New escalation along the Line of Contact around Nagorny #Karabakh: reports very fluid, so casualties impossible to verify for now, but this appears more similar to April 2016’s ‘4-day war’ than July 2020’s border clash (but all started on a Saturday or Sunday).
Reports of civilian casualties through missile attacks and bombardment on both sides; there are reports of military casualties and destroyed hardware; fighting seems to be focused in Terter/Agdam, Murovdag (Mrav) heights and Fizuli-Jebrayil areas.
Azerbaijani officials are reporting some areas in Fizuli-Jebrayil retaken from Armenian control - reports not confirmed. Perhaps another limited aims operation to recoup some territories before reverting to the status quo? Armenian MoD has pledged counter-attack.
Martial law and mobilization declared in #Armenia and #Karabakh. There had been prior reports of reserve call-ups for training and vehicle confiscations in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani internet/social media networks appear to be have been largely taken down, except Twitter.
OSCE, Russia, UN, France, Council of Europe have called for restraint and talks; Turkey, as before, declares support for Azerbaijan; mobilization of diasporas, with possible violence, seems likely.
This escalation follows July 2020 clashes and further mounting tensions. No international guarantees operative in combat zone, and there is much more at stake strategically. Risks for regimes across the conflict are huge – military failure could have devastating domestic impacts.
International attention will be focused as long as violence continues. But global conditions of fractured multipolarity both enable such escalations + militate against effective multilateral diplomacy needed to create leverage + confidence in negotiations. Situation v dangerous.
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The past few tumultuous weeks in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations have seemingly ended in commitments by both Yerevan and Baku to conclude a peace accord by year's end. Recent events serve notice of at least 5 risks accompanying this process, which I explore here. A (long) 🧵: 1/
Risk 1: Low-cost coercion: The first risk is a strategy of coercion that appears to deliver the outcomes that the coercing side is looking for, with no significant countervailing cost. 2/
crisisgroup.org/europe-central… True, Azerbaijan’s cross-border strikes on Armenia in September elevated the inter-state level of the conflict, resulting in a consolidation of international support for the territorial integrity norm. 3/
While the world is distracted with Ukraine’s success in Kharkiv, there are reports of large-scale Azerbaijani shelling + use of UAVs against targets in Armenia: Jermuk, Goris, Vardenis, Tatev, Kapan.
These are locations within the Republic of Armenia, *not* in Nagorny Karabakh (also the site of another escalation at the beginning of August).
The attacks come less than two weeks after the country’s leaders met with EUCO President Charles Michel in Brussels to review progress on prior agreements to move forward with connectivity, border demarcation, humanitarian issues and the possibility of a peace treaty.
I found George’s learner’s grammar of Georgian to be an indispensable resource when I was learning Georgian. George was also an engaging and inspired teacher of the language and I’ll always be grateful to him. 1/
His was the only modern learner’s grammar that was available at the time, and it was also a great privilege to be taught by the same person who wrote the grammar you are learning from. I learned Russian the same way with Anna Pilkington’s inspired course and teaching. 2/
Yes, the grammar showcased some of George’s political views in ways one wouldn’t usually find in a language grammar. Had I been the series editor I would no doubt have had issues with this to say the least. 3/
Some thoughts on implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (RIU) for Armenia + Azerbaijan, a 🧵. TLDR? A weakened/hardened Russia presents risks for both states, esp ARM, resulting in strategies of formal compliance or evasion, but AZ also sees tactical opportunities in NK.
Whether thru Armenia’s ‘complementarity’ or Azerbaijan’s ‘sovereign foreign policy/non-alignment’ the foreign policies of both states have been predicated on the avoidance of choice. RIU challenges that, forces both states to make both performative and real choices.
RIU radicalises relations between the West, where ARM + AZ both have a variety of important linkages, and the country with the single greatest leverage over both. Unsurprisingly, we have seen ARM + AZ strategies of formal compliance with RU and tactical evasions where possible.
Yesterday 19/7 there were reports of gunfire, along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchivan, in the area of Sadarak / Yeraskh. Azerbaijani social media subsequently suggested reports of advances by Azerbaijani forces.
If true would likely be in the no man’s lands that still obtain between the lines of actual control in this area. (In summer 2018, Azerbaijan also reported advances in this area, meaning advances into no man’s lands: cacianalyst.org/publications/a…)
aysor.am/en/news/2021/0… On 20/7 local Armenian community head in Yeraskh Rudik Oghikyan was reported wounded by Azerbaijani fire, on the same day that Ilham Aliyev is meeting Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss implementation of Armenia-Azerbaijan agreements so far.
On the ‘borderization’ of #Armenia: this week a number of territorial encroachments by Azerbaijani forces were reported on Armenia proper, along the international border between Armenia and those parts of #Azerbaijan that were under Armenian occupation.
On 13/5 Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that some 250 AZE troops had advanced 3.5 kilometres around a remote lake in ARM’s southernmost Syunik region, Sev Lich, that Soviet-era maps indicate is divided by the de jure border. Other movements reported in Gegharkunik.
AZE says it is demarcating the border per maps in its possession. France and the US have called on AZE to withdraw. ARM has referred the matter to to the CSTO. As of today, latest reports are that Russian troops from the Gyumri base are on way to Syunik.