In week 8 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we focused on how state-sponsored espionage operations, hacks and leaks can play a role in influence operations. How does the dissemination of leaked material and forgeries fit into the IO playbook?
1/ Excited to share our 2017-2020 IO Threat Report! It looks back at the last 3+ years of our work at @Facebook to counter influence operations and analyzes the 150+ CIB takedowns we've done since 2017: about.fb.com/wp-content/upl…
2/ Back in 2017, we published our first IO white paper where we described how we conceived of this problem at the time: about.fb.com/wp-content/upl…
3/ We've come a long way since 2017 - our investigations teams have grown, our knowledge of threat actors has expanded, and our understanding of the influence ops problem has evolved. Today's report is a chance to take a step back, reflect on what we've seen, and to look forward
1/ Every week, I have mentorship sessions w/ students/others interested in getting into the “field” of countering influence operations, disinformation, misinformation. Having all these conversations, I realize it might be helpful to share the advice and tips more broadly: a 🧵
2/ Normally, I break down the “field” into several different categories: investigations, policy development, advocacy, and resilience/literacy. For many of these categories, you can do this work in government, at tech companies, multilateral institutions, or in civil society.
3/ Within government, certain agencies are responsible for technical investigations, some responsible for deterrence and response, and others policy or regulation. Same often goes for tech companies. The question is what folks are most interested in spending their time doing
1/ Interesting to see @USTreasury explicitly spell out role of Russian Intel Services, front orgs, outlets in global influence operations. And for those of us tracking this space, it’s helpful to map these to CIB disruptions we’ve done over the yrs, a 🧵 home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
@USTreasury 2/ So let’s break this down. In this graphic, @USTreasury links RU intel services (FSB, GRU, SVR) to websites/outlets InfoRos, Newsfront/SouthFront, Strategic Culture Foundation. Respectively, our teams have disrupted networks linked to these in Aug '18, April ’20, Sept '20
@USTreasury 3/ In Aug 2018, our IO team took down a network attributed to "Russian military intelligence services" -- InfoRos was linked to that network about.fb.com/news/2018/08/m…
In week 7 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we focused on role of media, state media/overt propaganda in the info ecosystem & toolbox of influence ops. What role can journalism play in inadvertently amplifying IO campaigns or conversely finding them?
@Georgetown One of my favorite pieces of all time on this subject is “Oxygen of Amplification" from @wphillips49@datasociety which looks at how the coverage choices of editors and reporters play a role in the amount of oxygen supplied to falsehoods and manipulations datasociety.net/wp-content/upl…
After a few months of a hiatus, reviving this tweet thread to cover the remaining material from weeks 6-14. Thanks to everyone for your patience waiting while work and other priorities got in the way.
In week 6 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we focused on Myanmar and the Philippines as case studies into (a) domestically aimed influence operations; and (b) how digital harassment, the silencing of activist voices can play a role in influence activities.
Thanks for your patience, class! Took a little hiatus for a month. But we're back! In week 5 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we pivoted from Russian influence activities to Chinese and Iranian IO state actors.
@Georgetown Our first reading was from @RANDCorporation's Timothy Heath @WarOnTheRocks on China's influence operations targeting the Chinese diaspora. The article does good job of highlighting distinctions between Russian and Chinese operations and their tactics warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijin…