The scope of the #Natanz attack is much broader than originally thought. While #Iran has kept quiet, this attack (likely carried out by Israel) could precipitate a new round of US-Iranian escalation seven months after the Soleimani assassination. nytimes.com/2020/07/10/wor…
Lots of comparisons are being made to Stuxnet, a coordinated cyber assault on Iran's nuclear infrastructure ten years ago. That attack took a year to repair and set back Iran's nuclear program by years. But there are some key differences wired.com/2014/11/countd…
Tensions between the US and Iran are higher than they were in 2010. The US is gearing up for a confrontation over four Iranian oil tankers currently making their way to Venezuela. This attack could be the first in a series of moves, rather than a one-off. reuters.com/article/us-ven…
Tehran is staying quiet about the Natanz attack. That is partly because it is waiting for the US election to see if Trump remains in office, or is replaced by Joe Biden, who might restart negots based on the JCPOA. US and Israel expects Iran to limit its retaliation after Natanz.
The attack seemed precisely targeted to weaken the Iranian program, setting it back rather than destroying it entirely. As the US position is outwardly based on bringing Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table, a damaged program might give Iran less leverage.
If all sides anticipate new negotiations, each will attempt to maneuver for favorable position. Israel (which was involved in the attack, if not the driving force) might want to carry out a blow against Iran while it still enjoys US support.
So far, we've had little substantive comment out of Iran. But that might be due to the fact that the Rouhani-Zarif govt has been playing defense, as it faces a confrontational Majlis and growing internal unrest, as presidential elections loom next year. en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-lawmake…
For now, I'm guessing they'll continue their waiting game, with changes in policy awaiting the US elections and the Iran Presidential elections next year. The decision to implement the JCPOA dispute mechanism is a tool to keep the issue alive. politico.com/news/2020/07/0…
Iran is hovering on the edge of the deal largely, I believe, because the leadership believes a new US admin might try to negotiate a deal comparable to the JCPOA. While that might prove difficult to do, it provides grounds for de-escalation and a possible end to sanctions.
For Khamenei, that's preferable to the current stand-off with the US, which hasn't resulted in the collapse of the regime but has certainly not been to the govt's benefit.
So, a lot to unpack here. Iranian domestic politics, US presidential politics, Israeli politics (and uncertainty over the future of US support), the uncertain state of the JCPOA, not to mention the overall state of US-Iran tensions amidst a global pandemic. What could come next!
