Ok, folks. The 2020 China Military Power report is out!
Here are a few thoughts on some of the interesting tidbits (IMO): media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/20…
Here are a few thoughts on some of the interesting tidbits (IMO): media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/20…
First up: overall size of the PLAN.
Folks will debate whether the PLAN is the "largest" in the world - ship count vs. tonnage, etc.
Regardless, this report reflects its continued VERY strong growth, referring to it as "approximately 350" vs last year's "more than 300".
Folks will debate whether the PLAN is the "largest" in the world - ship count vs. tonnage, etc.
Regardless, this report reflects its continued VERY strong growth, referring to it as "approximately 350" vs last year's "more than 300".
As the USN continues to produce (& soon start decommissioning) the "controversial" LCS, and works on the design of FFG(X), the PLAN has 42+ Jiangdao FFLs in service.
The FFL production run is now projected to be at least 70(!) ships, the latest equipped with towed array sonars.
The FFL production run is now projected to be at least 70(!) ships, the latest equipped with towed array sonars.
On the topic of equipping China's submarines with LACMs in the future, some discussion that the PLAN will "probably" field them on the future Type 093B SSGN, as well as potentially backfitting to older classes of submarines.
@CovertShores recently wrote this article discussing the possibility that the PLAN may base aircraft carriers at Hainan Island... forbes.com/sites/hisutton…
...and it appears that DoD agrees.
On the topic of aviation: we see a mention of the Y-8Q as a a dedicated fixed-wing ASW aircraft, now likely deployed to the Eastern Theater Navy.
And a definitive statement that China is developing a tanker version of the Y-20, which could significantly increase the PLAAF/PLANAF's reach. Last year's statement was much mushier, saying only that they "could" acquire that mission area.
Regarding variants of China's H-6 bomber, we have discussion/confirmation of the maritime strike H-6J, armed with YJ-12 ASCMs, as well as the H-6N's carriage of a drone or Air Launched Ballistic Missile (ALBM).
Me on the H-6J a while back:
IMO some of the biggest news in the report is the observed *major* growth in the PLA Rocket Force's IRBM (i.e., DF-26) inventory. This year's report identifies 200 launchers with 200+ missiles, compared to last year's 80 launchers and 80-160 missiles.
For those not-familiar with the DF-26, it's kind of an all-singing, all-dancing dual nuclear/conventional missile capable of hitting land & naval targets & able to rapidly swap warheads between both missions. China having large numbers of them could present a Major Challenge.
Would you like to know more? cnas.org/publications/r…
BTW, I've heard some folks doubt publicly whether the PLA Rocket Force can actually hit a moving target at sea. For at least the 2nd year in a row, the report states flat out that the DF-26 "is capable" of conducting strikes against naval targets. Pretty strong language IMO.
On the topic of nuclear forces, the report again mentions future deployment of the longer-range JL-3 SLBM, and adds the PLAN will then gain the "ability to target the United States from littoral waters."
Standing by for a debate over what "United States" means in 3...2...1...
Standing by for a debate over what "United States" means in 3...2...1...
Oh hey, looks like China may be developing its own lower-yield nuclear weapons, perhaps on the DF-26.
Someone should really let the PRC know how totally destabilizing and dangerous lower-yield nuclear weapons are going to be... 🧐
Someone should really let the PRC know how totally destabilizing and dangerous lower-yield nuclear weapons are going to be... 🧐
On the topic of overseas bases, China has armored vehicles and artillery at their base in Djibouti, but they're dependent on nearby commercial ports...
...but not for long!
And no, even DoD hasn't seen large scale deployment of aircraft to the Spratlys...yet.
I recently wrote an article about Chinese state-owned construction companies doing critical infrastructure work in strategic locations, and how China's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy matters for this sort of thing: lowyinstitute.org/the-interprete…
The report has a robust discussion of MCF, and I think reinforces some of the concerns that I mentioned in the article:
Takeaways IMO:
- huge growth of IRBM forces (range of DF-21s, i.e., 1st island chain, will matter less & less)
- continued major growth in number of modern PLAN surface combatants
- confirmation of a number of other new systems (H-6J/N, submarine LACMs, Y-20 tanker, etc.)
Fin.
- huge growth of IRBM forces (range of DF-21s, i.e., 1st island chain, will matter less & less)
- continued major growth in number of modern PLAN surface combatants
- confirmation of a number of other new systems (H-6J/N, submarine LACMs, Y-20 tanker, etc.)
Fin.
