Ori Pomson Profile picture
International law enthusiast and sometime practitioner | PhD candidate @cambridgelaw | Usual caveats apply

Sep 23, 2022, 20 tweets

#Finland's๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ and #Estonia's๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช respective declarations of intervention are now available on the #ICJ's website:
icj-cij.org/public/files/cโ€ฆ
icj-cij.org/public/files/cโ€ฆ
Observations๐Ÿชก #Ukraine #Russia 1/19

Both ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช invoke their right of intervention under art 63 and the nature of obligations enshrined in Genocide Convention. ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช also invokes J Canรงado Trindade's opinion in Whaling case underlying importance of intervention for treaties where collective interests are concerned. 2/

๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช also consider capacity to intervene on jurisdictional issues, noting art 63 does not distinguish between different phases. They refer both to Judge Schwebel's opinion in the Nicaragua case and to leading treatises on the subject to justify intervention on such issues. 3/

As for provisions invoked upon which constructions will be offered, ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ invokes "at least" art I, VIII, IX. ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช adds to these art II-IV. Additionally, ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช notes its willingness to assist the Court in "grouping" its intervention if useful for "expedient administration of justice". 4/

๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช divides its intervention between issues relating to jurisdiction and the merits, whereas ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ considers the provisions it invokes chronologically. For practical reasons, ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช's structure will be followed below in overviewing both declarations. 5/

In interpreting art IX, ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช both begin by defining concept of "dispute", both quoting from Mavrommatis, South West Africa, Qatar v UAE and Gambia v Myanmar.
Moving onto other elements of art IX, ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ is more brief than ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช, though somewhat similar in structure. 6/

๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ notes that the ordinary meaning and context of art IX connotes that jurisdiction is not confined to disputes over whether genocide has been committed, but also extends to good faith application, including unilateral use of force for preventing & punishing genocide. 7/

๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ also highlights "any party" formula in art IX, which it argues underlines that both the accusing and accused states may seise the Court. 8/

๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช elaborates on broad scope of art IX, highlighting language of "relating to" and "fulfilment", arguing ordinary meaning extends jurisdiction to good faith application, abuse of law, non-violations and unilateral use of force for preventing & punishing genocide. 8/

๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช similarly invokes the "any party" formula to justify jurisdiction extending to non-violation claims.
Finally, both ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช invoke the Convention's object & purpose as justifying the extension of jurisdiction to alleged abuse of the Convention. 9/

๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช makes similar argument to ๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡ฑ that ICJ may reject jurisdiction if not satisfied that genocide prima facie occurred.
This seems to undermine argument ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ and interveners are making; otherwise conflates PM issues to those of jurisdiction for merits. 10/

On the substantive provisions of the Convention, both ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช underline that obligations to prevent and punish must be applied in good faith. They underline that prevention must be based on assessment with due diligence. 11/

In this regard, they refer to the @UN_HRC resolution on prevention of genocide and i.a. emphasise importance of findings of independent UN human rights investigations. ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช adds that evidence of genocide or risk thereof must be fully conclusive for acting under art I. 12/

๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช refer to legality requirements in applying art I, but in different ways. ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ refers to the ๐Ÿ‡ง๐Ÿ‡ฆv๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡ธ formula that prevention measures under art I are those in accordance with intl law, while further underlining that serious violations are not permitted under art I. 13/

๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช, referring in particular to arts VIII and IX, argues that unilateral acts of prevention must be a last resort. Additionally, for ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช, otherwise unlawful measures cannot be taken if genocide or serious risk thereof has not been assessed properly. 14/

Both states (further) underline preference of the Convention for collective measures by reference to art VIII, with ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช elaborating that unilateral extraterritorial measures of prevention cannot be taken under Convention without prior seising (and inaction) of competent organs.15/

๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช also consider meaning of "punishment" under Convention, both emphasising criminal law nature of such measures and that recourse to military force and "'punish[ing]' a State or a people" are not the form of "punishment envisioned. 16/

๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช seems to make argument setting the stage for finding that Russia is violating Convention in discussing art IX. It argues that Convention's "object to protect the most elementary principles of morality... prohibits any possibility... to abuse its provisions for other means".17/

To conclude, Finland's and Estonia's declarations make very similar arguments, even if Estonia's is somewhat more elaborative. At times the states even use the exact same phrases. 18/

What perhaps puts ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช in a more exclusive group (with ๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡ป๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡น๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡ฉ๐Ÿ‡ฐ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ช?) is that it (precariously) makes way for the argument that Russia is in fact violating the Convention. 19/19

Share this Scrolly Tale with your friends.

A Scrolly Tale is a new way to read Twitter threads with a more visually immersive experience.
Discover more beautiful Scrolly Tales like this.

Keep scrolling