Jim Mitre & I make case for @DeptofDefense to give top priority in defense planning to Taiwan scenario. Adapting the U.S. military to be able to defend TWN will be hard but is necessary, and will also allow US to defend other allies in Asia against PRC. warontherocks.com/2020/10/why-th… 1/
Scenarios sound arcane but are crucial for development of US mil force structure, posture, employment patterns, etc. Focusing on TWN makes sense for following reasons: 1) Taiwan is militarily significant & is critical to American credibility in Asia - so needs to be defended. 2/
US shld be prepared for PRC invasion or blockade/bombard attempt, though former is likely Beijing's best mil strategy. 2) Taiwan is tough to defend but feasible. But making one of several scenarios distracts from significant shifts needed. 3/
Importantly, defending Taiwan does not require that the U.S. military dominate within the first island chain, but rather deny that dominance to China. This is a lower but achievable standard. Failing to focus on TWN will make it more likely to be suborned. PRC can then 4/
focus on Phils et al, making those previously easier scenarios much harder. 3) Esp important to prioritize TWN scenario b/c of reluctance to make needed change in defense establishment. If other scenarios are highlighted, stasis or ill-suited force structure can result as 5/
people can point to those less stressing scenarios as justification for keeping/developing ill-suited forces. This is a very real tendency. Fortunately, leaders like @CMC_MarineCorps@GenCQBrownJr are pushing for necessary change. Need support right scenario focus provides. 6/
4) US mil able to defend Taiwan will also be useful for less stressing scenarios in area. Taiwan is the frontline. If US can defend it, then that force is likely to be able to defend other allies and partners like Japan, Australia, and the Philippines against China. 7/
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W all due respect to estimatable @BonnieGlaser I don't get her counterargument. She argues that we shldn't clarify we would defend Taiwan b/c "China could respond by mounting an attack." That's certainly a real risk & one we shld consider (tactically) even in move to clarity. 1/
That implies we shld be careful b/c real risk of PRC attack. But then later: “there is little evidence that China is poised to invade Taiwan.” “Poised” is ambiguous. Capabilities clearly growing. Intent disputable, but intent can change on dime. So we shld plan they might try. 2/
Key is: If there’s real risk of China invading Taiwan, clarity removes Beijing’s doubt of US response. If there’s NOT a risk, then clarity might tick off Beijing, but a) won’t really affect Taiwan & b) what’ll they do, suppress Hong Kong? 3/
Allies&partners ("A/Ps") essential. Lie at heart of #NDS. Not a platitude b/c US is no longer so preeminent. Mostly about China but US also faces challenges from RF to NATO, transnational terrorists, Iran, & NK. US ergo cant do everything. So US needs to focus on whats key. 2/
Key for US is to focus on top challenge: potential for Chinese hegemony in Asia & esp alliance defense there. Otherwise China will be able to use focused & sequential strategy to break apart any anti-hegemonial coalition there. This will be a consuming rqmt for US. 2/
As Kaplan&I noted in our @ForeignAffairs piece: "ideology does not lie at the root of the matter between the United States and China—even if elements in China’s Marxist-Leninist elite think it does." What does USA want? Open access to Asia for its prosperity, freedom, security.1/
Whether China is run by CCP or not or whether countries in SE Asia are democratic or authoritarian may factor in to how competition goes, but they aren't fundamental from Americans' perspective. Critical to distinguish this. 2/
To give an analogy (h/t @MichaelSinghDC), the fact that elements of Iran's leadership may see dynamic w US in religious terms doesn't mean we should. More provocatively, the same hold would hold true of AQ or ISIS. We don't want terrorist attacks. We need to understand how AQ 3/
Thoughtful/useful post from @RushDoshi. Maybe there's more agreement than I had previously understood. That might be good! In the interests of avoiding premature consensus, though, let me prod a bit. I think 1 and 2 are almost undeniable, even if one is a realist (as I am). 1/
Clearly ideology playing a role in US-PRC comp. If nothing else, check out recent DOD China report for discussion of how CCP thinks it is. Re 2, stakes clearly relevant for political structure, since victor/dominant power is near certain to influence (if not impose on) others. 2/
So then real question is how much should ideological considerations be prioritized/emphasized/reflected in US policy. This is ? I raised yesterday. If Demo Peace Theory is correct, eg, then US really shld be in business of transforming Chinese govt (prudently of course). 3/
Robert Kaplan & I write in @foreignaffairs that Americans should not see the necessary competition w/ China as primarily about ideology. Doing so will misconstrue the nature of the competition – w/ potentially catastrophic results. Summary thread follows. 1/
Why? Beijing’s motivations in pursuing its goal of regional hegemony are largely not ideological. A) China very likely seeks to form a regional trade area/bloc favorable to its economy. B) Its drive for hegemony also has strategic purpose. China has long felt fenced in. Now...2/
wants to compel neighboring states to take security cues from Beijing. C) & after “century of humiliation,” China is eager to stand tall, asserting its power in Asia and beyond. None of these imperatives is strictly ideological. 3/
Superb & clear - & v important - piece from @RichardHaass on why US needs to be clear it would defend Taiwan & why consistent w US one China policy. Makes the compelling case very well. Bravo!
"Time has come for US to intro a policy of strategic clarity: one that makes explicit that US would respond to any PRC use of force against Taiwan. Washington can make change in manner consistent w its 1 China policy. Indeed, would strengthen US-PRC relations in long term..." 2/
"Maintaining ambiguity will not keep peace in next 4 decades...Too many variable that made it wise course have fundamentally shifted...Whether US could prevail in Taiwan conflict is no longer certain, and trend lines move in PRC favor." 3/