Thread by @junghpak1

I’ve been seeing some comments on this platform & elsewhere sugg that the CIA as an institution is resp for US inability to make progress w/NK.

Let me share a few thoughts about what it’s like to be a CIA analyst in the 21st cent, esp on a high profile, hard target like NK. 1/

It is intense: the White House scrutiny and attention, the unbelievable amount of prep required for NSC meetings, constant flow of taskings from CIA and DNI seniors, not to mention the long hours, birthdays and celebrations missed, and holidays & trips hijacked by NK actions....2

Cryptic calls from your manager after you’ve tucked your kids into bed and settled in for the night:
“It’s happened. Can you come in?”....

The random trips abroad... 3/

Going into the office at 3 am, 5 am, or doing an overnight shift because of what’s happening....the coordination battles with the other intel organizations or within your own group...multiple layers of review that would make seasoned academics throw up their hands in defeat....4/

If you’re given a “hair on fire” tasking with huge policy implications, you send out the bat signal—and your colleagues from DIA, NSA, NGA, DOE, INR, FBI, Treasury, DNI, show up with their lock bags and we all head into a secure conference room. It’s AMAZING. 5/

Sometimes this kind of in-person group discussion isn’t possible but disagreements are hashed out (or not) via email or phone. 6/

If you’re writing a longer piece and have the luxury of time, perhaps you’d consult with a tradecraft specialist, a senior analyst with 30 yrs exp, talk to collectors, convene a structured analytic exercise with a methodologist. 7/

But even then your analysis is caveated, nuanced, & offers scenarios, rather than express certainty about a particular conclusion.

Bc our job was not to predict the winning lottery numbers, but to offer probability of something occurring, reduce surprise & offer options. 8/

We don’t provide policy recs; that was a huge No-No.

And given that our focus was all-source analysis, inc HUMINT, we provided, among other things, the info that could corroborate or refute what NK dips might be saying to US negotiators to put the US in the best position. 9/

Could the CIA and the IC do better? ABSOLUTELY.

But when it comes to NK, the frustration with the lack of progress too often settles on finger-pointing at CIA/IC analysis, as if North Korea’s *intentions* play no role and Kim is merely responding rather than driving events. 10/

That view underestimates the agency that the NK regime has exercised and continues to exercise.

Unfortunately, it has been doing so with much aplomb. 11/11