Probably most controversial finding in today's orders is the (thinly reasoned) finding that the interruption of movement along the Lachin Corridor plausibly constitutes violation of #Cerd.
J Yusuf's criticism of shoehorning disputes into Cerd compromissory clause worth a read. 2/
Both 🇫🇮🇪🇪 invoke their right of intervention under art 63 and the nature of obligations enshrined in Genocide Convention. 🇪🇪 also invokes J Cançado Trindade's opinion in Whaling case underlying importance of intervention for treaties where collective interests are concerned. 2/
Ireland, like almost all the other other interveners, invokes both its right to intervene pursuant to art 63 of the ICJ Statute as well as the nature of the obligations found in the Genocide Convention to justify its intervention. 2/
To begin all three states invoke their "right" to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while Denmark and Italy also invoke the nature of obligations in the Genocide Convention. All three also try to add their respective personal touches. 2/
Starting off, France invokes its right to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while also underlining the legal nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (no personal touch but does later quote the Court observing the prohibition on genocide is peremptory(!)). 2/
To begin, Romania's declaration is very much to-the-point. While it does underline the importance of the Genocide Convention, it doesn't expand so much beyond the Statute's requirements for justifying its intervention. 2/
As is becoming routine for these interventions, Sweden invokes both its "right" to intervene under art 63 of the Statute and the nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (though first to cite Judge Cançado Trindade's sep op in the Whaling case order). 2/
In its opening remarks, the #US follows the trend of other states by invoking its right of intervention under art 63, but also underlining the erga omnes partes nature of the Genocide Convention obligations. 2/
Perhaps the most conspicuous part of Germany's declaration is that it seeks solely to give its construction on article IX of the Genocide Convention (the compromissory clause), unlike 🇱🇻🇱🇹🇳🇿🇬🇧 which offered interpretations for several provisions and relating to the merits. 2/
Aug 8, 2022 • 21 tweets • 11 min read
Text of the #UK's declaration of intervention in #Ukraine v #Russia, pursuant to article 63 of the #ICJ Statute, now available on the Court's website: icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
Some observations.🪡 1/20 (it's the longest declaration yet...)
As preliminary matter, UK is first intervener to refer to ICJ's recent The Gambia v Myanmar judgment, such as in underlining its erga omnes partes legal interest (though tbf, 🇱🇻 submitted its declaration the day before judgment and 🇱🇹 on the day). 2/
Jul 25, 2022 • 15 tweets • 8 min read
A few observations on #Latvia's and #Lithuania's respective declarations of intervention in the #ICJ's #Ukraine v #Russia case, under article 63 of the ICJ Statute and on the basis of them being parties to the Genocide Convention. 1/15🪡
While art 63 of the Statute enshrines the right to intervene, art 82 of the ICJ's Rules stipulates the form and content of a declaration to intervene. Art 83 thus compelled the two states to address important issues of procedure and substance which arise in the case. 2/
Feb 27, 2022 • 9 tweets • 5 min read
Interesting analysis from Marko Milanovic, but I’m afraid I’m less optimistic than he is regarding #Ukraine’s prospects against #Russia for receiving some kind of (legal) relief at the #ICJ in the form of provisional measures. 1/9
There are essentially three tests which must be met to receive provisional measures: prima facie jurisdiction; plausibility of rights and link between them and measures requested; and risk of irreparable prejudice and urgency (most recently: icj-cij.org/public/files/c…). 2/
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