Ben Nimmo Profile picture
10 Aug, 11 tweets, 5 min read
JUST OUT: In-depth report on the #Fazze case — a campaign from Russia targeting primarily India and LATAM, and to a lesser extent the US.
It was focused on the Pfizer and AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccines, but got close to zero traction across the internet.
about.fb.com/news/2021/08/j…
There’s already been reporting on the Pfizer phase, in May (h/t @daniellaufer, @toniodaoust, @FloraCarmichael, @charliehtweets, @arawnsley).

Our investigation uncovered that in December, the same op targeted AstraZeneca.
We attributed this operation to Fazze, a marketing firm primarily operating from Russia.
It functioned as a disinformation laundromat.

It’d start by planting content on a few online forums. It then amplified that content on other platforms, including social media, with the basic message, “Look what I found on the internet!”
Disinformation is not always subtle.
The message was boosted by a couple of hundred spammy Instagram accounts that pushed out similar memes with hashtags in English or Portuguese.

A lot of the memes with Portuguese hashtags had Hindi text. Maybe not surprisingly, the vast majority got zero likes.
A handful of influencers in India and LATAM appeared to amplify the same message and hashtags at the same time.

That fits the pattern from May 2021, when the op reportedly offered to pay influencers for amplification.

An influencer operation, not just an influence operation.
The operation went silent until May, when it began focusing on the Pfizer vaccine.

Again, this was a cross-platform effort, with blogs and long-form articles across over a dozen platforms.
We know from open-source reporting that the operation tried to recruit influencers. But we also know that it backfired: two of the influencers went public.

bbc.com/news/blogs-tre…
That highlights the dilemma for influence operations. Do you go for low-impact tactics and stay hidden, or do you go for the big bang of influencers with built-in audiences, and risk having your operation exposed?

Final point: there’s been awesome research into this operation by the open-source community, and we owe the initial exposure to @dirtybiology and @mrwissen2go.

Hats off to all of them for breaking the ground on this one.

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More from @benimmo

8 Jul
JUST OUT: Our monthly report on Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour takedowns - June 2021 edition.

Eight networks, seven countries.

about.fb.com/news/2021/07/j…
Full details in the report, but a couple of thoughts here.

All but one of the networks focused on domestic targets. That’s not unusual: influence operations so often start at home — remember our recent IO Threat Report?
Historically, even some operations that became (in)famous for foreign interference started domestically.

E.g. the early Russian IRA posted critical commentary about Navalny back in 2013, often on LiveJournal (h/t @soshnikoff)

mr-7.ru/articles/90769/
Read 11 tweets
6 May
JUST OUT: 9 takedowns in our April CIB report. Primarily domestic ops:

👉Palestine, linked to Fatah;
👉Azerbaijan, linked to individuals associated with defence ministry;
👉Central African Republic, linked to local NGO;

(More in next tweet...)

about.fb.com/news/2021/05/a…
👉Mexico, 1 network linked to local election campaigns, 1 linked to a local politician and a PR firm;
👉Peru, 1 linked to a local party and an advertising firm, 1 linked to a marketing entity;
👉Ukraine, 1 linked to people associated with the Sluha Narodu party,

And...
👉Ukraine, 1 network linked to individuals and entities sanctioned by the US Treasury — Andrii Derkach, Petro Zhuravel, and Begemot-linked media + political consultants associated with Volodymyr Groysman and Oleg Kulinich.

Deep dive in the report. about.fb.com/news/2021/05/a…
Read 10 tweets
3 Mar
Five takedowns for CIB from the @Facebook investigative team last month.

Thai military, domestic targeting
Iran, targeting Iraq, Israel, Afghanistan, UK
Iran, domestic + regional
Morocco, domestic focus
Russia, targeting the Navalny protests

Link: about.fb.com/news/2021/03/f…
A range of behaviours here. Influence ops take many forms.

Fake a/cs posting to multiple pages to make content look popular
In-depth personas to seed geopolitical content
Large numbers of fakes to spam hashtags and geotags
GAN-generated faces, in bulk, but sloppily done.
First, the Thai Military’s Internal Security Operations Command.

About 180 assets, esp. active in 2020, posting news, current events, pro-military and pro-monarchy content, anti-separatist.

Stock profile pics, some posing as young women.

Found by internal investigation.
Read 8 tweets
5 Feb
Some personal news: today’s my last day at @Graphika_NYC.

My team did amazing investigative work and research into influence ops from Russia, Iran, China and many other places.

We’ve broken new ground, and I couldn’t be more proud of the team @camillefrancois and I built.
Next week, I’m starting at Facebook, where I’ll be helping to lead global threat intelligence strategy against influence operations.

I’m very excited to join one of the best IO teams in the world to study, catch and get ahead of the known players and emerging threats.
As a community - platforms, researchers and journalists - we’ve all come a long way since the dawn of this field of research.
Read 13 tweets
4 Feb
JUST OUT: Update on pro-China op Spamouflage Dragon.

Still spammy, but prolific and persistent, and getting some traction for the first time.

Over 1,400 videos in the last year.

Including geopolitical rivalry with the US.

@Graphika_NYC report: graphika.com/reports/spamou…
Spamou works on YouTube, Twitter, Facebook.

Mainly videos in Mandarin, Cantonese, or Mandarin + English.

Low quality, high volume, on:

Guo Wengui (from 2018)
Hong Kong protests (2019)
Chinese achievements (Feb 2020)
US crises (early 2020)
US-China rivalry (mid-2020)
We don’t have attribution on this op yet.

It’s persistent, well enough resourced to produce over 1,400 videos in a year, and closely tracks Chinese state messaging.

But who exactly is running it remains a question.
Read 30 tweets
4 Feb
Well this is big.

UK telecoms regulator @Ofcom just revoked the licence of Chinese state broadcaster CGTN to broadcast in the UK, arguing the licence is held by an entity which doesn't have editorial control, in breach of UK rules.

ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/la…
Important to underline this is not about content.

Ofcom found that the company which held the CGTN licence, Star China Media, didn't have editorial control.

CGTN offered to transfer to a different entity, but it's ultimately controlled by the CCP, and therefore disqualified.
On the content side, though, CGTN *was* found guilty last year of breaking the rules on due impartiality with its coverage of the Hong Kong protests.

Turns out they didn't give the protesters a fair hearing.

ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/…
Read 5 tweets

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