🚨 JUST OUT: We took down a troll farm in Nicaragua, run by the Nicaraguan government and the FSLN party.
Our team’s research here: about.fb.com/news/2021/11/o…
Important terminology point: over the years, I’ve seen some confusion over what constitutes a “troll farm”, as opposed to clickbait/content farms.
Here’s how we understand it.
Two things to note on this operation:
1) This was the closest thing to a “whole-of-government” operation we’ve seen.
2) The troll farm lived across the internet: own media websites built on wordpress, blogspot, amplified on FB, IG, TikTok, Twitter, Telegram, YouTube, etc.
This troll farm was mainly run from the Post Office headquarters in Managua by employees of TELCOR, the Institute of Telecommunications and Postal Services. Smaller clusters ran from other government institutions as well.
The operators did this as their day job. They posted Monday to Friday, 9 to 5, with an hour for lunch and a skeleton crew at the weekend.
Flooding the online conversation in Nicaragua with pro-government and anti-opposition messaging appeared to be the goal.
The operation on our platform kicked off in April 2018, after anti-government protests broke out.
The operation first tried to discredit the protesters and mass report them in an unsuccessful attempt to have them taken down.
Later, they pivoted to more pro-government content, including from their bigger media brands. But they also accused independent outlets of being “the chorus of fake news”.
Trolls love turning reality inside out.
In fact, this operation fits the 4D model I developed back in 2015 to analyse influence ops:
Dismiss by denigrating the protesters;
Distort the conversation with fake accounts;
Distract, by accusing the opposition of your own behaviour;
Dismay government critics.
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JUST OUT: In-depth report on the #Fazze case — a campaign from Russia targeting primarily India and LATAM, and to a lesser extent the US.
It was focused on the Pfizer and AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccines, but got close to zero traction across the internet. about.fb.com/news/2021/08/j…
Full details in the report, but a couple of thoughts here.
All but one of the networks focused on domestic targets. That’s not unusual: influence operations so often start at home — remember our recent IO Threat Report?
Historically, even some operations that became (in)famous for foreign interference started domestically.
E.g. the early Russian IRA posted critical commentary about Navalny back in 2013, often on LiveJournal (h/t @soshnikoff)
👉Mexico, 1 network linked to local election campaigns, 1 linked to a local politician and a PR firm;
👉Peru, 1 linked to a local party and an advertising firm, 1 linked to a marketing entity;
👉Ukraine, 1 linked to people associated with the Sluha Narodu party,
And...
👉Ukraine, 1 network linked to individuals and entities sanctioned by the US Treasury — Andrii Derkach, Petro Zhuravel, and Begemot-linked media + political consultants associated with Volodymyr Groysman and Oleg Kulinich.
A range of behaviours here. Influence ops take many forms.
Fake a/cs posting to multiple pages to make content look popular
In-depth personas to seed geopolitical content
Large numbers of fakes to spam hashtags and geotags
GAN-generated faces, in bulk, but sloppily done.
First, the Thai Military’s Internal Security Operations Command.
About 180 assets, esp. active in 2020, posting news, current events, pro-military and pro-monarchy content, anti-separatist.