for the next 5 years. And a further 2 trillion related to debt accrued in shantytown rehabilitation. (h/t ANZ China team).

@XHNews just released the Communique of the long-awaited third plenum of the 20th central committee of the Communist Party of China.
h.xinhuaxmt.com/vh512/share/12… The Communique is about as long as that of the 18th Party Congress--around 5000 characters. Of course, as is usual, it is loaded with party jargon, and contains few specific reforms. More specific reforms could be in the "Decisions" document that is likely to be released in

I presented at the RCEP Think Tank Alliance meeting at the China Institute for Reform and Development in Hainan. I talked about how global trade tension is affecting RCEP. Though I am pessimistic on the former, the outcome for RCEP may not be all that negative. In particular, the trade tensions have intensified the China -ASEAN cooperation. The story for Japan and Korea is less clear.

Important views on overcapacity:

China believes that:
Firstly, the issue of overcapacity should be viewed within the context of economic globalization, adhering to market economy principles and the laws of value. The so-called "overcapacity" is a manifestation of the market 1/n

https://twitter.com/zichenwanghere/status/1777342316359074014

mechanism at work, and supply and demand balance is relative, with imbalance often being the norm. This can occur in any economy operating under a market economy system, including historical instances in the U.S. and other Western countries. Solutions to these issues primarily 2/

Very pleased to see this @nuseai @AsiaLeiden publication on the consequences of US-China decoupling out: leidenasiacentre.nl/dealing-with-d…
The report focuses on business strategies to deal with US-China decoupling. The uncertainty that the thread of decoupling creates has spill-over effects for companies around the world. Governments can help companies by (i) providing clear policies for their own companies with

The @IMFNews just published its annual review of #China's economy. It projects GDP growth to dip below 4 percent by 2026. imf.org/en/Publication…
The IMF projects total social financing to continue to grow as a share of GDP to top 320 percent by 2028. The government's augmented debt (including most Local government financing vehicles and government guided funds) to top 143 percent by 2028.

Sad to learn the news of Li Keqiang’s death. I first met Li Keqiang when he was governor of Liaonign province. Then several times as part of world bank delegations when he was vice premier and premier.

He always struck me as very committed to China’s development, intellectually curious, with a highly sophisticated understanding of the Chinese economy and how China could learn from international good practice in economic management. 

Together with world bank president Bob Zoellick he presided over the Bank’s first joint report with the DRC, “China 2030”

China now has a net inflow of scientists. In contrast, the US, which greatly benefited from talent inflow in the past, saw an outflow in 2021. Data from @OECD A remarkable turnaround for the EU as well. Their growing science funding programs are an attraction for many!

"For China, it has taken some time to understand the issue of debt sustainability in a multilateral context, because there are many institutions in China that are part of the solution. But China has engaged very constructively with the new global sovereign debt roundtable." caixinglobal.com/2023-04-01/cov…

It is #lianghui day, or in other words, the opening session of #China's National People's Congress (#NPC). Later today I will be live tweeting premier Li Keqiang's government work report and commenting on it along the way. For now though, it is @MeetThePress with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era:

Xi Jinping delivering the eulogy, just like Jiang Zemin did for Deng Xiaoping in 1997 and Hua Guofeng for Mao Zedong in 1976. Jiang's widow Wang Yeping in attendance.

Party time this morning: The Communist Party of China (CPC) kicks off its 20th National Party Congress (二十大) today with 2296 delegates in the great hall of the people in Beijing. On the program this morning: the General Secretary's report to the Congress. I will be watching from Singapore, and will live tweet some of Xi Jinping's speech and comment on it as it happens.

New @WorldBank report: #China's Climate and Development Report. openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/hand… A Thread with a sumary.

China’s transition to the committed carbon neutrality will require decarbonization at a lower income level and
at a faster pace than other major economies. At the same time, China must succeed, as it is now by far the largest greenhouse gas emitter, and its per capita emission levels is considerably higher than the EU, Japan, and other comparators.

The government is aiming for a RMB 1 trillion bailout of the property sector. Aside from the good questions raised in this article, the bigger question is whether this will only worsen the incentives in the property sector. If everybody gets a bailout--developers, buyers, banks

https://twitter.com/ftchina/status/1552503502764662786

--this risks perpetuating the misallocation of capital that has been plaguing China for some years now. Property and infrastructure have accounted for a growing share of total investments in China, which has been a key cause of the decline in productivity during the past decade.

@Noahpinion @adam_tooze Many thanks for @Noahpinion's reply and great additions to this debate. Obviously, how fast China can grow is important--for China, for the world, and for US-China competition--so getting this right is Some of Noah's remarks will need more work, but let me give some 1/n @Noahpinion @adam_tooze reactions here. First, at the risk of sounding like a cop-out, I do not necessarily see my "comprehensive reform scenario" as the most likely, so I am not necessarily an optimist. True, I would want China to pursue a number of these reforms, but am not at all sure it will.

I had a great time presenting at the @FairbankCenter last night on the topic "How Fast Can #China Grow?" Thanks to Winnie Yip for hosting and moderating and to @YashengHuang and @WilliamHOverhol for their great comments. China has set itself ambitious goals for the "New Era." President Xi Jinping's 2035 target implies a growth rate of some 4.8% per year on average. The 2050 goals suggests it wants to be the largest economy in the world by then-a position it had until 1870, when the US took over

@ADB_HQ Projects China's growth to fall short of 5.5 percent target. For 2022 it projects 5 percent growth in GDP and 4.8 percent next year. adb.org/publications/a…

World Bank projects China will fall short of 5.5 percent growth target. Its 2022 baseline projection is now 5 percent, with a downside scenario of 4 percent growth. worldbank.org/en/publication… COVID restrictions are the main chokepoint for China's growth, but the country would have sufficient macro policy space to boost growth.

A tax on real estate has been much debated in China. It can be a good source of income for local governments, which could reduce their high debt levels and cover more spending. Some have also raised the tax as a tool for common prosperity. China does tax property at a level 1/ Comparable to that of OECD countries. But Chinese households do not pay any real estate tax (or "recurrent taxes on immovable property" as the OECD parlance goes). Even if the Chinese authorities manage to introduce a real estate tax for household s(and that is a big if) 2/

IMF Article IV document. Staff projections see growth below 5 percent this year and stabilizing att around 5 until 2026. imf.org/-/media/Files/…

Meaningful reforms in China remain elusive. Neither dialogue nor enforcement through WTO changed China's policies. Phase 1 agreement included a limited set of commitments. It stabilized the market, but there have been shortfalls. Reality is that it did not address the fundamental issues we have with China.