Concerning the basis of HTM05-02 progressive horizontal evacuation - during a fire incident moving patients from a fire area to adjacent safe zone appears to be abandoned.
It’s unclear how this will be achieved in @NightingaleLDN
More over where very high dependancy areas such as ICU / ACU patient areas are designated & requiring a smaller sub-compartments units to limit fuel load + fire spread
Again it’s unclear from the @NightingaleLDN press release images how maximum travel distances are not breached.
Fires are not unknown - the 2009 five london hospital fires report hammers home the challenges
So why are important HTM 05-02 evacuation concepts not built into @NightingaleLDN eg hospital streets?
preventionweb.net/files/13954_re…
2019 Brazil, a fire behind an ICU unit resulting in 11 fatalities, Most victims died from asphyxiation as smoke filled the wards, & some died when life support equipment stopped working in the fire.
nbcnews.com/news/world/bra…
2019 Algeria: 8 infants
2018 Korea: 41 fatalities
1968 Warwick: 24 females
1949 USA: 77 Fatalities
Why risk building mega field hospitals, with huge open expanses for fire spread & ignore warnings
opendemocracy.net/en/ournhs/expo…
Approvals & fundamental hospital #firesafety principals appear abandoned @NightingaleLDN
Whats the contingency or is it simply another compounding disaster waiting to happen?
hsj.co.uk/patient-safety…
@labcuk approach to mega field hospitals approvals is appalling!
Fire fatality case history demonstrates why we cannot accept the fire risk of large uncompartmented spaces in these mega field hospitals!