Salvini dice che la manovra sarà da 50 mld e sarebbe ampiamente sotto il 3% del PIL. Ma non è tutto oro quel che luccica (segue aritmetica) agi.it/politica/crisi…
1) I 50mld diventano 15-18 una volta sterilizzata IVA. Flat tax per tutti molto lontana,
2) questo se tagliamo RdC e 80€, quindi grosso impatto redistributivo da poveri a ricchi
3) se tagliamo solo RdC, i mld liberi sono solo 7-9
Se invece non prendiamo Salvini in parola ma assumiamo che i 50 mld siano tutti per la flat tax (che, ricordiamo, costa 50-70mld) allora anche togliendo RdC e 80 euro:
I received an unexpected massive response to this (nerd energy tweet going viral, who would have thought!). So I wrote up the methodology, I updated with data as of end-August, added more scenarios and published. One Q deserves in-depth discussion ⬇️ algebris.com/market-views/e…
Some have pointed out that Italy has signed contracts for extra flows (compared to 2022) from North Africa in 2023/24. In my baseline scenarios (see here with data updated through end-August) I am not considering those future flows for two reasons (continues below).
First, details about quantity and timing of deliveries from these new contracts is scarce in the material published so far (I added links to press releases in the piece). Take Algeria: Sonatrach stated they would provide an extra 4 BCM in 2022 with delivery to start in August...
#EnergyCrisis: energy savings in 🇩🇪 versus 🇮🇹. In Germany, gas consumption has decreased by 15% on average during the first 6 months of the year compared to 2021. If it keeps saving energy at this rate, Germany will have enough gas to withstand a scenario with 0 Russian flows. 1/
In Italy, gas consumption has declined by just 2% on average over the first 6 months of 2022 wrt 2021. At this rate, Italy will run out of gas by the spring even if Russia keeps sending 10% of the flows. Italy needs to more than double its energy savings to weather the storm. 2/
Why this difference? One obvious counter-argument is that the share of gas used for electricity production in total consumption is higher in Italy (~35%) than in Germany (~15%) and this is an area where substitution may be difficult. 3/
It took me some time to make all puzzle pieces click in my head, but here is why I think the rouble gas payment scheme matters. For Russia, it is functional to undermine sanctions and to pursue long-term strategic geo-economic goals. #UkraineRussiaWar 🧵1/ algebris.com/market-views/r…
First, it cuts the middleman. Gas contracts typically structure payment as a direct transfer from the buyer to the seller’s designated account at a European bank, with the payment obligation deemed fulfilled when this transfer comes through. 2/
A lot of press has focused on the rouble element, but that’s marginal. The substantial change is that the new scheme prescribes gas to be paid for in hard currency in an account at government-owned Gazprombank in Russia, rather than at a Gazprom account in any Western bank. 3/
Commodity markets are reacting to uncertainty in agricultural supply by sending futures through the roof. Will the #UkraineRussiaWar be a challenge to #FoodSecurity in the short to medium term? The short answer is YES. The long answer is a read through this thread ⬇️🧵 1/
#UkraineRussiaWar is disrupting physical, logistical & market dynamics in the Black Sea - a key hub for wheat, feed grains & sunflower seed to world markets. 🇺🇦 ports are all closed or blockaded by 🇷🇺 Navy. 🇺🇦 suspended port operations for commercial activities since 24/02. 2/
Most immediately, this will impact export of 🇺🇦 #corn, which has been harvested but not all shipped. Exports are predicted to drop by 18% due to trade disruptions and part of the stored grain being lost or damaged from shelling. 🇺🇦 exports 14% of all corn, so prices will raise 3/
Europe Unplugged: can we give up Russian gas? In our latest ESG investor letter, we find that 🇪🇺 could make up for ~62% of energy needs tied to 🇷🇺 gas, at high economic and political cost. The remaining gas deficit would exhaust reserves in 5-10 months. 1/ algebris.com/insights/green…
🇪🇺 gas production declined by 20% over the past 20 years. Today 🇷🇺 supplies ~38% of European gas imports. With gas accounting for 45% of all energy imports and 🇷🇺 providing 95% of imported gas, 🇭🇺 is by far the most exposed. 🇩🇪 and 🇮🇹 would also bear much pain from cut-off. 2/
Substituting 🇷🇺 gas with LNG is difficult, for logistic and price reasons. The historical avg of European gas prices has been around 20 EUR per MWh. Paying for an additional 1300 TWh of LNG imports would translate into an annual cost of approximately 26bn euro for the EU. 3/
In light of interest in yesterday's tweet on central bank sanctions, let me add a few more details. 🧵
Russia has ~USD 630bn in reserves. After invading Crimea in 2014, CBRU has moved reserves out of Europe/USA and into gold and China. Clearly, they were thinking ahead. 1/
A similar picture if we look at currency composition of reserves: out of EUR/USD (down from a combined 87% in 03/2014 to 49% in 06/2021, which is the latest figure available) and into gold and Yuan (up from 9% in 2014 to 25% in 2021). 2/
What are reserves needed for? First, trade: ~80% of 🇷🇺 trade is settled in EUR or USD. 🇷🇺 imports are worth ~USD 307bn, 58% of which is from EU/US. Total reserves are worth ~2 years of total imports, and EUR/USD reserves are worth ~1.7 years of EU/US imports (current quantity) 3/