Interesting proposal by @DavidMaxwell161 for a Dept of Special Ops. Though if #SOF were to be their own service, it’d make more sense to consolidate the Service components under the new Dept as well (Dave proposes leaving them as is). 1/n militarytimes.com/opinion/commen…
If the underlying problem to be solved is lack of effective oversight, creation of a whole new Dept/Service for #SOF doesn’t solve that if a bifurcated chain of command remains. 2/n
Plus, if #SOF are to be their own service, they can’t have their cake & eat it too—they’d likely have to forego the vast majority of the “Service common” support they currently get from the Services (MFP-2) & pay for that stuff themselves (MFP-11). 3/n
This would require significant increases in manpower for the #SOF enterprise, as they’d now have to manage their own MILPAY and personnel systems, etc. And you know they wouldn’t get a 1:1 increase in budget to account for the loss of MFP-2 support. 4/n
Other Qs I’d have about this proposal include:
- What happens to JSOC’s acquisition authority if it’s a COCOM?
- Where do all the 3* billets come from for the TSOCs? (Not to mention all the 1* deputy billets) And what are the feeder paths to create all these SOF 3*s? 5/n
- If you consolidated today’s service components under the new Dept/Service (as it would make sense to do), you’d have redundancy in HQs, ground unit capabilities, etc. Would you then create a single Ground Unit, Air Unit, & Maritime Unit? & maybe an “Influence Unit?” 6/n
In short, I applaud @DavidMaxwell161’s radical thinking—such proposals are helpful thought exercises—but it seems to me that such a proposal would need to be taken to its logical conclusion. 7/n
If #SOF were their own service, an optimally designed Dept of Special Operations would look little like the SOF enterprise does today. I wonder if even SOF would be ready for that radical a set of changes. 8/8
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As with its last report, this latest report on the #Taliban’s relationship with #alQaeda in #Afghanistan is 180 degrees out from the current US assessment. 1/n cbsnews.com/news/afghanist…
“According to the report presented to the UNSC [#alQaeda] has established ‘up to 8 new training camps in #Afghanistan, including four in Ghazni, Laghman, Parwan & Uruzgan Provinces, w\a new base to stockpile weaponry in the Panjshir Valley….’ 2/n
“…The terrorist organization also operates 5 madrasas - religious schools where it trains and indoctrinates children to become fighters - in the east & northeast of #Afghanistan, the reports said…” 3/n
I was recently passed a pre-publication copy of Feridun Sinirlioğlu's independent assessment of the situation in #Afghanistan, conducted for the @UN
I'll put some thoughts about it in this THREAD. 1/n
@UN (Since the report isn't out yet, I can't link to it, but you can find various news articles about it via Google, such as this one by @VOANews: ) 2/nvoanews.com/a/un-mandated-…
@UN @VOANews Overall, the assessment is clearly written & admirably forthright, especially given that its audiences are wide-ranging, from the #Taliban to those who hate the Taliban.
Its primary conclusion: "the status quo of int'l engagement is not working." 3/n
Today, the #Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an evaluation report of its contribution to the Resolute Support mission in #Afghanistan that *pulls no punches.*
I'll string together its primary findings in this THREAD. 1/n
Before the findings, a quick comment: the Dutch MFA produced this report b/c "Dutch contributions to missions under Article 100 of the Dutch Constitution are subject to an obligation to evaluate the deployment after it's been completed"
Today, the @JoeBiden admin released its National Security Strategy. I’ll summarize its major points & put some thoughts on #terrorism & #Afghanistan specifically in this THREAD. 1/n
@JoeBiden The strategy exists in 5 parts: (1) overview of the problem; (2) sources of US strength (solutions); (3) global priorities; (4) strategy by region; (5) conclusion.
Oddly, part 1 starts on page 6. Nitpicky, I know, but still weird--who counts the cover as page 1? 3/n
Today the @StateDept held a presser and there were questions about today's announcement of the "#Afghanistan Fund." I'll string those together in this THREAD. 1/n
Thread. In the immediate aftermath of #Afghanistan’s collapse, I attended a virtual event featuring Petraeus & Crocker on what went wrong. Their comments are best summarized as “things were bad until we got there, then they improved until we left & others effed it up.” 1/n
In this article, P4 adopts a similar tone. The “we” he uses is not a “royal we” that includes himself, but a we of “others.” The parts that he describes as having been done right are the parts that he did—aligning resources, getting HQs in place, etc. 2/n
Count the number of times he uses “I” & the associated context. Overwhelmingly these refer to policies that he recommended but weren’t adopted (& were the “right” ones), not mistakes that he personally made. 3/n