How can the rivalry between #Armenia + #Azerbaijan be both enduring + asymmetric? This thread explores the inconclusive strategic interactions between the two states as a factor sustaining the rivalry between them. #NKpeace 1/14
Realist perspectives emphasise asymmetry as one of this rivalry’s key features. This might contradict the idea of enduring rivalry if parity is taken to be an essential pre-requisite for long-term militarised competition to be sustained. 2/14
Yet we know from the Israeli-Arab + India-Pakistan rivalries that this is not necessarily so. These notorious rivalries are starkly asymmetric + suggest that even in scenarios of deep disparity there can be mitigating power configurations moderating asymmetry. 3/14
In my book I apply the concept of ‘truncated asymmetry’ from the work of T.V. Paul on India/Pakistan, meaning that while #Azerbaijan’s aggregate power capability is greater than #Armenia’s, several factors reduce the disparity. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108… 4/14
It has been a staple of Azerbaijani rhetoric over the 12 years or so to emphasise #Azerbaijan’s preponderance on almost all aggregate indicators of material resources, such as territory, demography, military capability + economic endowment. 5/14
Yet three factors have enabled Armenia to keep up despite being materially weaker. These are, firstly, local parity in the theatre of conflict. Forces facing off across the Line of Contact are broadly proportionate + terrain favours Armenian forces in many locations. 6/14
Secondly, Armenia pursues a deterrent strategic posture focused on maintaining, not changing, the status quo. It does not necessarily seek superiority across all military parameters, but only sufficient capacity to make any Azerbaijani offensive extremely costly. 7/14
Third, Armenia balances with Russia, ‘borrowing’ power both through purchasing capability at a discount + embedding itself within an extended Russian deterrent. These factors have enabled Armenia to truncate the power asymmetry thru Azerbaijan’s oil boom + sustain rivalry. 8/14
Some implications of the truncated asymmetry dynamic: Neither side has a logic for concessions: preponderant #Azerbaijan sees eventual victory in its larger size + capacity. Yet #Armenia’s truncation of the asymmetry makes threats of coercion less credible + mitigates costs. 9/14
There is also a stability-instability paradox, whereby #Armenia has an uneven but functional deterrent against Azerbaijani blitzkrieg, diminishing prospects of a major war. The truncated asymmetry thus explains a common truism, that this conflict has no military solution. 10/14
But while the Armenian deterrent might operate against all-out war, it is less effective against increasing minor skirmishes + limited aims offensives, such as the Azerbaijani offensive in April 2016, and wider escalatory dynamics esp in 2014-17 period. 11/14
Furthermore, if #Azerbaijan faces significant constraints in coercing #Armenia, as long as Armenia must devote substantial resources to the rivalry + shape its geopolitical alliances accordingly, Azerbaijan effectively holds significant veto power over its future. 12/14
Finally, balancing with Russia embeds the Armenian deterrent within Russia’s own deterrent strategy against an Armenian-Azerbaijani war. There are subtle but crucial differences between the two deterrents, Russian + Armenian, which I will address in a separate thread. 13/14
In conclusion, in defiance of realist expectations the truncated asymmetry dynamic signifies strategically inconclusive interactions between #Armenia and #Azerbaijan, contributing to the sustainability and longevity of rivalry. 14/14
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
The past few tumultuous weeks in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations have seemingly ended in commitments by both Yerevan and Baku to conclude a peace accord by year's end. Recent events serve notice of at least 5 risks accompanying this process, which I explore here. A (long) 🧵: 1/
Risk 1: Low-cost coercion: The first risk is a strategy of coercion that appears to deliver the outcomes that the coercing side is looking for, with no significant countervailing cost. 2/
crisisgroup.org/europe-central… True, Azerbaijan’s cross-border strikes on Armenia in September elevated the inter-state level of the conflict, resulting in a consolidation of international support for the territorial integrity norm. 3/
While the world is distracted with Ukraine’s success in Kharkiv, there are reports of large-scale Azerbaijani shelling + use of UAVs against targets in Armenia: Jermuk, Goris, Vardenis, Tatev, Kapan.
These are locations within the Republic of Armenia, *not* in Nagorny Karabakh (also the site of another escalation at the beginning of August).
The attacks come less than two weeks after the country’s leaders met with EUCO President Charles Michel in Brussels to review progress on prior agreements to move forward with connectivity, border demarcation, humanitarian issues and the possibility of a peace treaty.
I found George’s learner’s grammar of Georgian to be an indispensable resource when I was learning Georgian. George was also an engaging and inspired teacher of the language and I’ll always be grateful to him. 1/
His was the only modern learner’s grammar that was available at the time, and it was also a great privilege to be taught by the same person who wrote the grammar you are learning from. I learned Russian the same way with Anna Pilkington’s inspired course and teaching. 2/
Yes, the grammar showcased some of George’s political views in ways one wouldn’t usually find in a language grammar. Had I been the series editor I would no doubt have had issues with this to say the least. 3/
Some thoughts on implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (RIU) for Armenia + Azerbaijan, a 🧵. TLDR? A weakened/hardened Russia presents risks for both states, esp ARM, resulting in strategies of formal compliance or evasion, but AZ also sees tactical opportunities in NK.
Whether thru Armenia’s ‘complementarity’ or Azerbaijan’s ‘sovereign foreign policy/non-alignment’ the foreign policies of both states have been predicated on the avoidance of choice. RIU challenges that, forces both states to make both performative and real choices.
RIU radicalises relations between the West, where ARM + AZ both have a variety of important linkages, and the country with the single greatest leverage over both. Unsurprisingly, we have seen ARM + AZ strategies of formal compliance with RU and tactical evasions where possible.
Yesterday 19/7 there were reports of gunfire, along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchivan, in the area of Sadarak / Yeraskh. Azerbaijani social media subsequently suggested reports of advances by Azerbaijani forces.
If true would likely be in the no man’s lands that still obtain between the lines of actual control in this area. (In summer 2018, Azerbaijan also reported advances in this area, meaning advances into no man’s lands: cacianalyst.org/publications/a…)
aysor.am/en/news/2021/0… On 20/7 local Armenian community head in Yeraskh Rudik Oghikyan was reported wounded by Azerbaijani fire, on the same day that Ilham Aliyev is meeting Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss implementation of Armenia-Azerbaijan agreements so far.
On the ‘borderization’ of #Armenia: this week a number of territorial encroachments by Azerbaijani forces were reported on Armenia proper, along the international border between Armenia and those parts of #Azerbaijan that were under Armenian occupation.
On 13/5 Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that some 250 AZE troops had advanced 3.5 kilometres around a remote lake in ARM’s southernmost Syunik region, Sev Lich, that Soviet-era maps indicate is divided by the de jure border. Other movements reported in Gegharkunik.
AZE says it is demarcating the border per maps in its possession. France and the US have called on AZE to withdraw. ARM has referred the matter to to the CSTO. As of today, latest reports are that Russian troops from the Gyumri base are on way to Syunik.