Thanks for your patience, class! Took a little hiatus for a month. But we're back! In week 5 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we pivoted from Russian influence activities to Chinese and Iranian IO state actors.
@Georgetown Our first reading was from @RANDCorporation's Timothy Heath @WarOnTheRocks on China's influence operations targeting the Chinese diaspora. The article does good job of highlighting distinctions between Russian and Chinese operations and their tactics warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijin…
@Georgetown @RANDCorporation @WarOnTheRocks Students then read this analysis from @RecordedFuture, which also makes distinctions btw Russian and Chinese tactics (disruptive & destabilizing vs. largely positive & coordinated), Chinese tactics targeted domestically vs. abroad go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/…
@Georgetown @RANDCorporation @WarOnTheRocks @RecordedFuture Next up was this piece from @PLMattis
@WarOnTheRocks which probably does the best side-by-side analysis of Russian & Chinese IO: “set-piece ops vs. playing the man; service-led ops vs. service-facilitated ops; and agents of influence vs. influenced agents” warontherocks.com/2018/01/contra…
@Georgetown @RANDCorporation @WarOnTheRocks @RecordedFuture @PLMattis For Iranian ops, we read this important analysis @FireEye in 2018, which delves into a network focused on audiences in US, UK, LATAM, & Middle East: fireeye.com/blog/threat-re… and this historical overview of Iranian IO @ForeignAffairs from @ArianeTabatabai foreignaffairs.com/articles/middl…
@Georgetown @RANDCorporation @WarOnTheRocks @RecordedFuture @PLMattis @FireEye @ForeignAffairs @ArianeTabatabai Last but not least, students read the @citizenlab Endless Mayfly report @gabriellelim @tenacioustek @jsrailton @moranned @albefittarelli @RonDeibert, which looks at an Iranian network that created inauthentic personas, websites & “ephemeral disinformation” citizenlab.ca/2019/05/burned…
@Georgetown @RANDCorporation @WarOnTheRocks @RecordedFuture @PLMattis @FireEye @ForeignAffairs @ArianeTabatabai @citizenlab @gabriellelim @tenacioustek @jsrailton @moranned @albefittarelli @RonDeibert In class we broke out each state actor into respective tactics/patterns. For Iranian IO, that included impersonating respected orgs & news outlets, typosquatting, media front orgs, contacting journalists & activists, leveraging state media, content laundering, & partisan personas
@Georgetown @RANDCorporation @WarOnTheRocks @RecordedFuture @PLMattis @FireEye @ForeignAffairs @ArianeTabatabai @citizenlab @gabriellelim @tenacioustek @jsrailton @moranned @albefittarelli @RonDeibert For Chinese IO, that breakdown of tactics/patterns included media influence operations, targeting of diaspora communities, education/think tank front orgs, capitalizing on the entertainment sector/Hollywood, capturing influencers and “fan girl” culture, and leveraging state media
@Georgetown @RANDCorporation @WarOnTheRocks @RecordedFuture @PLMattis @FireEye @ForeignAffairs @ArianeTabatabai @citizenlab @gabriellelim @tenacioustek @jsrailton @moranned @albefittarelli @RonDeibert I know there’s been a lot of great writing, analysis on both Iranian and Chinese influence operations that has come out since we held this lecture earlier this year. I am definitely planning on updating the syllabus before the next spring semester. Feel free to send ideas my way!

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Оlga Belogolova

Оlga Belogolova Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @olgs7

26 May 21
1/ Excited to share our 2017-2020 IO Threat Report! It looks back at the last 3+ years of our work at @Facebook to counter influence operations and analyzes the 150+ CIB takedowns we've done since 2017: about.fb.com/wp-content/upl…
2/ Back in 2017, we published our first IO white paper where we described how we conceived of this problem at the time:
about.fb.com/wp-content/upl…

I got to work with @jenrweedon @alexstamos @Will_Nuland on that paper and today feels like a million yrs later
3/ We've come a long way since 2017 - our investigations teams have grown, our knowledge of threat actors has expanded, and our understanding of the influence ops problem has evolved. Today's report is a chance to take a step back, reflect on what we've seen, and to look forward
Read 17 tweets
24 May 21
1/ Every week, I have mentorship sessions w/ students/others interested in getting into the “field” of countering influence operations, disinformation, misinformation. Having all these conversations, I realize it might be helpful to share the advice and tips more broadly: a 🧵
2/ Normally, I break down the “field” into several different categories: investigations, policy development, advocacy, and resilience/literacy. For many of these categories, you can do this work in government, at tech companies, multilateral institutions, or in civil society.
3/ Within government, certain agencies are responsible for technical investigations, some responsible for deterrence and response, and others policy or regulation. Same often goes for tech companies. The question is what folks are most interested in spending their time doing
Read 10 tweets
15 Apr 21
1/ Interesting to see @USTreasury explicitly spell out role of Russian Intel Services, front orgs, outlets in global influence operations. And for those of us tracking this space, it’s helpful to map these to CIB disruptions we’ve done over the yrs, a 🧵 home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
@USTreasury 2/ So let’s break this down. In this graphic, @USTreasury links RU intel services (FSB, GRU, SVR) to websites/outlets InfoRos, Newsfront/SouthFront, Strategic Culture Foundation. Respectively, our teams have disrupted networks linked to these in Aug '18, April ’20, Sept '20
@USTreasury 3/ In Aug 2018, our IO team took down a network attributed to "Russian military intelligence services" -- InfoRos was linked to that network about.fb.com/news/2018/08/m…

Based on what FB shared with SSCI, more by @noUpside @shelbygrossman @stanfordio: cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/publication…
Read 8 tweets
6 Dec 20
In week 8 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we focused on how state-sponsored espionage operations, hacks and leaks can play a role in influence operations. How does the dissemination of leaked material and forgeries fit into the IO playbook?
@Georgetown To start, students read “Tainted Leaks: Disinformation and Phishing With a Russian Nexus” frm @citizenlab @jsrailton @CyberClues @cmatthewbrooks, Peter Tanchak, Ron Diebert citizenlab.ca/2017/05/tainte… for a case study into stolen and manipulated documents & how they can be used in IO
@Georgetown @citizenlab @jsrailton @CyberClues @cmatthewbrooks For a refresher on the 2016 Russian hack & leak operation, students read “The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the US” @SangerNYT @ScottShaneNYT @EricLiptonNYT nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/…. Perhaps next semester, I’ll assign documentary now @HBO hbo.com/documentaries/…
Read 11 tweets
28 Nov 20
In week 7 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we focused on role of media, state media/overt propaganda in the info ecosystem & toolbox of influence ops. What role can journalism play in inadvertently amplifying IO campaigns or conversely finding them?
@Georgetown One of my favorite pieces of all time on this subject is “Oxygen of Amplification" from @wphillips49 @datasociety which looks at how the coverage choices of editors and reporters play a role in the amount of oxygen supplied to falsehoods and manipulations datasociety.net/wp-content/upl…
@Georgetown @wphillips49 @datasociety A useful visual for our discussion in class was the “trumpet of amplification” from @cward1e @firstdraftnews which shows the journey of disinformation through the information ecosystem
Read 10 tweets
27 Nov 20
After a few months of a hiatus, reviving this tweet thread to cover the remaining material from weeks 6-14. Thanks to everyone for your patience waiting while work and other priorities got in the way.
In week 6 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we focused on Myanmar and the Philippines as case studies into (a) domestically aimed influence operations; and (b) how digital harassment, the silencing of activist voices can play a role in influence activities.
@Georgetown The week’s readings included the fascinating “Architects of Networked Disinformation” from @jonathan_c_ong and Jason Vincent A. Cabañes: newtontechfordev.com/wp-content/upl… and “How Duterte Used Facebook To Fuel the Philippine Drug War” from @daveyalba @BuzzFeed buzzfeednews.com/article/daveya…
Read 12 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(