Thread by @HeshmatAlavi

LONG THREAD

1)
#Iran’s regime is going the distance to portray the July 2 attack on a sensitive nuclear site as an act of “sabotage” & deny any possibility of an airstrike.

Recent developments indicate strange movement of equipment underground.

Why?
medium.com/@heshmatalavi2…

2)
A certain report went unnoticed—Iran is transferring new generations of advanced centrifuges used to enrich uranium from a pilot facility (attacked on July 2) into a hall at its primary fuel plant in Natanz.

The hall is underground.

h/t: @SnakeDocTop

bloomberg.com/news/articles/…

3)
Why is the hall being underground important?

Let me explain.

The Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) is where smaller research cascades (less than a few thousand centrifuges) of newer models are installed for higher levels of enrichment for research purposes.

4)
According to the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), all these research centrifuges in this center must be installed & tested above ground. JCPOA also dictates that uranium enrichment must be with IR-1 centrifuges & Iran cannot mechanically test more than two IR-2—IR-8 centrifuges.

5)
Two 164-centrifuge cascades of IR-2 & IR-4 centrifuges installed & under testing in the PFEP site were uninstalled & placed in warehouses.

6)
Back in November 2019, Iran gradually installed 60 IR-6 centrifuges & inserted gas into these devices. Launching 164-count cascades of IR-4 & IR-6 centrifuges were also ordered to be installed on ground at the PFEP building.
reuters.com/article/us-ira…

7)
Iran’s ability to assemble advanced centrifuges decreased significantly after the July 2 attack.

The Bloomberg report says the remaining advanced centrifuges have been transferred to the main buried halls (for protection against future attacks) & not for re-installation.

8)
This transfer to an underground facility is yet another indication of the source of the July 2 attack.

Transferring the remaining centrifuges in the span of around one month to an underground bunker, built to withstand air attacks, signals security priorities for the regime.

9)
Reminders:
The addition of advanced centrifuges to Hall B of the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant is a technical violation of the JCPOA, which Iran remains a member of.

Iran has withheld its conclusions on what caused the blast, citing security considerations.

10)
More recently:

The sabotage theory would be difficult to prove the evidence that have been gathered to this day by various experts and their rendered analysis.

For example, this 4.5-meter radius hole in the roof.

11)
Natanz’s assembly building is a single large building with an annex. Images from the construction period indicates it contained the annexed section housed logistical/heavy equipment. The roof & walls were probably finished after installation.

12)
Note the location of the circle-shape hole that indicates a 11-meter symmetrical impact from the explosion on the roof. It is located on the wall separating the building & the annex, showing the entrance of a foreign object.

13)
A sabotage bombing attack placing explosives inside the building would not create a symmetrical impact resulting in such a hole in the roof and expand on both sides of the wall.

14)
The most logical explanation for this type of damage is the entrance of a foreign object (projectile) from the roof and an early explosion prior to reaching the necessary penetration inside the building, and the foreign object hitting building columns or machinery inside.

15)
The only on-the-ground image of the site after the attack (which has been doctored) clearly shows this hole.

RGB code of black area—#000000 (absolute darkness) which is very unlikely in such size & in a naturally taken image, especially in daylight.

Credit: @NarimanGharib

16)
This image shows the damaged wall (in red) in the area near the blast location on the roof, and not near the ground. Whereas the wall near the claimed area of the pipe blast (in green) remains intact.

17)
While the blast can result in a complex arrangement of remnants (especially considering the arrangement of equipment inside), the main damage seen on the other side of the building ~50 meters from the hole in the roof can’t be simply associated to just one blast in this area.

18)
Objects with long lengths & smaller widths, such as plates covering the roof or different rods that scatter due to the blast, are not thrown in circular fashion around the blast center.

They shape like arrows towards the center. This indicates another focal blast point.

19)
At least one other focal blast point outside the building, and another inside the building, not the claimed corner but more inside on the southwest edge and separate from the main focal blast point, can be seen.

20)
Great effort went to leave the site untouched
Brighter image—Morning of July 3, day after the attack
Darker image—July 6, four days after the attack
Only obvious change is the removal of a triangle-shaped object (~2x5 meter) & one object on the NW edge of roof was rearranged.

21)
Official: that air defense measures around Natanz increased following the July 2 attack.

“Due to the presence of various advanced air-defence systems, it is advised to be cautious with the risk associated to civil aviation.”

Valid until Jan 16, 2021
easa.europa.eu/domains/air-op…

22)
The warning cites a record of previous incidents & issued warnings, presence of numerous air defense systems, concluding that flight under 25,000 feet is analyzed of high in risk.

It is recommended that flights take this risk analysis & updated NOTAM date into consideration.

23)
This video from July 5, four days after the attack, shows Iran moving air defense missile batteries to the Natanz nuclear site.

If it was a sabotage bombing, why move such strategic units to Natanz?

24)
Compiling the damage evidence with an increase in air defense measures & transferring remaining centrifuges to fortified underground structures all indicate the July 2 attack was an airstrike & not the claimed sabotage scenario.

25)
An airstrike with manned aircraft, such as F-16s or F-35s, would be difficult but not impossible.

Other than the long range & refueling needs, the amount of damage caused is not worth it. Such an airstrike would only be allowed if it renders a long-term strategic setback.

26)
While Iran is flatly denying any airstrikes, the possibility of using armed drones for such a surgical attack is not unlikely.

On August 25, 2014, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency reported that the IRGC shot down an Israeli Elbit Hermes 450 spy drone near Natanz.

27)
A normal industrial incident in Natanz is also unlikely.

Due to various reasons, including massive investing & constant advice provided by int'l experts, the site is probably one of Iran’s most advanced industrial complexes when it comes to HSE rules & regulations.

28)
The destroyed building that exploded was used for the mechanic assembly of centrifuges, meaning there were no special explosive material inside.

Furthermore, a night shift is unlikely in such a building.

Images indicate a pressure wave (explosion) inside the building.

29)
The possibility of sabotage & entrance into the site (special forces) is next to none.

Possibility of secretly transferring explosives into the site is doubtable due to security measures tighter than airports.

Everyone is tested for traces of explosives before entrance.

30)
Back in November 2019 Iran alleged that the U.N. inspector it blocked from entering a nuclear site tested positive for suspected traces of explosive nitrates.
apnews.com/4f5d5ac4817740…

31)
Moreover, I think we can agree that this attack deliberate.

Yet, considering its small proportions, it appears the attackers sought a specific objective and to inflict a psychological blow, as if such measures can be repeated in the future.

32)
However, since preventing such a future attack through any form of sabotage would be quite easy with further inspections and security measures, the sought psychological impact cannot be realized through sabotage.

33)
The possibility of a cyber-attack is even less than sabotage considering the above-mentioned reasoning (lack of explosive material) and escalated security measures following the Stuxnet attack.

34)
Some more details:

The yellow dot shows one of the possible points of impact and the arrow indicates the general direction of one of the projectiles.

35)
The damage is Category B (50-75% of external brickwork destroyed, remaining walls have unrepairable gaping cracks) inflicted in yellow circle area (20m radius).

This amount of damage needs around 200-300 kgs of TNT-equivalent explosives (w/ initial velocity).

36)
Initial blast radius 6.5 to 7 meters at the Natanz nuclear site in central Iran

Credit: @TheGoodISIS & @AuroraIntel

37)
Moreover, the building remnants spreading in east to west direction to a distance of more than 50 meters (light yellow lines) support the possibility of a foreign projectile impact from the general east direction. Some debris are distanced at up to 100m, via @AuroraIntel.

38)
A cruise missile with a medium-size warhead cannot create a crater as it explodes aboveground to inflict maximum damage on the target.

Filtered images show a corner of the building is gone.
Low number of small remnants are blown far away. A 5m wall is gone & no columns!

39)
Iranian officials should know by now what type of projectile was used (possibility an advanced cruise missile).

Air-launched weapons, be it cruise missiles or glide bombs (latter most likely not used in this attack), leave remnants that can be quickly analyzed at the site.

40)
Reminder:

Iranian officials claim they are aware of the source of this sabotage but refrain from public announcements due to security considerations (most likely due to the psychological impact).

Determining an airstrike is far easier than sabotage or cyber-attacks.

41)
Better images show one of the multiple points of impact on the asphalt road outside the Natanz building.

Considering the destruction and shrapnel both inside and outside the building, multiple projectiles could have been used in this attack.

42)
Remarks made by Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesperson of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, about the possibility of reconstructing the building at the same site, or another location “with air defense considerations” further the possibility of an airstrike in this attack.

43)
“Air defense considerations” is the key to the Natanz riddle here.

It is worth noting that building another site in another location other than Natanz is yet another a violation by Iran of the 2015 nuclear deal that there is so much controversy about these days.

44)
In the images on the left @IntelliTimes points to a lesser observed detail of the explosion at the Natanz nuclear site that sheds more light on nature of the blast.

Credit also to @Maxar & @JDoaim

45)
Let’s also quickly evaluate similar situations following airstrikes in Syria.

This 48-meter x 26-meter building was destroyed in Homs, central Syria. It’s around two thirds of the 45-meter x 75-meter building in Natanz.

Parts of the Homs building remained intact.

46)
This is another target near the Damascus International Airport, around half of the Natanz building area.

One fifth of this Damascus building remained intact after the strike.

Pay close attention to how the building’s remnants and shrapnel are spread (seen in green arrows).

47)
In that attack two flat-bed trucks next to the building were apparently the target of an airstrike. However, the attack inflicted damage to parts of the building.

48)
Two important issues raised by @LesJohnsonHrvat & @MatthewDavidHa4 who know far more than me about this subject. Their input further advances the airstrike scenario.

(Thank you to you both!)

49)
Again, Iran’s regime has gone the distance to portray the July 2 attack as an act of sabotage, knowing an airstrike would be costly.

An NYT piece citing an IRGC member & a Mid-East intel official is quite suspicious due to its very timely nature & mysterious sources.

50)
Keep in mind:

a. It is written by @FarnazFassihi, who has a long report card of being described as an Iran apologist, praising both Zarif & Qasim Soliemani in previous NYT pieces.

51)
b. The possibility of an advanced air/cruise missile strike on Natanz would deliver a humiliating setback to the regime after all its propaganda about purchasing the S300 air defense system from Russia & claiming to have indigenous systems “even more advanced than the S300”!

52)
Another Iran apologist rushing to Tehran’s rescue is Babak Taghvaee who in an Independent (Farsi) article claims the Natanz attack is anything but an airstrike.

Taghvaee: “It appears a bombing inside this building rendered significant damage and a fire, not an air strike.”

53)
And it’s quite interesting that Reuters, after four days, continues to deliberately provide false and face-saving reporting for Iran’s regime.

The piece was written by Parisa Hafezi, a known Iran apologist at Reuters.

54)
Reminder:

-2007 document mentioning @PHREUTERS shows how the @ReutersIran team needs approval from Iran's Intelligence Ministry to visit the city of Qom.

-All foreign media reporters in Iran must abide by Intel Ministry guidelines.

55)
For me, this is looking more like a precision airstrike by Israel with U.S. support & maybe even U.S. allies in the region.

Remember that Iran first claimed the building was nothing but a shed & now we know it was probably the regime’s most advanced centrifuge assembly lab.

56)
If “advanced equipment & precision measurement devices” have been damaged in this attack, it will set back Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons for many weeks & even months. Some are saying a year.

We may see more bits of intelligence leaking in the future.

57)
As more signs indicate a foreign attack, Tehran needs to save face.

In my opinion, that is why Iran apologists such as Farnaz Fassihi, Babak Taghvaee & Parisa Hafezi have written pieces emphasizing the attack was anything but an airstrike.

58)
And a lesser discussed aspect of Natanz is the material damage the mullahs’ regime has inflicted on the Iranian people with this 300-hectare complex in the past 18 years.

Reminder: Iran has spent at least $800 billion dollars in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.