Never mind the more excitable stories, the following WILL happen in a no-deal Brexit
1/
UK products will face tariffs if sold into the EU - for example cars at 10% and shoes at 8%. Some UK producers will become uncompetitive when facing these tariffs, especially compared to EU producers, and will therefore cease production
2/
UK products which require testing to be placed on the EU market will need a test carried out within the EU, a UK test will not be sufficient. This will add costs to production.
3/
There will be no customs cooperation between the UK and EU, thus for example no mutual recognition of the Authorised Economic Operator scheme. Products are therefore likely to take more time to go through customs checks
4/
UK agricultural exporters will face potentially even higher tariffs, such as 42% on cheddar cheese. Our access to the lower tariff rate quotas is uncertain, without which many agricultural exports will be incompetitive
5/
There will also be extensive checks on EU agricultural exports to the EU, which will further add costs, and there will not be veterinary equivalence schemes in place to facilitate these
6/
UK service providers will not have the right to sell certain services across the EU, particularly direct from the UK. In many cases they will have to set up new offices in the EU
7/
Many UK based staff will not have the right to work across the EU, for example as tour reps for UK travel companies. EU citizens would have to take these roles
8/
UK haulage companies would not be able to carry loads between EU destinations, and could for the short term only carry from UK to an EU destination and return. This will make them uncompetitive to EU hauliers
9/
The tariffs on goods, and restrictions on services, will also apply to countries with who the EU has a current trade agreement that the UK fails to replicate - for example there is likely to be no agreement with Turkey
10/
In no-deal Brexit there will be no agreement with the EU on data adequacy or financial services equivalence. This will mean extra cost for all UK companies who move data between UK and EU for example
11/
The UK Government will have to decide on whether to keep or reduce our own tariffs. This will not be an easy decision - lower tariffs may help consumers but harm UK producers and developing countries who currently get particular privileges
12/
Over 50% of UK trade will be affected by these changes. Less than 10% of EU trade will be affected by these changes. UK costs will rise, EU costs are unlikely to do so. This will be a major change to the terms of trade between us
13/
These issues are why even no-deal advocates talk of 'managed no-deal', or a deal with the EU. But if all of this is going to affect the UK more than the EU there is no reason for the EU to offer a more generous deal than that on offer now
14/
All of these are the sort of issues which are typically resolved in a free trade agreement. But these take time, typically in the EU 5-7 years. Waiting this time would mean all of these issues being maintained, affecting UK competitiveness
15/
Some no-deal advocates claim the UK could gain competitiveness by scrapping EU regulations, however it would be difficult then to negotiate a trade deal with the EU at the same time.
16/
The UK is expecting to start Free Trade Agreement negotiations with US and others in a no-deal situation. However if the UK economy is changing it will not be clear which sectors the UK should prioritise.
17/
Well known incompatibilities between US and EU will also cause problems, if we accept US agriculture this will make a good trade deal with the EU harder. It will take time for the UK to make these decisions
18/
As from the date of a no-deal Brexit UK companies will have no easy redress for business issues in the EU or countries with whom there is no trade agreement e.g. delayed containers, staff refused permission to work.
19/
The UK Government will have to take business issues up diplomatically with the EU, a process that typically takes a number of years to resolve individual issues. EU Single Market tools like Solvit will not be available
20/
It is all of these reasons - not even the more excitable shortage stories - why the EU believes the threat of no-deal to be non-credible. They believe that no UK Government could survive the economic harm likely from the above
21/
There is no plan from no-deal supporters to address the issues outlined above. The Government's plan is to hope the absolute worst doesn't happen, but they also have no realistic future plan
22/
No-deal puts up a high economic barrier between the UK and our largest and nearest trading partner. This cannot be a sustainable long term position, and never has been in 2000 years.
23/
As workers and consumers no deal has the potential to cause problems for millions in the UK, particularly if it happens in less than two months. This is now the key message that needs to be spread
24/ end
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I realise this government is uniquely brilliant / evil, but this looks remarkably similar to UK government policy since the days of TTIP, since these won't be trade deals as in the rather dated tariff reduction, but more likely cooperation of various sorts.
Deals with US states are in no sense multi-billion, but I'm sure for example that animal welfare groups would be only too happy for the UK to adopt California's rules... to note though, US states are happy to talk, but rather less to do anything that meaningful internationally
Anyway, its good the UK government attempts to build up cooperation across the globe, all part of the steady trade diplomacy every developed country does. In fact it should probably be higher priority, as part of an overall trade strategy. Not just US states. And no overselling.
Between real scandals and fantasy boosterism we don't have much space for normal politics, as in finding solutions to societal problems. Such as, just on today's news, housing, birth rates, inflation.
That's the real cost of electing a PM because he's fun or some such.
Social care remains the classic example. Claimed by the PM to be 'solved' on the basis of a hurried vote in Parliament on a boost to National Insurance, without any suggestion the supporting detail was actually in place. Debate reduced, issue still as large as it was.
The Johnson style in PMQs, to read out lists of achievements real or imaginary, diminishes politics weekly. You would hope that at some point Labour takes this on, but I'm unconvinced they will, in fear of 'talking Britain down'.
Really good @adampayne26 piece on UK supply chains and supermarkets in particular. What I take from this is retailers choosing to reduce choice (and contribute to price rises) to try to avoid the worst disruptions arising from Brexit trade barrier. politicshome.com/thehouse/artic…
@adampayne26 UK supermarkets and supply chain professionals have an excellent reputation for efficiency, and that seems to have led to logical decisions, if short of drivers due to labour shortages, or goods harder to import, do less of it. Also proving classic trade theory right.
For the UK as a whole the impact of high trade barriers to nearby markets was always likely to be a loss of competitiveness, with knock-on consequences potentially to exports globally. Brexit is protectionist in effect if not in the minds of plenty of proponents.
New paper alert! On the vexed subject of the Northern Ireland Protocol.
Quite simply it does not look like the right vehicle to resolve political disagreement between the UK and EU. We need a new approach, that builds on and takes inspiration from 1998.
This is not going to be a comfortable message for either UK or EU, but what we have right now is in effect a zero-sum game, where either UK or EU single markets get to be protected. Northern Ireland becomes the venue as contested territory, too much for a fragile polity. 2/
The Northern Ireland Protocol is a trade agreement. But without a shared political vision, the argument over medicines or SPS checks becomes political. It also becomes about identity, given the 1998 agreement allowed an ambiguity over being British or Irish. 3/
For some around the UK government, the initial point of joining the CPTPP was to use it to weaken UK food rules (particularly attractive to those being paid by US farm lobbies) as a US trade deal might be too controversial. politico.eu/article/canada…
Of course the UK government has long denied that it plans to weaken food laws. But it has also resisted a veterinary equivalence agreement with the EU which would make such weakening much more difficult. From which we can draw an obvious conclusion - this promise may be dropped.
Which is also interesting timing for another clash between House of Parliament committees and the government on the level scrutiny treaties receive. "far short of the European Parliament’s powers" as this article from @AlexanderHorne1 says prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/treat…
With @AnnaGuildea@ecipe I have a new short paper on specialisation and comparative advantage as part of our New Globalization project. We show that developed countries still produce a wide range of goods and services - but specialise in complexity.
@AnnaGuildea@ECIPE What we are really exploring is the idea that the EU, US, UK are increasingly vulnerable due to the rise of other countries, in particular China. The evidence for this remains slim - we may not make everything, but we hold the knowledge, and can trade. ecipe.org/publications/c…
It is part of our continuing work to show global trade has actually delivered, rather than being a failure to be corrected. As we have shown with other papers such as this on the response to the pandemic. Not perfect, but better than suggested alternatives ecipe.org/publications/g…