Germany hasn't followed its 2009 playbook -- and it shows here. Germany's fiscal response to COVID also very different from its fiscal response to the global crisis.
As I have noted before, credit should be given where credit is due.
China of course hasn't totally followed its 09 playbook -- its stimulus has been much more restrained, and it is relying much more on exports (to my chagrin)
One continuity: China's ongoing reluctance to directly support household income.
IMF generally produces great charts -- tho I continue to wonder why they make them so small and hard to read ...
(and a small technical criticism -- the scales on the two // charts differ dramatically, the fall in IP and the recovery is much more dramatic than in retail sales)
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I worry that the IMF's agenda this fall is far less ambitious than the current shock demands.
One way of framing this point is that the IMF so far has provided less financing to limit the impact the impact of COVID-19 on the world than it provided to Argentina alone.
1/x
Another way of framing the issue is that the bulk of the IMF's balance sheet is sitting unused -- and there doesn't seem to be much of a plan to bring it to bear to held vulnerable countries finance higher levels of spending in the crisis.
2/x
The IMF has funds to cover the world's maturing sovereign hard currency bonds many times over. There isn't a systemic crisis from hard currency EM debt lurking just over the horizon. So the IMF could do more to help a broader set of countries meet current fiscal needs
3/x
The Taiwan dollar certainly looks like a managed currency -- and the central bank seems to come in toward the close of the trading day more or less all the time.
But the CBC is also making a bid to avoid crossing the Treasury's trip wires ...
To be fair, the period of heaviest management (July and August) isn't covered the CBC's disclosure -- and Treasury's fx report *due tomorrow but likely to be postponed * only looks at data through h1
On the other hand the CBC could reinforce its disclosure about its intervention by publishing more detailed data on reserves -- including a backward looking monthly time series on its forwards and ongoing data on its domestic fx deposits ...
As I noted earlier today, Anna Gelpern and I have been the project directors for the Group of Thirty Working Group Report on Sovereign Debt and Financing for Recovery.
The report broadly speaking is a call for the international community to do more
More to provide financing to low income countries that have been hard hit by the pandemic -- external inflows (from exports, reduced remittances, reduced FDI) to the DSSI countries will likely fall by $150b this year
2/x
The $12-13b from a fully implemented DSSI with full CDB participation wouldn't have offset this shock -- and certainly the $5 to $5.5b in relief actually provided is wildly insufficient. It doesn't even cover the $10b in interest on on commercial and bilateral debt
3/x
Somewhat disappointed in the IMF's global current account forecasts. The "imbalances" are shrinking frame misses the rise in imbalances in the two biggest economies.
IMF has US current account deficit falling in 2020?
And only a 30 bp increase in China's surplus in 2020?
Even with the surprise fall in China's September surplus ($10b of which looks to be a one off tied to chip stockpiling and the like) China is running a $100b plus quarterly surplus, and the US deficit is running at record levels in dollar terms ...
It doesn't seem like the IMF incorporated q2 current account data for either the US or China or for that matter much of Asia into its forecast ...
Here is what is in the last three months of global trade data. Don't see the "shrinking imbalances"
Big rise in imports pulled the overall surplus down -- annualized monthly surplus in the $450b range, well below the highs of July and August (tho still large)
q3 current account surplus now likely to be in line with q2, not above.
Increase in imports on first glance looks fairly broad based -- imports from the US are up, but so are imports from the EU
A lot of the US demand side stimulus, for example, has spilled over to the rest of the world (in part because of the shift in demand toward goods). US is left with the debt (admittedly at v low rates) without a // boost to output ...