Thread by @KomissarWhipla

To all concerned with Russian reaction to the show by @USArmsControl yesterday, strongly suggest watching Ryabkov speaking today at @Gorchakov_Fund:

Will try to do some live-tweeting. Ryabkov seems to be in good mood. Than Rogov arrived.

Moderator thanks @POTUS for a gift of #OpenSkiesTreaty withdrawal, so they don't have to think about agenda.

#COVID19 affected international relations, official visits etc., but we remain active.

6 Putin-Trump calls, 4 Lavrov-Pompeo calls, activee communications via embassies. Mentions US active work and OPEC+. Praises humanitarian deliveries of ventilators etc. between US and Russia.

RU/US relations remain strained due to US internal politics, as the elections come closer hysteria will increase. Sanctions pressure remain, RU will never ask for relief, but US illegal policies are a symptom of distorted worldview in Washington.

Anti-Chinese push noticed.

Military domain - US strategic deterrence against Russia includes "peace based on strength" and "great powers competition". This is confrontational. NSS, NPR, MDR pose Russia as a threat. Washington destroys all legal barriers to ther domination. No respect for international law.

US foreign policy dominated by 'exclusiveness', putting other countries into position "with us or against us", invented "rules-based order".

Strategic stability in bad shape, and the US does not like these words at all, preferring 'strategic security' etc.

After dissolution of the USSR, the US began to withdraw from arms control arrangements, starting with ABM. Global Missile Defense is a part of offensive posture. No interest in Washington to address Russian concerns.

US withdrew from the INF Treaty, this instrument is dead.

US accusations of Russian INF violation - just a screen, no acts presented. Yesterday and today - same model for the Open Skies Treaty.

US never addressed Russian concerns w/ INF Treaty: UCAVs, Mk41, target missiles.

When the INF was dead we invited US and allies to agree on restraint for future, but were told that there is no interest. Pentagon clear about plans for the Asia-Pacific, intensified R&D. Europe might come next.

February 5, 2021 - New START, last regime w/ verification will end. The US remains ambiguous about their plans, while Russia openly calls for extension.

US seeks full military dominance. Allies used to project power. Contrary to Russia-NATO Founding Act, new contingents and heavy weapons are deployed in the Baltic and Poland. Permaent rotation of naval vessels in the Black and Baltic seas, aggressive ISR flights.

Russia offered to scale down exercise due to covid, no interest in NATO.

NATO Nuclear Sharing - violation of NPT. B61-12 will turn this bomb into battlefield weapon.

Space is a warfighting domain in US documents, no interest in RU/CN initiative to develop a TPPW.

Still, some domains work - counter-terrorism, some regional topics. But this is not enough. No interest in cyber dialogues, non-interference statements etc.

US manhunt on Russian citizens is a big problem, americans not interested in working through pre-established bilateral mechanisms. Russian citizens in US jails.

Diplomatic buildings confiscated in the US is a huge irritator in bilateral relations.

RU not naive, understand the limits of possibilities for cooperation, especially in the election year. But ready for positive work in any domain.
#Elbe75 statement - rare example.

Rogov agrees with Ryabkov assesments, comes with three questions:
1) Inspection visits, verification etc. postponed due to COVID, is it possible to have a proper talks in virtual domain, especially on nuclear issues? Can 'non-papers' etc. be shared this way?

2) On New START: US wants China, and has a stupid demand that RU has to bring China in. RU wanted France and UK. What's now?

3) OST: Trump yesterday that they are ready to discuss new better treaty. What the hell? Official US position or an improvisation, current POTUS-style?

Ryabkov thanks Rogov for active work with US counterparts through Track II. Starts with second question: after a long road from tens of thousands warheads, now we are at 1550. Logical next step is the only one: the further we go in quantitative cuts...

... the more is the influence of other factors. The 'relative value' of each warhead increases, which is true for every country. It is not a new position. It was formulated long before Trump elected, long before Trump admin started blackmailing China, etc.

It is wrong to say that going multilateral is a new position for RU. RU said it long ago. Strategic weapons can't be cut without addressing Missile Defenses. Link is in the NewSTART preface. If the US declines this formula, it doesn't mean that we agree.

Other factors have to be considered: space-based strike systems, CPGS, future US hypersonic weapons, conventional disbalances.

US asks to bring China to the table. We believe that it is a sovereign right of any nation to join any talks.

Arsenals of the closest US allies - UK and France - have to be addressed. They know that we want it.

But we understand that at the moment due to trust deficit within P5 such mechanism is next to impossible to achieve. That's why we invite the US to extend New START.

Extend for five years, and spend this time to address mutual concerns. RU ready to discuss anything, but the US must understand that these discussion will be based on the RU national security interests , and demanding verification of any agreements.

Dialogue is in bad shape, with long unexplained pauses. There are different channels of communication, and not everything will be public. But the US attitude is rigid, they decline our logic. Still we can exchang official documents.

Today the MFA received an official note on US withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty form the US Embassy.

COVID19 is not forever, we are ready for communications at any venues. But the challenge is the absence of the US will to agree on the basis of balance of interest. The US only works in ultimatums. Chances for New START surviving after 05/02/2021 'not very high' (sic!).

On Open Skies Treaty - if Russia does not fulfill a number of US demands, they will withdraw in November. US demands make no sense, but RU is ready to continue dialogue.

Chinese position should be respected. There must be no illusions that Russia will work for the US.

Next Q on RU and OST. A: Russia remains committed. But the US is a serious violator of the Treaty. Concept similar to what was done with the INF Treaty. US aggressively implements myths in the global policy circles.

This is disinformation, or misinformation (part lies, part truth), but our US partners are masters in this trade, and they've gathered teams in other countries that help them. Media in 'like-minded nations' use the same vocabulary for the same myths.

...Like coronavirus. One can protect oneself by avoiding contact.

Back to Open Skies Treaty: notes received by all states-parties. Now Canada nad Hungary should gather a conference. There might be different options.

US attitude like INF: do this, that and that, than they might re-consider. If the US want to find solutions, they have to address RU concerns.

Next Q: can the Russian image in the US media be improved? Also, can the discussion on cybersecurity be fruitful?
A: RU works actively through our media and embassies, offers dialogue. Unfortunately, the US put itself into a position that cooperation is impossible.

Q: Personal contacts with Billingslea? Post-OpenSkiesTreaty? Will we work with other parties to the OST to ask them to remain, especially closest US allies?

A: Sure that the announcement yesterday was a surprise for allies. Many allies are ignored.

Russia will spend some time to explain to them as clear as possible why the US spreads lies, and what can be the path towards the OST preservation. Explanation will be made for the US as well, but no hopes - Washington wants RU only to follow orders.

Meeting Billingslea - ready.

Q: Can Ryabkov imagine a future where Russia and the US switch to strategic cooperation? What can be the driver?

A: Americans like to label right and wrong sides of history. Ryabkov does not feel a basis for a change. There is a broad mainstream anti-Russian consensus in the US.

Q: Does Russia consider the US in violation of Art.XIV of the New START through non-engagement in extension talks?

A: Ryabkov does not want to make such statements. There is a BCC where everything is addressed. Spring BCC was canceled due to COVID, now we wait for Autumn BCC.

If the decision to extend will be made, RU will need time to go through all the procedures, that involve different ministries, agencies and the Parliament. Will take several months.

My Q: Will RU draw a picture of the world w/o New START? Can we offer some unilateral transparency measures?

A: We won't wake up in a different world on February 6, 2021, w/o New START. Missile-nuclear domain has a great degree of inertia, rapid changes hard to implement.

Russia will act according to our national interests. Unilateral measures impossible, only mutual, reciprocal, verifiable agreements.

Q: Israel, Palestine, "Deal of the century".
A: RU will work with everyone.

Q: You've mentioned that US no longer likes 'strategic stability'. But they have 'stability restored' in Nuclear Operations Handbook. Maybe we need updated glossary?

A: There's hardly any other domain with such detailed and mutually agreed terminology, thanks to decades of work.

There's a room for a 'constructive ambiguity', but there can't be different levels. E.g. JCPOA has the lowest number of ambiguities.

Now within P5 there have been a huge volume of work done, also agree Glossary.

We have an instrument for future talks.

RU and US understands agree each other perfectly on these subjects. The challenge is in absence of their political will to agree to anything. It seems that such attitude will remain, and we may run out of means to implement all the ideas and initiatives.

Q: can Europe contribute to the development of Russia-US relations, or Europe will remain a bystander wathching with eyes wide open waiting for the winner?

A: RU relations with European countries might have a stabilizing role.

But the 'shrinkage' in different European capitals when they witness abnormalities in RU/US relations is a troubling sign. Washington is succesful in consolidating allies on anti-Russian basis. Now same process is developing with regard to China.

Q: Russian interference etc.
A: There has never been a more crazy idea. Let's grab some coke and pop-corn and continue to watch the show.

Q: Can Germany play an important role with rvitalize the OST?
A: OST is not dead! When US withdraws in November, it does not mean that the Treaty will die. US said that it is a decision, not an intention, than we'll have a 33 parties. Or less. But it still doesn't mean OST death.

If Europeans are interested, and OST is an important part of the European security, we can find solutions. But if some European country will express their 'deepest concern' with Russian 'violations' etc., that's not a way forward.

Q: What if somehow the US manages to re-impose UNSC sanctions on Iran, what will be the Russian re-action: silently obey or vocaly oppose?

A: This Q sounds fatal. Can't even think about any limitation on arms trade w/ Iran after October 18, 2020. RU will do what it can.

Continue the linkage between sanctions on Iran and non-proliferation is counter-productive. US withdrew from JCPOA, and now wants to implement limitations on conventional arms trade with Iran. International Law is not a plate with appetizers, where you can eat what you like.

US is a serious violator of the international law, and now they are going towards a new record in that regard. We are approaching rough time and discussions on this topic.

Q: RU/US economical relations under/after COVID. Some people in the US are afraid of new economic recession, is there a possibility for a sanction relief?

A: A lot on the world depends on how effective US recovery would be. Volume of economical stimulus packages are unmatched.

Is there a danger of US inflation after injection of such volumes of money in the US economy, that will affect global economy? US is actively returning productions to the US soil, might have different effects as well. Our leaders played a vital role in oil market stabilization.

US business would like to stay in Russia. There's basis for cooperation. Russian government will continue to implement measures to facilitate doing business in Russia. If we launch the business dialogue, it might provide new ideas.

Q: how distancing between RU and US might affect Nagorno-Karabakh settlement?
Q: will RU continue to raise the question of Missile Defense, if there will be new talks with the US?
Q: will US OST withdrawal affect the initiative to hold a P5 summit?

Q; any plans for P5 events/statements on doctrines, nuclear war prevention etc, previously planne for NPT RevCon?

A: Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the domains where cooperation continues.

Back to OST: US demands on Abkhazia border is a bad practice on inclusion of state recognition issues to the arms control domain. Same mistake was done with the CFE in 1999. Russian position is legally perfect, US engaging in misinformation campaign.

A: On missile defense - it is an essential part for discussion of new russian weapons.

A: P5 initiative won't be affected by US OST withdrawal. Arms control is a part of the agenda for the summit, and not the most crucial one.

A: P5 nuclear doctrines and nuclear war prevention - personal contacts impossible, doing virtual stuff, hoping for conference. Still no agreement on the 'no winners in nuclear war' statement due to 'second thoughts' by some of Western partners.

Among other things said by officials in Washington yesterday, we were surprised to learn about Russian 'escalate to win' strategy. Looks like American colleagues saw something in their dreams, and now they believe in winning a nuclear war themselves.

-FIN-