How to Understand the battle between Damascus and the Jabal Druze

Read this thread 🧵

History provides important context for the battle being waged today in the Jabal Druze

This is not the first time that the Druze demand regional autonomy and a federal system. Let's see what happened to them the first time they demanded autonomy in 1946. The leaders of the Druze demanded autonomy in 1946 at #Syrian independence.

President Quwatli refused it and relations between the two quickly turned to war, ending with the bombardment of the Jabal Druze by President Shishakli in 1954. Most issues were the same then as they are today.

(These events are quotes are taken from my article: "Shishakli and the Druze: Integration and Intransigence." joshualandis.oucreate.com/Joshua_Landis_…

The Alawite women taken as sex slaves in #Syria

She resisted. He called another man. One of them held her down and the other raped her. She says, “I fainted. When I woke up, there were seven men in the room. They took turns raping me.”

spectator.co.uk/article/the-al… Samira says that she escaped after being abducted, gang-raped and sold into a forced
marriage. That isn’t her real name, of course.

She’s too scared to allow it to be published. She is 23, with long chestnut hair, and we speak over WhatsApp using a translator. She tells me she was snatched off the street while visiting the city of Homs in February. This is
her account of what happened:
A white panel van daubed with mud for camouflage – ‘a military vehicle’ – pulled up and six men wearing balaclavas jumped out.
Samira ran but they caught her and threw her into the back. She thrashed around as the van moved off, trying to free herself while hands gripped her arms and legs and punches rained down. Then one of the men raised his boot and stamped on her face. ‘I didn’t move
after that.’

Syria's minorities are being killed and abducted with a relentless regularity that many Syrians can only conclude is supported by HTS leaders.

https://twitter.com/mutludc/status/1935894206737760409

Lattakia, #Syria: The young Alawite, Ali Iyad Hamdan, 22 years old, was martyred by bullets from members of government-backed militias near the al-Muzayri’a Bridge in the city of Lattakia this morning, June 21.

Syria’s phantom institutions - 🧵

By @SyriaTransition

"What is emerging in Syria is not a failed state but a hollowed-out one."

"Sharaa's promised state overhaul has delivered the illusion of government"

syriaintransition.com/syriasphantomi… The trappings of governance exist – ministers, ministries, announcements, ceremonies, meetings, photo-ops; but the substance does not.

Authority is centralised in the person of the president and radiates outwards from him through a constellation of loyalists, family members and HTS veterans.

The US stand on Syria and Sanctions - Sam Heller @AbuJamajem explains what he learned in Washington about US policy toward #Syria

Opinions on Syria within the Trump administration are divided
enabbaladi.net/751283/ between figures who support conditional engagement with the new Syrian leadership and others (including Sebastian Gorka, the National Security Council's counterterrorism official) who view the new Syrian leadership as "jihadists" and de facto "al-Qaeda" elements.

Alawite women in #Syria being abducted and used as Sabaya just like the Yazidis.

“They tortured and beat us. We weren’t allowed to speak to each other, but I heard the kidnappers’ accents. One of them had a foreign accent and the other had a local Idlib accent. I knew that because they were insulting us because we were Alawites.”

daraj.media/%d9%85%d9%86-%… Following the testimonies of Syrian women who were kidnapped on the Syrian coast, we found Rabab, who was kidnapped in broad daylight and found herself with Basma (a pseudonym) in the same house, where they were both beaten and insulted for being “Alawites,”

Thread about the situation on #Syria's #Alawite coastal region My brother-in-law traveled from Qadmous to Latakia today - March 12, 2025. This is what he saw.

He was accompanied by Sunni regime officials to make sure that he would not be shot. He counted 8 checkpoints between his village and Banias on the coast - a 20 minute drive - from his village.

There were no Amn al-`Amm (gov security) at any of the checkpoints. He did not see any HTS uniforms or police uniforms. None of the vehicles had markings on them.

(Photo of Qadmous castle)

President Sharaa of #Syria interview with The Economist - Feb 3

"Warlord, jihadi or nation-builder"

"all” Syria’s militias are to join a new Syrian army. All militias, including his own—Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—he says, have been dissolved. “Anyone who keeps a weapon outside the control of the state” would be subject to unspecified “measures”. He ruled out a federal arrangement to deal with Kurdish opposition. But the projection of a strongman was belied by the absence of palace staff. There was no one on hand to serve coffee, and only one person freshly arrived in the country for the first time handling comms. His foreign minister and fellow former jihadist, Asaad al-Shaibani, sat at his side directing proceedings.

On the ground his 30,000-man force is stretched just as thin. As he notes, “a vast area is still out of the control of the Syrian state”. None of the rebel commanders assembled for his stage-managed inauguration were broadcast clapping. “We also sacrificed for a decade,” says a southern rebel commander, who fumes that Mr Sharaa took charge of what had been a collective effort to overthrow the Assads. Rival militias control most of the country’s borders. Many of their chiefs, some of whom were previously officers in the Syrian army, are reluctant to surrender their weapons, fiefs or command. The defence minister has yet to set a deadline for them to do so. The Kurds, who control Syria’s prime oil fields, farmland and the dam that powers much of its electricity in the east, refuse to recognise his rule.  When asked about his negotiations with the Kurds, Mr Sharaa replied: “Not with that much optimism.”

economist.com/middle-east-an… Mr Sharaa is also struggling to curb the excesses of jihadists who hitherto formed his base. To date, a bloodbath has been averted. But the information ministry has restricted access for foreign journalists to the coastal provinces and Homs, where revenge killings against Alawites are spiking. Mr Sharaa dismisses talk of a resurgent Islamic State (IS) as “a big exaggeration”. But he admits that his forces have foiled “many attempted attacks” since he took power. IS cells are believed to be returning to Damascus and other cities, soaking up growing dissent.

The new #Syria school textbooks are moving from a nationlist to Islamist interpretation of Syrian history.

A "martyr" is no long someone who dies defending the "homeland" but someone who dies for "God."

https://twitter.com/Aleppo2024/status/1874487481971953748

In #Syria's islamic education texts:

Where it says in the first-grade text that

"Those with whom God is angry, and who have lost their way" should now be replaced by the words: "Jews and Christians."

This is one of the modifications to the school curriculum in Syria announced by the Ministry of Education in the transitional government

Israel’s Revenge: An Interview with Rashid Khalidi

(I have copied the entire NYRB interview in this thread. It is worth reading.)

The historian Rashid Khalidi has, for many years, been a preeminent Arab-American intellectual and among the most vocal critics of America’s involvement in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. In the aftermath of the armed incursion by Hamas and other militant groups on Israeli territory on October 7 last year, and of the ongoing Israeli military campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon that followed, Khalidi and his work have only increased in relevance. His book The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine (2020), which frames the history of Palestinian dispossession as a settler-colonial project dependent on elite support in the West, has been a fixture on the New York Times best-seller list for much of the past year.

Khalidi was born in New York City, where his Palestinian father was a member of the United Nations Secretariat. While relating the history of Palestine through six major acts of war on its people, his book draws on the archive of his father’s family. It begins, for instance, with an extraordinary correspondence in 1899 between his great-great-great-uncle Yusuf Diya al-Din Pasha al-Khalidi, who had been mayor of Jerusalem, and Theodor Herzl, the progenitor of modern political Zionism.

Khalidi recently retired from Columbia University, where he was Edward Said Professor of Modern Arab Studies in the Department of History. In the past academic year, he was a prominent faculty supporter of the student protests at Columbia. We conducted this conversation, via e-mail and over online video chat, in late October and early November of this year.

—Mark O’Connell

nybooks.com/articles/2024/… via @nybooks Mark O’Connell: I wanted to begin by asking what your initial reaction was, both as a Palestinian American and as a historian of the Middle East, to the attacks on October 7 of last year.

Rashid Khalidi: I was surprised. I shouldn’t have been surprised, because I’ve always expected that the intensity of Israeli repression would eventually produce a response, but I was certainly surprised by the extent of that response. The overrunning of Israeli military bases and border settlements was something I certainly did not expect.

That was my first reaction. My second reaction, when the reports began to come in of the extent of civilian casualties, was shock. And I was deeply concerned: I knew that it would have an enormous impact here in the US and would lead to an absolutely ferocious Israeli military response.

O’Connell: Has anything about the scale and ferocity of that response, or the reaction to that response in the West, shocked you or surprised you in the course of this past year?

Khalidi: No. The savagery of what Israel has done, its intentional targeting of civilians and of civilian infrastructure, is routine. The level of it was unprecedented, obviously; the Palestinian death toll and now the growing Lebanese death toll are beyond what we’ve seen before. But that they would attack desalination plants and sewage plants and universities and demolish mosques and so on didn’t surprise me in the least.

If there was anything that was unexpected, it was the participation of the US government on every level, and its complete unwillingness to restrain Israel in any significant fashion. And by participation, I mean a repetition of Israeli lies. The idea that Israel was not trying to kill people on purpose; the idea that every time Palestinians were killed, it was because they were being used as human shields; completely ignoring the purposeful destruction of infrastructure in order to make life impossible; the fact that the US government repeated every single Israeli justification for the unjustifiable: I found that over the top, frankly. This administration has done less to restrain Israel than pretty much any administration, except perhaps the previous one, the Trump administration.

In other words, you go back to Eisenhower, or Reagan, or anybody, and they were always complicit. They were always involved. They always supported Israel up to a point. But that point would come after months or weeks. And here we are in month thirteen. That point has not come.

O’Connell: And so at what point do we stop talking about America’s “complicity” in this slaughter, and begin to talk of America as an antagonist, of America being at war with Palestine?

Khalidi: That has always been my view. When we were negotiating with the Israelis in Washington, I realized that actually the Americans and the Israelis were really on the same side, opposed to us.* It was in effect a joint delegation. Now you actually have revelations in the American press of joint targeting, and of intelligence operations to find and kill leaders of Hezbollah and of Hamas. If you look carefully, you’ll see that the United States is actually directly at war. It’s an intense, high-level collaboration in planning and targeting. Not to speak of the fact that virtually every shell, every missile, every bomb is American, and that the Israeli army couldn’t go on for more than three months without those hundreds of airlifted shipments. So it is participation at an active level without, for the most part, boots on the ground.

5 takeaways from Israel’s killing of Nasrallah

1. This is a turning point for the region and the axis of resistance. Israel has made a stunning show of its power, intelligence capabilities, and of Western technological and military superiority. If anyone had any doubts about Israeli power after Oct 7, those doubts have been dispelled. Iran turns out to be the paper tiger that many said it was. 2. The root problem of Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians has not been solved, indeed, it will only get worse. There are 7 million Palestinians living in historic Palestine. The 5.5 million living in the occupied territories have no rights, no sovereignty, no hope of self-determination. Netanyahu will come out of his Lebanon gambit a towering hero, who has secured his legacy and life’s work, which is to frustrate the two-state solution, ensure that no Palestinian state emerges in any part of historic Palestine, and that the occupied territories become Israeli territory. It is a great day for the messianic wing of Israel. Israel is likely to lurch to the right, disregard Palestinian hopes, and exacerbate its infractions of international law and norms.

Why would @CAIRNational support sanctioning 17 million more Muslims?

The US #Sanctions are designed to keep #Syria in ruins and to stop reconstruction of the country, and stop foreign investment.

There is no U.S. plan to get rid of Assad or his security state.

This bill… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… To understand what's wrong with this bill you have to put it in the context of our current (failed) policy on #Syria

This two minute explanation by Dana Stroul gives a good summary of the policy



As Sproul says, the Assad-controlled areas of Syria are… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

WSJ claims that “The Arab League’s about-turn, en­gi­neered by Riyadh, co­in-cides with Wash­ing­ton’s wan­ing in­flu­ence in the region. “

Why?

B/c the “U.S. has of­ten pressed for de­moc­ra­tiza­tion.”

But this is wrong. ==> 🧵 wsj.com/articles/syria… US policy makers had decided by 2013 that they did not want to see the Syrian military destroyed b/c they feared that the opposition was dominated by radical Islamists & the country might fall apart.

The US chose Assad over the alternatives.

Blaming Russia is disingenuous

Jordanians want sanctions on Syria lifted

Jordan's exports to Syria increased by 23% during the first 7 months of 2022, but are not close to prewar levels.

Jordanian economists demand that the Caesar Act that disrupted trade be lifted.

ammannet.net/english/jordan… “The international sanctions on #Syria must be lifted, and Jordanian-Syrian economic relations must return to the status quo ante,” wrote Musa Al Saket, a member of the Amman Chamber of Commerce.

US tries to thwart Turkish invasion of northern #Syria again

But with no long-term Syria policy, everyone sees the US commitment to the Kurds as weak and vacillating.

SDF Commander Mazlum Kobane insists that the US must do more: =>🧵

al-monitor.com/originals/2022… via @AlMonitor Russia wants us to seek an agreement #Syria, Kobani told Zaman

“As for the U.S., they need to articulate a policy on Syria. They have no strategy beyond fighting [ISIS] and have failed to formulate a clear policy with regard to the future of the areas under our control.

Shifting energy import patterns enhance China’s clout in the Middle East

China became in 2016 the largest investor in the Arab world with investments worth $29.5 billion, targeted at infrastructure, industrial parks, pipelines, ports, and roads. Total bilateral trade b/n Saudi Arabia & China grew from $42.4 billion in 2010 to $76 billion in 2019, quickly making China the top trading partner for Saudi Arabia.

In 2020, China replaced the European Union as the GCC’s largest trading partner.

agsiw.org/growing-china-…

The logic of Turkey and Syria returning to the Adana Agreement of 1998 or something approaching it is overwhelming.

Both Turks and Americans are learning that ruling hunks of Syria and unruly Syrians, is a thankless task that will sink them into ever growing trouble.

https://twitter.com/Karam__Shaar/status/1557324981163286529

1. Idlib & N Aleppo cannot be made into a viable state. Neither can Kurdish led N.E. Syria.
2. ISIS is strengthened by Syria's partition into 3 waring parts.
3. There is no internat'l legitimacy to the N. Syrian statelets, which means that no oil company will undertake repairs.

I am linking to two videos made by a graduate student in Great Britain, Jalal Imran, as a part of his research on #Syria

Jisr video 1 t.me/WaR2011sl/6 (On Telegram)

This videos covers the violent episode in Jisr al-Shughour area in Syria in early June 2011.

Thread => This early phase of the Syrian conflict was characterized as a period of peaceful and spontaneous protests. The videos contradict this narrative.

The 1st video shows that large-scale violence in Jisr (dozens of Syrian security forces were killed) was the result of

Syrian Kurds seek Damascus's support against Turkish military action

The SDF & the Syrian gov forces are negotiating a joint operations command room, a Kurdish leader said.

"Our military coordination with the regime is developing.”

By @AlkanjSultan

al-monitor.com/originals/2022… Syria's Kurds have no where to turn but to Damascus & Russia to halt Turkey's expansion of a buffer zone.

The U.S, the traditional defender of the Kurds, seems to have accepted the Kurdish-Damascus rapprochement as the best outcome.

The US needs better relations with Turkey.

The connectedness of the Syrian & Lebanese Pounds until 2021

When Syria cut subsidies.

worldbank.org/en/country/syr… The depreciation of the Syrian pound gained momentum with the start of the Lebanese currency crisis in late 2019. Following the onset of Lebanon’s financial crisis, the correlation between the movements and volatilities of the Lebanese Pound and SYP increased.

The best way to stop the Captagon trade of Syria is to engage #Syria gov economically & diplomatically.

That is how the Lebanese Hashish trade of the 1980s was stopped.

That is how the Turkish heroin trade of 1960s was stopped. 80% of heroin used in US came from Turkey.

https://twitter.com/M_Alneser/status/1540659755244523521

Syrian gov is happy to sell drugs to KSA b/c it can sell nothing else.

It is humiliating to deal with Assad, but it is the best way to fight the drug trade

Chaos & poverty also lead to illicit drug trade.

Lifting sanctions & negotiating w Damas is perhaps the best way forward