Thread by @disruptivedean

For anyone wanting a proper read of what the Uk Government has announced today about @huawei and #5G and #FTTX networks, this document from @NCSC has a lot more detail than all the guff in the press

Actually discusses specific network elements affected

ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/ncsc-…

My take:

- I don't buy this idea today's rule change "delays 5G by 2-3 yrs"
- My sense is it allows the industry (& some in govt) to quietly back away from 5G's cult-like hype with a good excuse
- Many I speak to hadn't realised the cool "vision" stuff was always 2023+ anyway

Added to that, post-pandemic economic downturn would likely have slowed 5G deployment *anyway*

Even though the telecoms industry is doing OK, it will face some fallout - not least, people unwilling to upgrade to new £1000 phones, esp as they're using home bband & WiFi more now

The NCSC angle - that the rules are changing largely because the new (revised) sanctions on #Huawei mean different components will get used & these haven't been scrutinised, seems reasonable

Hard to know where objective cybersec ends & subjective politics starts here, though

I see lots of people on the China-hawk side of things bemoaning the 2027 deadline, but to be honest if it's old kit which has already been through GCHQ / HCSEC scrutiny then if it's OK today then that won't really change

I can't really see argument for a fast rip/replace

... as that would just write off existing assets merely to make a political point.

Would be costly for the MNOs & probably need to be covered by Government, and would likely mean downtime & various other disruptions on existing working networks

This does all have a bunch of implications about:
- Private 5G networks (now even more likely to be enterprise-run, as MNOs will be focused on sorting the main public macro networks)
- Open RAN technologies - likely to be more mature by 2027, so definitely in with a shot

Thinking more about it, the end-2020 target date to end new Huawei purchases is also (rather conveniently) after the US election, which might give a chance to see if the recent sanctions might be reversed

Another thing that occurs to me is that non-MNO telcos (industry specialist NOs, MVNOs, private networks, community bband, local authorities, wholesale & neutral-host players) all need to start playing much more attention to cybersecurity & supply-chain issues, especially HRVs

Irony: it's the imposition of recent US sanctions on selling components to @Huawei that, paradoxically, seemed to have made it a higher perceived risk

Where it's using US components, @NCSC scrutiny suggested that RAN equipment was OK.

But the post-sanctions versions are riskier