Thread by @LaurenceBroers

How can the rivalry between #Armenia + #Azerbaijan be both enduring + asymmetric? This thread explores the inconclusive strategic interactions between the two states as a factor sustaining the rivalry between them. #NKpeace 1/14

Realist perspectives emphasise asymmetry as one of this rivalry’s key features. This might contradict the idea of enduring rivalry if parity is taken to be an essential pre-requisite for long-term militarised competition to be sustained. 2/14

Yet we know from the Israeli-Arab + India-Pakistan rivalries that this is not necessarily so. These notorious rivalries are starkly asymmetric + suggest that even in scenarios of deep disparity there can be mitigating power configurations moderating asymmetry. 3/14

In my book I apply the concept of ‘truncated asymmetry’ from the work of T.V. Paul on India/Pakistan, meaning that while #Azerbaijan’s aggregate power capability is greater than #Armenia’s, several factors reduce the disparity. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108… 4/14

It has been a staple of Azerbaijani rhetoric over the 12 years or so to emphasise #Azerbaijan’s preponderance on almost all aggregate indicators of material resources, such as territory, demography, military capability + economic endowment. 5/14

Yet three factors have enabled Armenia to keep up despite being materially weaker. These are, firstly, local parity in the theatre of conflict. Forces facing off across the Line of Contact are broadly proportionate + terrain favours Armenian forces in many locations. 6/14

Secondly, Armenia pursues a deterrent strategic posture focused on maintaining, not changing, the status quo. It does not necessarily seek superiority across all military parameters, but only sufficient capacity to make any Azerbaijani offensive extremely costly. 7/14

Third, Armenia balances with Russia, ‘borrowing’ power both through purchasing capability at a discount + embedding itself within an extended Russian deterrent. These factors have enabled Armenia to truncate the power asymmetry thru Azerbaijan’s oil boom + sustain rivalry. 8/14

Some implications of the truncated asymmetry dynamic: Neither side has a logic for concessions: preponderant #Azerbaijan sees eventual victory in its larger size + capacity. Yet #Armenia’s truncation of the asymmetry makes threats of coercion less credible + mitigates costs. 9/14

There is also a stability-instability paradox, whereby #Armenia has an uneven but functional deterrent against Azerbaijani blitzkrieg, diminishing prospects of a major war. The truncated asymmetry thus explains a common truism, that this conflict has no military solution. 10/14

But while the Armenian deterrent might operate against all-out war, it is less effective against increasing minor skirmishes + limited aims offensives, such as the Azerbaijani offensive in April 2016, and wider escalatory dynamics esp in 2014-17 period. 11/14

Furthermore, if #Azerbaijan faces significant constraints in coercing #Armenia, as long as Armenia must devote substantial resources to the rivalry + shape its geopolitical alliances accordingly, Azerbaijan effectively holds significant veto power over its future. 12/14

Finally, balancing with Russia embeds the Armenian deterrent within Russia’s own deterrent strategy against an Armenian-Azerbaijani war. There are subtle but crucial differences between the two deterrents, Russian + Armenian, which I will address in a separate thread. 13/14

In conclusion, in defiance of realist expectations the truncated asymmetry dynamic signifies strategically inconclusive interactions between #Armenia and #Azerbaijan, contributing to the sustainability and longevity of rivalry. 14/14