THREAD: the White Helmets were subjected to the most sustained state-backed smear campaign I’ve ever seen. By all appearances, it’s because they were witnesses to probable war crimes.
The White Helmets were set up to rescue people in conflict zones. That’s what they did for years. As such, they became witnesses to atrocities, like the Khan Sheikhoun sarin attack in April 2017.
They were accused of being “propaganda”, of working for al-Qaida, the CIA and NATO. The @Graphika_NYC archive of attributed info operations, io-archive.org, shows the spike in attacks on them in April 2017.
The attacks started in the pro-Assad blogger sphere. Russian state outlets started picking them up in 2015, just before the Russian bombing campaign began.
The attacks really picked up in the second half of 2016, during the siege of Aleppo, when the White Helmets provided evidence of chlorine attacks, hospital bombings and the use of incendiary cluster munitions in civilian populated areas.
The attacks on the White Helmets were unrelenting, from pro-Assad bloggers, conspiracy sites, Kremlin outlets, and diplomats. Here’s a really telling quote from the Russian foreign ministry.
Calling the White Helmets a “propaganda machine” and alleging “fake stories to prove war crimes” shows what the concern was: not the fact of their rescues, but the evidence of war crimes – such as chemical-weapons attacks on civilians and repeated airstrikes on hospitals.
Time and again, the White Helmets were accused of staging as "false flags" the chemical attacks they exposed. Here's a story apparently posted by Russian military intelligence in September this year.
And why was the state-backed campaign so vicious?@ChrisDYork puts it well here:
"The footage captured by White Helmets posed a problem for pro-regime forces as it is video evidence of potential war crimes perpetrated by Syrian and Russian forces."
James Le Mesurier, who founded the White Helmets, believed that nobody should be without emergency services. “If you get buried, you know someone is looking out for you,” he said.
The smear campaign tried to bury the White Helmets themselves.
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* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
It’s not the first time for an Iranian op to pose as supporters of Scottish independence.
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013. @Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27) graphika.com/reports/irans-…
* Expanding Crowdtangle IO archive to more researchers
* First public takedowns of brigading & mass reporting networks
* CIB takedown from Palestine (Hamas)
* Two CIB ops focused on Poland / Belarus migrant crisis (one from Belarus KGB)
* Op Swiss Rôle
First, deep dive: in July, a fake “Swiss biologist” persona on FB and Twitter accused the US of bullying the WHO over COVID origins, and was picked up by Chinese state media with amazing speed.
I appreciate this discussion bc it helps shine a light on the complexity of these problems. Two things to note as we all work to tackle inauthentic behavior & deception. 🧵
1. There’s a big behavioral difference between spammy amplification and complex IO;
2. Platforms traditionally approach each differently for a reason — each represents different behaviours and has different incentive structure.
Boosting shares and likes is a numbers game to make content look more popular than it is. It can be used on political content or fake sunglasses (or both).
🚨 JUST OUT: We took down a troll farm in Nicaragua, run by the Nicaraguan government and the FSLN party.
Our team’s research here: about.fb.com/news/2021/11/o…
Important terminology point: over the years, I’ve seen some confusion over what constitutes a “troll farm”, as opposed to clickbait/content farms.
Here’s how we understand it.
Two things to note on this operation:
1) This was the closest thing to a “whole-of-government” operation we’ve seen.
2) The troll farm lived across the internet: own media websites built on wordpress, blogspot, amplified on FB, IG, TikTok, Twitter, Telegram, YouTube, etc.
JUST OUT: In-depth report on the #Fazze case — a campaign from Russia targeting primarily India and LATAM, and to a lesser extent the US.
It was focused on the Pfizer and AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccines, but got close to zero traction across the internet. about.fb.com/news/2021/08/j…
Full details in the report, but a couple of thoughts here.
All but one of the networks focused on domestic targets. That’s not unusual: influence operations so often start at home — remember our recent IO Threat Report?
Historically, even some operations that became (in)famous for foreign interference started domestically.
E.g. the early Russian IRA posted critical commentary about Navalny back in 2013, often on LiveJournal (h/t @soshnikoff)