Day 6, a brief summary: after very tentative signs of deceleration on Thurs/Friday, today saw a significant surge in fighting. All parties made statements or speeches indicating battles today seen as critical. ARM MoD says this is full-scale war, land + air + cyber. 1/7
Reported Armenian KIA stands at c. 206, ARM MoD has published details of 243 Azerbaijanis it claims KIA, but real figures for both likely much higher, especially after intense fighting in NE and SE of Line of Contact today; many hundreds more wounded. 2/7
Azerbaijan has said that 7/8 villages recaptured, incl. Madagiz in NE Karabakh and villages in SE in Fizuli-Jebrayil; there was a jubilant mood reported in Baku. Too early to confirm shifts in territorial control; certain though that aims much more ambitious than in 2016. 3/7
N. Pashinyan gave a televised address claiming no major strategic change; there have been reports from ARM journalists in NK that the LoC has moved in some places + ARM reports that ARM forces repelled attacks have gained positions suitable for counter-attack. 4/7
Were previous days aimed at softening up Armenian defences, pending more concentrated land assault today? Or has previous fighting not yielded intended results, needing more concentration of forces? Impossible to say for now. 5/7
3 possible logics for events to unfold: 1) de-escalation + diplomacy (as in April 2016) v unlikely for now; 2) military outcomes – now dominant; 3) deal-making by parties’ patrons, Russia + Turkey: lots of conspiracy thinking on this but reining in ARM or AZ just now unlikely 6/7
Either way, no let up in fighting foreseen. Our thoughts are with all those in the line of fire today. 7/7
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The past few tumultuous weeks in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations have seemingly ended in commitments by both Yerevan and Baku to conclude a peace accord by year's end. Recent events serve notice of at least 5 risks accompanying this process, which I explore here. A (long) 🧵: 1/
Risk 1: Low-cost coercion: The first risk is a strategy of coercion that appears to deliver the outcomes that the coercing side is looking for, with no significant countervailing cost. 2/
crisisgroup.org/europe-central… True, Azerbaijan’s cross-border strikes on Armenia in September elevated the inter-state level of the conflict, resulting in a consolidation of international support for the territorial integrity norm. 3/
While the world is distracted with Ukraine’s success in Kharkiv, there are reports of large-scale Azerbaijani shelling + use of UAVs against targets in Armenia: Jermuk, Goris, Vardenis, Tatev, Kapan.
These are locations within the Republic of Armenia, *not* in Nagorny Karabakh (also the site of another escalation at the beginning of August).
The attacks come less than two weeks after the country’s leaders met with EUCO President Charles Michel in Brussels to review progress on prior agreements to move forward with connectivity, border demarcation, humanitarian issues and the possibility of a peace treaty.
I found George’s learner’s grammar of Georgian to be an indispensable resource when I was learning Georgian. George was also an engaging and inspired teacher of the language and I’ll always be grateful to him. 1/
His was the only modern learner’s grammar that was available at the time, and it was also a great privilege to be taught by the same person who wrote the grammar you are learning from. I learned Russian the same way with Anna Pilkington’s inspired course and teaching. 2/
Yes, the grammar showcased some of George’s political views in ways one wouldn’t usually find in a language grammar. Had I been the series editor I would no doubt have had issues with this to say the least. 3/
Some thoughts on implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (RIU) for Armenia + Azerbaijan, a 🧵. TLDR? A weakened/hardened Russia presents risks for both states, esp ARM, resulting in strategies of formal compliance or evasion, but AZ also sees tactical opportunities in NK.
Whether thru Armenia’s ‘complementarity’ or Azerbaijan’s ‘sovereign foreign policy/non-alignment’ the foreign policies of both states have been predicated on the avoidance of choice. RIU challenges that, forces both states to make both performative and real choices.
RIU radicalises relations between the West, where ARM + AZ both have a variety of important linkages, and the country with the single greatest leverage over both. Unsurprisingly, we have seen ARM + AZ strategies of formal compliance with RU and tactical evasions where possible.
Yesterday 19/7 there were reports of gunfire, along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchivan, in the area of Sadarak / Yeraskh. Azerbaijani social media subsequently suggested reports of advances by Azerbaijani forces.
If true would likely be in the no man’s lands that still obtain between the lines of actual control in this area. (In summer 2018, Azerbaijan also reported advances in this area, meaning advances into no man’s lands: cacianalyst.org/publications/a…)
aysor.am/en/news/2021/0… On 20/7 local Armenian community head in Yeraskh Rudik Oghikyan was reported wounded by Azerbaijani fire, on the same day that Ilham Aliyev is meeting Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss implementation of Armenia-Azerbaijan agreements so far.
On the ‘borderization’ of #Armenia: this week a number of territorial encroachments by Azerbaijani forces were reported on Armenia proper, along the international border between Armenia and those parts of #Azerbaijan that were under Armenian occupation.
On 13/5 Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that some 250 AZE troops had advanced 3.5 kilometres around a remote lake in ARM’s southernmost Syunik region, Sev Lich, that Soviet-era maps indicate is divided by the de jure border. Other movements reported in Gegharkunik.
AZE says it is demarcating the border per maps in its possession. France and the US have called on AZE to withdraw. ARM has referred the matter to to the CSTO. As of today, latest reports are that Russian troops from the Gyumri base are on way to Syunik.