Full details in the report, but a couple of thoughts here.
All but one of the networks focused on domestic targets. That’s not unusual: influence operations so often start at home — remember our recent IO Threat Report?
Historically, even some operations that became (in)famous for foreign interference started domestically.
E.g. the early Russian IRA posted critical commentary about Navalny back in 2013, often on LiveJournal (h/t @soshnikoff)
And one of Russian operation Secondary Infektion’s first cross-platform fake personas in January 2014 was called “bloger Nasralny” (crude pun on Navalny) and featured a profile of Navalny painted blue.
Also this month, a reminder that not all operations are created equal — the ones our team took down in June varied in size, following, targets and techniques.
It’s so important to be discerning. Not all ops are big, or clever, or sophisticated. Here’s a paper from last year, describing one way to judge between them.
The operations our team took down in June posted on a wide range of topics, e.g.:
Local elections (Mexico)
Praising the military (Jordan)
Pro- Iranian military and Syrian gov, anti-Saudi Arabia, Israel, US, and Turkey (Iran/Iraq)
(...)
(...)
Posting allegedly hacked / leaked material about the opposition (Algeria)
Criticising Egypt and Sudan for their stance on Ethiopia’s mega-dam (Ethiopia)
The people behind these ops varied too: individuals with links to political parties, campaigns, PR firms, security forces.
If you look back over the last few years of takedowns, this variety of actors (including for-hire ones) has been a steady trend.
👉Mexico, 1 network linked to local election campaigns, 1 linked to a local politician and a PR firm;
👉Peru, 1 linked to a local party and an advertising firm, 1 linked to a marketing entity;
👉Ukraine, 1 linked to people associated with the Sluha Narodu party,
And...
👉Ukraine, 1 network linked to individuals and entities sanctioned by the US Treasury — Andrii Derkach, Petro Zhuravel, and Begemot-linked media + political consultants associated with Volodymyr Groysman and Oleg Kulinich.
A range of behaviours here. Influence ops take many forms.
Fake a/cs posting to multiple pages to make content look popular
In-depth personas to seed geopolitical content
Large numbers of fakes to spam hashtags and geotags
GAN-generated faces, in bulk, but sloppily done.
First, the Thai Military’s Internal Security Operations Command.
About 180 assets, esp. active in 2020, posting news, current events, pro-military and pro-monarchy content, anti-separatist.
UK telecoms regulator @Ofcom just revoked the licence of Chinese state broadcaster CGTN to broadcast in the UK, arguing the licence is held by an entity which doesn't have editorial control, in breach of UK rules.
And this, just out from @MsHannahMurphy and @SVR13: questions about the hundreds of thousands of followers that the same Huawei Western Europe execs have.
I'll leave it to others to analyse the 800k+ accounts involved in these followings, but one anecdotal sidelight on the fake network of accounts that attacked Belgium: some of its other amplification came from glambots from a network that also boosted Huawei Europe.
Glambots = automated accounts that use profile pictures taken from glamour shoots and similar sources.