Food for thought, over 2020s we may see a trend of existing S400 regiments (30+ of them) being reinforced with S500 divizions, which would lead to addition of ~180+ engagement channels focussed on MRBMs, IRBMs and possibly with some ICBM capability. 1/6
This force may provide not only a system for strategic defence against sub-ICBM BMs (ie from Middle East and elsewhere, as those proliferate), but also some capability against the potential HGV and other similar threats.
But I would expect this to be overshadowed... 2/6
In the discussions by their potential to form a second echelon in terms of strategic defence against ICBM threats, together with new EW means and exo-atmospheric interceptors.
But all three would probably be one of the drivers behind marketing it as an S400 upgrade package. 3/6
And with the EW element being formed around Voronezh-SM L/S band radars, EKS space based IR sensors, possible EKS space based bistatic (with a ground emitter, using onboard AESA, though I believe it is used for the comms aspect of EKS) S-band sensors. 4/6
The new forward deployed (in Vorkuta, maybe elsewhere) shorter (L/S band for Voronezh-SM) sensors may be one of the more important components of such a network, particularly if I am wrong and EKS does act as a multistatic component, due to the ability to discriminate. 5/6
Such BMD development (together with a senior component) may change the Russian stance on the BMD related arms control, as well as impact Russian export markets, especially the S400 operators that have an SRBM/MRBM/IRBM threats (ie India). 6/6
On the topic of arms control, de-alerting and the like.
As we prepare for possible extension of NST specifically and some sort of future arms control in general I would caution against mirror immaging and copypasting exact approaches across the board. 1/7
This is not only true due to different concerns the parties may have and thus seek to adress but also due to technical, doctrinal and geographical differences between the parties.
So lets look at the de-alerting as one of the common ideas floating around. 2/7
The main argument seems to be that the (US) silo based ICBM force is non survivable and must be used in a LoW style strike, which can lead to launches on false warning, etc.
This leads to the conclusion that SSBNs and other mobile platforms are inherently better 3/7
In the light of the soon demise of the NST, some long term trends for the Russian triad, in a short thread.
Overall the triad seems to be stable in terms of numbers, with modernisation being focussed on the like for like replacements and development of new capabilities. 1/10
First of all, what kinds of new technical capabilities can we expect? In addition to the Avanguard HGV that sort of went through IOC already there is a smaller HGV for the Sarmat (for MIRV) and what appears to likely be a powered HGV (Anchar-RV), most likely on light ICBMs. 2/10
There is also the concept of parallel staging comming about in the form of likely parallel RV dispersal on Yars and possibly other ICBMs (ie Sarmat).
This is there in anticipation of space based weapons systems as allows faster (earlier?) deployement. 3/10
This graphic of #JL2 may be of interest, especially if it is accurate. Found on the internet.
While the depiction of the SSBN with the WAA style sonar set up is not surprising, the depiction of the SLBM is, note the large discardable launch fairing used, with what appears to be classical sequential RV/third stage set up under it.