This shouldn’t be news to anyone,but human operated ransomware is a problem that has gotten completely out of control
The reasons are relatively straightforward:
The cost to pay is often significantly less than cost to business impact from downtime
The “supply” of possible targets is significantly higher than traditional financial crime which have to target payment/gift cards, banks (or related orgs)
Monetization is also wayyyyy easier
I don’t think you will see a material change in % of orgs who pay ransom unless governments make payment of ransoms illegal (which will have a lot of other unintended consequences).
Do you think governments should outlaw payment of cyber ransoms?
If governments banning payment of ransoms isn’t feasible/reasonable - what other actions be take to materially impact frequency of human operated ransomware campaigns causing significant disruption?
And don’t tell me orgs just need better security or more security staff. Many of orgs being hit have no dedicated security resources (just IT personnel).
I remember a 300 person manufacturing org hit with a 6 figure ransom payment. Most 300 person orgs have no security staff
Maybe MSPs can help fill the gap?
Let’s pretend MSP detects breach in progress. Most MSP’s I’ve seen report intrusions but don’t take recovery steps
If attacker obtains domain admin rights & you were notified by MSP - what could you realistically do to prevent the ransomware
Even relatively simple things like password changes (in a windows environment) take several hours (180 hours is default on DCs for replication).
If you are in this situation - you aren’t left w/many good options
1) shut off internet (most orgs won’t do this) 2) block workstation to workstation comms (not trivial to implement quickly). What happens if attacker pushes ransomware from DC logon script (quite common)?
3) One of more successful approaches I’ve seen implemented while working w/@MsftSecIntel is deployment of Attack Surface Reduction rules that limit files that can run (length of time or system prevalence) combined w/ AV detection using cloud lookups
The threat actors are often operating from countries that won’t cooperate with foreign law enforcement (or have enough corruption to nullify international law enforcement cooperation)
And advent of crypto currency enables criminals to largely bypass the regulated banking system
If you aren’t familiar with (or haven’t implemented) Attack Surface Reduction rules - there are a ton of really useful ones that can limit chance of initial compromise, privilege escalation and some forms of lateral movement/remote execution
Here are the licensing requirements for implementing ASR
It’s notable that Cyber Command targeted Trickbot (malware that commonly leads to human operated ransomware)
I’m a little surprised governments haven’t taken a more active approach to interdicting criminals behind ransomware
As a cyber criminal - I might not be that concerned about getting indicted & extradited by law enforcement
But I would probably be a lot more concerned if an org like Cyber Command targeted me (especially if they were going after my crypto currency wallet & ransom transactions)
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One of most undervalued aspects of incident response is incident documentation
In my experience as a consultant step 1 is interviewing client & reviewing whatever scattered notes 🔖📝they have about an incident & organizing it in a logical manner b/c most orgs do this poorly 🙈
Challenge is analysts (due to crisis) move fast to respond quickly & most orgs don’t experience impactful breaches often
This leads to scattered knowledge/understanding & each analyst documenting things in their own way that is efficient for them but not overall investigation
In my experience - here are the most important things to track (a spreadsheet is my preferred tool)
One table for each of the following:
-Timeline of forensic artifacts
-Systems
-Indicators (I prefer separate table for host and network)
-Compromised accounts
After more than a decade - today is my last day @FireEye.
Taking a job @Mandiant was one of the best decision's I've ever made & I wanted to share some of the stories & experiences of what it was like as well as recognize some of the people that helped me learn and grow
When I started @Mandiant in 2009 the infosec space (it was called information security and not cyber security for starters) was so different from today. It was fairly rare for companies to get breached and when they did there was an amazing amount of stigma associated with that.
I was employee 63 (not because there were 63 active employees but because I was the 63rd employee hired since the inception of the company in ~2005). There were offices in 3 cities (DC, NY, LA) & company split roughly 50/50 between consultants and software devs on MIR
BREAKING: APT41 initiated a multi-month global campaign at over 75 @FireEye customers attempting to exploit Internet facing systems using recently released exploits for Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Cisco Routers & Zoho ManageEngine.
I've been analyzing @FireEye's telemetry over the last few months for attempts to exploit CVE-2019-19781 (Citrix ADC) and this is the first campaign I was able to find and tie to a specific threat actor.
The CVE-2019-19781 exploitation had three main phases 1) initial reconnaissance on January 20-21 executing the command 'file /bin/pwd' (APT41 was the only actor I could find executing this command)
We've all received emails with no attachment and assume it's "safe" to open in a mail client (as long as we don't explicitly click on any URLs). Right?
Not so much...
Let's talk about email tracking pixels for a minute and how sales/marketing (as well as real threat actor's) can use them to evaluate the success of an email marketing (or phishing) campaign...or for information gathering before sending a follow-up payload.
I'm not attending @RSAConference - but I get marketing emails like this one. If you use the Outlook client - have you ever noticed the "to help protect your privacy; Outlook prevented automatic download of some pictures."?
@FireEye@citrix@Mandiant The tool looks for both specific indicators of malware
(coinminers, NOTROBIN and more) as well as methodology indicators that should generically identify compromise (e.g. processes spawned by user nobody, files with 644 user permission...etc.) #DFIR