Now we’re getting to the juicy stuff. In week 3 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we basically had to make up for the fact that @RidT’s fantastic book had not yet come out. And I hope I did a decent job of telling the story of Soviet "Active Measures" without it.
@Georgetown@RidT One thing I haven’t yet told you about class is that I kicked off a tradition of picking a propaganda poster to thematically work with each week’s lesson. In week 3, to go along with Active Measures, I decided to go with a classic – this Не болтай! poster from 1941.
@Georgetown@RidT Our first reading was an excerpt from the “Soviet Active Measures” Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing in 1985, featuring the testimony of former Defense Sec Robert Gates, who at the time was Deputy Director of Intelligence @CIAloc.gov/law/find/nomin…
@Georgetown@RidT@CIA “Moscow’s ability centrally to orchestrate their political influence activities, both overt and covert, is unique in the world,” Gates said at the time, covering tactics like front organizations, forgeries, article placements, agents of influence, and more.
@Georgetown@RidT@CIA Gates also likened Soviet efforts to that of a “giant political action committee” w/ a large budget, experienced campaign strategists, activists, serious PR chops, ability to place covert agents, freedom frm disclosure. Interesting to consider now in context of domestic IO actors
@Georgetown@RidT@CIA But before we dove into Cold War history, we went back to the 1920s-30s, talking about Soviet Agit trains used to spread propaganda w/ a reading from @adelheidh4: apparatusjournal.net/index.php/appa…; & Operation Trust involving a fake anti-Bolshevik org which @RidT covers v. well in his book
@Georgetown@RidT@CIA@adelheidh4 We couldn’t get through this week of class w/o covering the case that has become a trope of disinfo research references: Operation INFEKTION, complete w/ media placements, leveraging existing conspiratorial sentiment and agents of influence/trusted figures cia.gov/library/center…
@Georgetown@RidT@CIA@adelheidh4 Throughout class, we broke Soviet active measures into a set of tactics, which *surprise surprise* we were able to draw present-day parallels to. These included front orgs, use of trusted figures, co-opting mass media, forgeries, stoking conspiracy & racial tensions, and more
1/ Excited to share our 2017-2020 IO Threat Report! It looks back at the last 3+ years of our work at @Facebook to counter influence operations and analyzes the 150+ CIB takedowns we've done since 2017: about.fb.com/wp-content/upl…
2/ Back in 2017, we published our first IO white paper where we described how we conceived of this problem at the time: about.fb.com/wp-content/upl…
3/ We've come a long way since 2017 - our investigations teams have grown, our knowledge of threat actors has expanded, and our understanding of the influence ops problem has evolved. Today's report is a chance to take a step back, reflect on what we've seen, and to look forward
1/ Every week, I have mentorship sessions w/ students/others interested in getting into the “field” of countering influence operations, disinformation, misinformation. Having all these conversations, I realize it might be helpful to share the advice and tips more broadly: a 🧵
2/ Normally, I break down the “field” into several different categories: investigations, policy development, advocacy, and resilience/literacy. For many of these categories, you can do this work in government, at tech companies, multilateral institutions, or in civil society.
3/ Within government, certain agencies are responsible for technical investigations, some responsible for deterrence and response, and others policy or regulation. Same often goes for tech companies. The question is what folks are most interested in spending their time doing
1/ Interesting to see @USTreasury explicitly spell out role of Russian Intel Services, front orgs, outlets in global influence operations. And for those of us tracking this space, it’s helpful to map these to CIB disruptions we’ve done over the yrs, a 🧵 home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
@USTreasury 2/ So let’s break this down. In this graphic, @USTreasury links RU intel services (FSB, GRU, SVR) to websites/outlets InfoRos, Newsfront/SouthFront, Strategic Culture Foundation. Respectively, our teams have disrupted networks linked to these in Aug '18, April ’20, Sept '20
@USTreasury 3/ In Aug 2018, our IO team took down a network attributed to "Russian military intelligence services" -- InfoRos was linked to that network about.fb.com/news/2018/08/m…
In week 8 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we focused on how state-sponsored espionage operations, hacks and leaks can play a role in influence operations. How does the dissemination of leaked material and forgeries fit into the IO playbook?
In week 7 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we focused on role of media, state media/overt propaganda in the info ecosystem & toolbox of influence ops. What role can journalism play in inadvertently amplifying IO campaigns or conversely finding them?
@Georgetown One of my favorite pieces of all time on this subject is “Oxygen of Amplification" from @wphillips49@datasociety which looks at how the coverage choices of editors and reporters play a role in the amount of oxygen supplied to falsehoods and manipulations datasociety.net/wp-content/upl…
After a few months of a hiatus, reviving this tweet thread to cover the remaining material from weeks 6-14. Thanks to everyone for your patience waiting while work and other priorities got in the way.
In week 6 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we focused on Myanmar and the Philippines as case studies into (a) domestically aimed influence operations; and (b) how digital harassment, the silencing of activist voices can play a role in influence activities.