Thread by @KomissarWhipla

To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time the Basic Principles of State Policy in the field of Nuclear Deterrence are made public in Russia.
publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/…

Stay tuned for a thread!

сс @SokovNikolai @russianforces @artjomh @DrRadchenko

Quick note: it is about "Nuclear Deterrence" as a whole, which does not equal "Strategic Deterrence".

Okay, I'm in a mood for a detailed dig-in. Let's go!

p.1, what this document is about:
- strategic planning
- official perspective on the essence of nuclear deterrence (ND)
- military dangers and threats to be neutralized by ND
- principles of ND
- nuclear use conditions

p.2. Nuclear weapons are a part of the overall "Guaranteed deterrence", that prevents aggression against Russia and/or allies, and is among the highest national priority.

p.3 State nuclear deterrence policy (SNDP) is a system of political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economical, informational and other measures carried out on the basis of nuclear deterrence assets, to prevent agression against Russia and/or allies.

p.4/1 SNDP has defensive nature, nuclear forces to be at the level sufficient for ND, guarantees sovereignity and territorial integrity, deters adversaries from aggression and in case the conflict starts - prevents escalation and of conflict termination on suitable conditions.

p.4/2 That's exactly the opposite to the infamous 'e2de': nukes prevent escalation by their existence, rather than support de-escalation by their employment. Some might argue that reference to nuclear deterrence might be an escalation in itself, but that's not how it works.

Let's move on. P.5 rather straightforward: nukes are only for deterrence, its use is unwanted measure of the last resort, and RU tries its best to reduce nuclear threat, and prevent intergovernmental confilcts that might lead to military and nuclear phases.

P.p. 6-8. Normative and legal basis are the Constitution, universally accepted principles and norms of international law, international military and arms control treaties, domestic legislation. SNDP are to be followed by all relevant authorities, and might be updated.

Section II: Essence of ND. P.p.9-11: ND goal is that the adversary understands the inevtiable nuclear retaliation in case of aggression, and ensured through availability of weapons and readiness to use those. ND is a permanent action at peacetime, conflict and war until nukes.

P.12/1 - possibly the most controversial one. Main dangers, that might become military threats, and which are to be neutralized through ND. Lots of stuff: increased deployments close to RU (conv. forces w/ nuclear delivery systems); missile defenses, INF-range ballistic and...

p.12/2 cruise missiles, precision non-nuclear and hypersonic weapons (note the order of words!), strike UAVs, directed energy weapons; space-based missile defense and strike systems; posession of nukes and other WMD and delivery systems which can be used (!) against RU/allies...

p.12/3 uncontrolled (!) proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems; deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems on the territories of non-nuclear weapon states (hello NATO Nuclear Sharing).

P.13, extremely important: Russia exercises ND against countries and military blocs that designate Russia as an adversary and which have nuclear weapons and (or) other WMD, or "significant" potential of general purpose forces.

Very creative framing. "You know who you are".

P.14 RU ND considers deployment of offensive arms (cruise and ballistic missiles, hypersonic vehicles, strike UAVs), directed energy weapons, missile defense , 'missile-nuclear strike warning' (?), nuclear weapons and (or) other WMD that can be used against RU and (or) allies.

P.15 another very important part, very traditional and also some music for the ears of arms control community.
Principles of ND:
а) compliance w/ international ams control obligations
б) continuity
в) adaptivity
г) ambiguity (scope, time and place of possible nuclear use)
...

p.15/2
д) centralization of ND management
е) rationality of ND forces composition and their readiness at the 'minimal sufficient' level.
ж) permanent readiness of designated ND forces part for employment.

P.16 ND forces consist of land-, sea- and air-based nuclear forces.

No separation between 'strategic' and 'substrategic', as this document is about nuclear deterrence as a whole. Strategic deterrence, as well as non-nuclear deterrence, are separate, yet linked topics.

The part everyone might be most interested in: Section III, the Conditions of Russia to start using nuclear weapons.
P.17 - classic from the Military Doctrine: use of nukes or other WMD against RU and (or) allies, or conventional agression threatening existence of Russian state.

P.18 - Decision to use nukes is made by the President. Any nukes.
P.19 is fun, as it goes deeper into the nuclear use preconditions.
а) credible info on ballistic missiles launched and attacking territories of Russia and (or) allies. Note - no details on range and payload.

p.19/2
б) use of nukes or other WMD agains territories of Russia and (or) allies.
в) attack/interference on critical civilian (!) or military infrastructure, killing which will undermine nuclear retaliation. Note - no details on attack type, which effectively includes cyber, etc.

p.19/3
Personally I've argued a lot that we need such statement as 19в. Actually it might be even used as a draft for P5 statement, and this is good and stabilizing.
г) traditional - conventional attack against Russia (no allies) threatening existence of state.

p.20 - fun one, President can inform miltary-political leadership of other countries and (or) international organizations that Russia is ready to use nukes, or the decision to use has been made, or the nukes have been used.

(might be wrong with English grammar here:))