How off-mark were the analysts about Yes Bank stock.
Today, share price of Yes Bank crashed to Rs. 71.25 on concerns surrounding financial misreportings by Crompton Greaves Power (CGP). Yes Bank has 13% stake in CGP. The stock was trading at Rs. 400 abt an year back. Thread 1/11
For many-many years, people cast aspersions on lending practices of Yes Bank and doubted the low NPA numbers it reported quarter after quarter.
All those fears came true post cutting short of Yes Bank's MD, Mr. Rana Kapoor's term by RBI in Sept. 2018. 2/11
Bewildering though, in this entire saga, is the cluelessness of the equity analysts (the supposedly well-informed lot). The level of ignorance was such that even after RBI action, many analysts kept giving 'buy' calls. Below is a list of such misplaced, ignorant calls. 3/11
Sep 2018: TP 425: Macquaire
Despite the uncertainty about RBI accepting the request for an extension to Mr. Rana Kapoor's term, Macquarie guided for a higher target price. Later (in Mar 2019), Macquarie realised it's mistake and gave Yes Bank a double downgrade. 4/11
Sep 2018: TP 378 : HSBC
HSBC Research sounded cautious about the RBI move yet it maintained a 'Buy' rating hoping that 'a decisive step taken by the board to ensure a relatively orderly succession could alleviate currently heightened concerns.' 5/11
Despite being unsure about what view RBI would take on the Yes Bank board’s request of extension of Mr. Kapoor's tenure, JPMorgan stuck to their bullish stance on Yes Bank with an upside of more than 80 per cent. 6/11
Motilal Oswal agreed that 'the near term uncertainty will remain till the new management takes charge' yet it believed that 'post sharp correction the stock is trading at reasonable valuations.' 7/11
Investec Securities believed that 'the market is going to ignore facts and numbers and focus more on news flow and sentiments in the near-term.' They added that 'risk-reward is extremely favourable'. 8/11
DB made back to back mistakes. First in Sep, 2018 it maintained a 'buy' call saying 'that management is confident on asset quality'. Later in Mar 2019, the bank retained a 'buy' call on Yes Bank with TP of 300. 9/11
EF maintained that 'at current levels the stock is available at 1.6-1.7 times multiple and because of franchise strength, the overall return profile over the long-term would still be sustainable.' 10/11
However, to balance out the observations made in this post, let me also state that there were some brokerage house who raised a red flag when RBI took action against Mr. Kapoor. Citi and IDFC Securities had cut the target price on Yes Bank. 11/11
Most equity analysts I have interacted with till date had little understanding of debt beyond leverage ratios. As a result, they are not able to fully comprehend the risks associated with debt. Here are a few lessons for equity analysts. 1/11
1. Unviable promoter level debt would adversely impact the operating company eventually. A promoter who is financially cornered will always look for ways to squeeze money out from the operating company. Some of these desprate measures could well be unscrupulous. 2/11
2. A debt-stressed company drains out healthier companies of the group. It is rare that a promoter lets go of a company easily. He tries hard to support the weaker entity through the resources of stronger entities (via ICDs, guarantees etc.) thereby jeopardising the later. 3/11
12 things to remember while buying Life Insurance:
1. Take term plan and not an endowment plan. The insurance cover is higher for a term plan for the same premium. However, you do not get maturity benefits in term plan. Remember, you are buying Insurance and not a FD. 1/9
2. Take your plan from an insurance company that is expected to survive 20-30 years. Insurance is used over long periods and therefore it is necessary to choose a company that has a size/ networth for a long life (what an irony!). Don't look beyond LIC, SBI, ICICI and HDFC. 2/9
3. Take adequate cover - If you think Rs. 2 Cr is a good enough cover for you; wait; increase your cover to Rs. 5 Cr. Inflation levels are high in India and money loses its value very fast. Remember how valuable Rs. 1 lakh were 20 years back. 3/9
Microfinance Institutions on the brink...yet again!!
The microfinance industry in India could never really recover from the Andhra crisis of 2009-10. Just when things start to normalise, a new crisis rocks the boat. There has been no respite. Thread 1/11
From inept legislation to demonetisation, from political interference to religious diktats and from frauds to natural calamities, Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) have been battered by every risk possible. The latest in this series of pitfalls is the Corona lock-down. 2/11
Following is why I feel it's the biggest threat ever:
1) Collections have come to a grinding halt - The loan collections have largely been in cash. The lock-down has severely impaired collection efforts as the mobility of collection agents and borrowers is restricted. 3/11
Recently, Standard & Poor (S&P) warned that India's SR will be downgraded if the country's economic growth does not recover. Bond yields spiked soon after the S&P red flag. Here's why India should take the warning seriously. Thread 1/11
SRs of 3 agencies - S&P, Moody's and Fitch are considered important. Currently, India is rated BBB- (Stable) by S&P, Baa2 (Negative) by Moody's and BBB- (Stable) by Fitch. Simply put, India is barely investment grade as per S&P and Fitch and a notch better as per Moody's. 2/11
Following are the reasons why SRs are important and why India should heed S&P's warning.
1. There is a clear correlation between bond yields/ spreads and SRs i.e. a poor SR could increase the cost of borrowings of Government as well as corporates. 3/11
A letter from Sterling Wilson Solar Ltd. (SWSL) dated Nov 14, informing the exchanges about the extension of debt repayment deadline granted to promoters (Shapoorji Pallonji Company Pvt. Ltd. - SPCPL & K. Daruvala) has created widespread panic. 1/14
As at Aug 19, other companies of the promoters owed Rs. 2,563 crore to SWSL. SWSL, in Aug 19, was IPO bound and the promoters, in the red herring prospectus, promised to pay off the entire debt owed to SWSL, within 90 days, from the IPO proceeds. 2/14
The SWSL IPO was entirely an offer for sale i.e. the IPO was meant only to dilute the promoters' shareholding and no IPO proceeds went to SWSL. The IPO was under subscribed (92%) yet the promoters managed to raise ~Rs. 2,850 crore. 3/14
Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code (IBC): The story so far
IBC was enacted in Dec 2016, with the objective of ensuring speedy resolutions of NPAs. It was hailed as one of the most landmark reforms in India. This post is an attempt to understand if this code lived up to its promise.1/9
Till June, 2019, 2162 cases have been admitted. Of these, 174 have been closed on appeal or review or settled; 101 have been withdrawn; 475 have ended in liquidation and 120 received an approval of resolution plans. 1292 cases are pending. 2/9
The 120 closed cases have yielded resolution worth ~Rs. 1,08,070 crore as against total admitted claims of ~Rs. 2,52,577 crore i.e. the recovery rate was 43%. The liquidation value of these assets was merely 23% of the claims. So, IBC yielded a better than expected recovery. 3/9