Ben Nimmo Profile picture
Nov 16, 2019 12 tweets 5 min read
THREAD: the White Helmets were subjected to the most sustained state-backed smear campaign I’ve ever seen. By all appearances, it’s because they were witnesses to probable war crimes.

independent.co.uk/news/world/eur…

H/t @Independent
The White Helmets were set up to rescue people in conflict zones. That’s what they did for years. As such, they became witnesses to atrocities, like the Khan Sheikhoun sarin attack in April 2017.

opcw.org/sites/default/…
They were accused of being “propaganda”, of working for al-Qaida, the CIA and NATO. The @Graphika_NYC archive of attributed info operations, io-archive.org, shows the spike in attacks on them in April 2017.
The attacks started in the pro-Assad blogger sphere. Russian state outlets started picking them up in 2015, just before the Russian bombing campaign began.

The attacks really picked up in the second half of 2016, during the siege of Aleppo, when the White Helmets provided evidence of chlorine attacks, hospital bombings and the use of incendiary cluster munitions in civilian populated areas.

publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingaleppo/
Lest we forget, even RT showed Russian planes carrying incendiaries in Syria in June 2016, despite Kremlin denials.

independent.co.uk/news/world/mid…

H/t @lizziedearden
The attacks on the White Helmets were unrelenting, from pro-Assad bloggers, conspiracy sites, Kremlin outlets, and diplomats. Here’s a really telling quote from the Russian foreign ministry.
Calling the White Helmets a “propaganda machine” and alleging “fake stories to prove war crimes” shows what the concern was: not the fact of their rescues, but the evidence of war crimes – such as chemical-weapons attacks on civilians and repeated airstrikes on hospitals.
Time and again, the White Helmets were accused of staging as "false flags" the chemical attacks they exposed. Here's a story apparently posted by Russian military intelligence in September this year.
And why was the state-backed campaign so vicious?@ChrisDYork puts it well here:

"The footage captured by White Helmets posed a problem for pro-regime forces as it is video evidence of potential war crimes perpetrated by Syrian and Russian forces."

huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/white-he…
Or in the words of @janindigi for @nytopinion,

“The White Helmets caught the Russians red handed and recorded their crimes on video.”

nytimes.com/2019/11/14/opi…
James Le Mesurier, who founded the White Helmets, believed that nobody should be without emergency services. “If you get buried, you know someone is looking out for you,” he said.

The smear campaign tried to bury the White Helmets themselves.

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More from @benimmo

Jan 20
JUST OUT: Report on coordinated inauthentic behaviour takedowns in December, and a look back over the past year & more.

Interesting: 2/3 of all ops we removed since 2017 were wholly or partially focused on domestic audiences.

about.fb.com/news/2022/01/d… Image
We took down three operations last month:

* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
It’s not the first time for an Iranian op to pose as supporters of Scottish independence.
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013.
@Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27)
graphika.com/reports/irans-…
Read 11 tweets
Dec 1, 2021
JUST OUT: Adversarial threat report on brigading, mass reporting and coordinated inauthentic behaviour.

With a deep dive into the Chinese operation that created a fake “Swiss biologist” back in July.

I think of that one as Operation Swiss Rôle.

about.fb.com/news/2021/12/m…
There’s a lot here:

* Expanding Crowdtangle IO archive to more researchers
* First public takedowns of brigading & mass reporting networks
* CIB takedown from Palestine (Hamas)
* Two CIB ops focused on Poland / Belarus migrant crisis (one from Belarus KGB)
* Op Swiss Rôle
First, deep dive: in July, a fake “Swiss biologist” persona on FB and Twitter accused the US of bullying the WHO over COVID origins, and was picked up by Chinese state media with amazing speed.

H/t @mradamtaylor and @BBCTrending for their reports.

washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/…
Read 11 tweets
Nov 20, 2021
I appreciate this discussion bc it helps shine a light on the complexity of these problems. Two things to note as we all work to tackle inauthentic behavior & deception. 🧵

1. There’s a big behavioral difference between spammy amplification and complex IO;

2. Platforms traditionally approach each differently for a reason — each represents different behaviours and has different incentive structure.
Boosting shares and likes is a numbers game to make content look more popular than it is. It can be used on political content or fake sunglasses (or both).

Either way, it’s on the simpler end of the spectrum.
@markhansontoo discussed it last year about.fb.com/wp-content/upl…
Read 9 tweets
Nov 1, 2021
🚨 JUST OUT: We took down a troll farm in Nicaragua, run by the Nicaraguan government and the FSLN party.
Our team’s research here:
about.fb.com/news/2021/11/o…
Important terminology point: over the years, I’ve seen some confusion over what constitutes a “troll farm”, as opposed to clickbait/content farms.

Here’s how we understand it.
Two things to note on this operation:

1) This was the closest thing to a “whole-of-government” operation we’ve seen.

2) The troll farm lived across the internet: own media websites built on wordpress, blogspot, amplified on FB, IG, TikTok, Twitter, Telegram, YouTube, etc.
Read 8 tweets
Aug 10, 2021
JUST OUT: In-depth report on the #Fazze case — a campaign from Russia targeting primarily India and LATAM, and to a lesser extent the US.
It was focused on the Pfizer and AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccines, but got close to zero traction across the internet.
about.fb.com/news/2021/08/j…
There’s already been reporting on the Pfizer phase, in May (h/t @daniellaufer, @toniodaoust, @FloraCarmichael, @charliehtweets, @arawnsley).

Our investigation uncovered that in December, the same op targeted AstraZeneca.
We attributed this operation to Fazze, a marketing firm primarily operating from Russia.
Read 11 tweets
Jul 8, 2021
JUST OUT: Our monthly report on Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour takedowns - June 2021 edition.

Eight networks, seven countries.

about.fb.com/news/2021/07/j…
Full details in the report, but a couple of thoughts here.

All but one of the networks focused on domestic targets. That’s not unusual: influence operations so often start at home — remember our recent IO Threat Report?
Historically, even some operations that became (in)famous for foreign interference started domestically.

E.g. the early Russian IRA posted critical commentary about Navalny back in 2013, often on LiveJournal (h/t @soshnikoff)

mr-7.ru/articles/90769/
Read 11 tweets

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