@lingli_vienna (1/x) The primary way I can imagine Xi’s power getting expanded is a scenario in which the institution of “the Party” itself begins to get cannibalized in name of Xi himself.
[Note: really dark. Major implications for political instability. But I think we’re in that zone now.]
[Note: really dark. Major implications for political instability. But I think we’re in that zone now.]
@lingli_vienna (2/x) I can imagine two ways in which this might happen.
First, resort to bottom-up mobilization. That’s the Cultural Revolution analogy. You’d need to see the top leader calling the disgruntled in society into the streets to attack his enemies – perceived or real.
First, resort to bottom-up mobilization. That’s the Cultural Revolution analogy. You’d need to see the top leader calling the disgruntled in society into the streets to attack his enemies – perceived or real.
@lingli_vienna (3/x) And of course, there’s *zero* sign at the moment of that happening. Everything at the moment appears to be top down. At least so far …
@lingli_vienna (4/x) The second possibility would be a more top-down effort. Say, remodeling core Party institutions to clarify that their role is to enforce – not simply *Party* (i.e. institutional) rules - but something closer to “Xi’ism/Xi thought.”
@lingli_vienna (5/x) That would be the way which one might seek to send tremors through the entire Chinese Party bureaucracy and orient a massive apparatus to be more attentive to the will of an single individual rather than other actors/institutions.
@lingli_vienna (6/x) Of course, in order for that to happen, you’d have to see some big moves in key bureaucracies in China. Say, the central disciplinary inspection apparatus. Or the Party politics and law committees.
@lingli_vienna (7/x) You’d expect to see some kind of sign that those were getting remodeled to ferret out – not just corruption or anti-Party sentiment – but active disloyalty or insufficient attention within the Party to top leader (i.e., “anti-Xi thought” or “unorganized political activity”)
@lingli_vienna (8/x) But who might be the key scholars to look at in order to help us understand whether such trends are taking place?
Oh, wait, I know one in Vienna! She’s been pretty much on top of *all* of these trends. See here: tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
Oh, wait, I know one in Vienna! She’s been pretty much on top of *all* of these trends. See here: tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
@lingli_vienna (10/x) My gut tells me that both the Qiushi piece and parts of the bureaucratic shifts that you (and @SPCmonitor ) are looking at are skirmishes in a deeper bureaucratic struggle tied to *the* core political challenge at the heart of China’s one-Party system ...
@lingli_vienna @SPCmonitor (11/x) ... namely:
the role of the top leader vis a vis the Party as an institution.
the role of the top leader vis a vis the Party as an institution.
@lingli_vienna @SPCmonitor (12/x) It’s not totally clear how all turns out. There’s inertia. There’s resistance. There are conflicting pressures to try to strengthen the Party as an institution.
However, I’ve got a real sick feeling in my stomach watching all this.
However, I’ve got a real sick feeling in my stomach watching all this.
@lingli_vienna @SPCmonitor (13/x) But I think your research is *right* on top of one of the most fundamental and important latent institutional problems in the Chinese political system.
Which is why it is so important!
Which is why it is so important!
