THEME 1: DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
Afghans played an integral role in development projects that started in mid 2000s. These projects were to help US nation-building goal and Afghan govt-building objective.
Afghans played an integral role in development projects that started in mid 2000s. These projects were to help US nation-building goal and Afghan govt-building objective.
2/n: Capturing their perspectives on what worked and what didn't is therefore crucial as they bring lived experience of the entire enterprise.
A aim lesson that emerged was that....
A aim lesson that emerged was that....
3/n: Money was squandered with no overall strategic aim or even coordination between various agencies. Lack of strategic goal will be dealt with in a separate thread, but it appears that in most cases, even intra-ministry level coordination and strategic planning was issing.
4/n: As this quote by a former Deputy Minister in Counter-Narcotics shows, ministries were running multiple projects simultaneously with no coordination or specific agenda. 
5/n: This fragmentation was multiplied due to lack of institutional memory. As top leaders left, often times their advisors left along with them. Their projects, ideas and lessons learned were discarded and a new leader with new ideas, priorities and tactics would take over.
6/n: This lack of clear and consistent approach was not just limited to government ministries, many donors, INGOs and aid organisations suffered from this too. As Zia sardonically states, 'foreigners would read kite runner on a plane and believe they were experts'.
7/n: Mamundzay points out that if local authorities opposed a project proposed by IPs, they would either go to another govt agency or involve powerful political leaders. Here Dr. Yamashita invokes P. Ghani to resolve a dispute SIKA and IDLG.
8/n: While this might be too harsh, the overall point about lack of consistent strategy still stands. Again, this was not limited to 'foreigners'. As this excerpt by a former DM of Counter-Narcotics Department highlights, Afghans were equally prone to similar impulsive action.
9/n: After a DM was removed, 40% staff left within months. New guy wanted to build loyalty and 'feel like a minister', so he went about building his own fiefdom.
10/n: In terms of project design, several issues stand out. In addition to projects lacking strategic objective, some were designed on whims or personal preferences.
11/n: Rather than implementing projects that maximized benefit, projects were selected based on manager/funder bias or political goals. More details in Nation-Building thread, but quote above by Nasiri sheds some light on this.
12/n: Ashraf Nasir points at the lack of strategic vision with projects. According to him, had the focus been limited to increasing literacy, and bridging the gap between the govt and mosque, this would have been more useful than short-sighted projects.
13/n: In Zabul context, his suggestion regarding 1) increased literacy; 2) bring mosque & govt; and 3) build water supplies served 1) future autarky; 2) stem flow of students to Pakistan madrassahs; and 3) make irrigation viable alternative to poppy production.
14/n: ) Donors applied timelines not suited to local dynamics. By the time many projects had progressed from design to implementation stage, changes in local security would render them inappropriate. Projects were too rigid to accommodate these changing local dynamics.
15/n: Bureaucratic waste pushed implementation even further back. These ballooned operation costs to around 75% according to Haider.
16/n: The lack of consultation with locals and dearth of local knowledge meant that projects, when completed, sometimes bred more conflict than solved. As Flynn states, locals would ask for wells to be put in specific areas, but donors would refuse and have their own plans.
17/n: For example, they would put wells between two tribes to 'bring them together'. But the result would be the opposite. Tribes would then have to fight over this scarce resource!
18/n: Implementation of projects was even more problematic. Little of the money earmarked for projects actually went to those projects. Apparently, it was US policy to give reconstruction projects to US companies so as to 'support them' & 'create jobs for them'. (Barmak)
19/n: According to Barmak, 60% of the money earmarked went to the contractor company and the remaining 40% to the project. As we will see, these figures might still be too modest.
20/n: The assumption that most of the reconstruction money was siphoned off by US contractors is supported by a US diplomat who hints that 40% of the money disappeared in the beltway than in #Afghanistan.
21/n: 50% of money was gobbled up be 'operational costs' (per Ahmadzai). While in theory, the govt was supposed to take lead, donors would manage operations, human resources, finance, sub-contracting and procurement. 'Everythng was managed by IPs with the consultation of USAID'.
22/n: The projects would get sub-contracted from one to another to another. To the point that the person actually contracted to build would not have enough budget to build the project. He would then not build some parts of the project. Quote by Wesa.
23/n: Somewhere I read in these files that the contractors would then hire some people to blow the project before inauguration, couldn't find that quote right now but it should be coming up in future threads.
24/n: The projects were built so inefficiently that material was imported rather than procured locally. Even fruits and vegetables were imported from Dubai (above).
25/n: The paucity of local input meant that US would usually be completely clueless as to what was going on.
26/n: I want to end this thread with a quote by a senior USAID official about how they thought a local mayor was amazing at helping them. Turns out he was in cahoots with others and ended up being killed over the money they had stolen.
27/n: Next thread would be about Governance and Security & Stability projects which are closely linked to this thread.
