JUST OUT: Report on coordinated inauthentic behaviour takedowns in December, and a look back over the past year & more.
Interesting: 2/3 of all ops we removed since 2017 were wholly or partially focused on domestic audiences.
about.fb.com/news/2022/01/d…
Interesting: 2/3 of all ops we removed since 2017 were wholly or partially focused on domestic audiences.
about.fb.com/news/2022/01/d…
We took down three operations last month:
* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
It’s not the first time for an Iranian op to pose as supporters of Scottish independence.
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013.
@Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27)
graphika.com/reports/irans-…
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013.
@Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27)
graphika.com/reports/irans-…
This time again, this activity didn’t get much traction: the most successful IG account had just over 4K followers, and only about half of those were in the UK.
What’s remarkable is how hand-crafted the operation was.
What’s remarkable is how hand-crafted the operation was.
Many of the accounts claimed to have specific jobs or hobbies, like an architect or a soccer fan. Then a lot of their posts were about that side interest to build credibility.
One account even stole its profile picture from a media personality in Iraq. Every couple of days, it would upload a new photo, to try and make it look authentic.
This was artisan work, not mass production: a small number of accounts active at any time (with auto detection disabling others).
Each tried to stay under the radar to avoid enforcement - which made it hard to be effective.
Each tried to stay under the radar to avoid enforcement - which made it hard to be effective.
They posted about a mixture of things. Some personal, identity-building content. Some Scottish scenery. Some UK politics, especially Scottish independence.
Occasionally they posted about Saudi Arabia, Israel or the USA.
Iranian operations seem unable to resist these.
Occasionally they posted about Saudi Arabia, Israel or the USA.
Iranian operations seem unable to resist these.
They copied the scenery photos and videos from real people.
That didn’t go down too well.
On at least one occasion, the real author called out the operation for using their images without asking.
That didn’t go down too well.
On at least one occasion, the real author called out the operation for using their images without asking.
Some of the people running it had a background in teaching English as a foreign language.
This didn’t stop them misspelling some of their hashtags, and some of the memes they appear to have created.
This didn’t stop them misspelling some of their hashtags, and some of the memes they appear to have created.
This was more like an old-fashioned IO: creating detailed personas, and trying not to be noticed. That’s a trend we called out last year.
It’s a recipe for staying under the radar, but it often means staying ineffective.
about.fb.com/news/2021/05/i…
It’s a recipe for staying under the radar, but it often means staying ineffective.
about.fb.com/news/2021/05/i…
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