Matt summarises very well the broadly non-ideological objections to what has just been achieved, in confirming corporate tax abuse as part of the illicit financial flows SDG target, so I'll try to thread a response with each of his points
So first, I don't think there really is much of this confusion around. People largely understand these are quite different phenomena; but they also recognise, rightly, that they depend on being hidden, and they do the same kinds of revenue & social damage
This is a point of disagreement. I saw that much of the pushback was *precisely* not to have corporate tax abuse addressed under either 16.4 *or* 17.1, but to keep it out of the SDGs entirely - on the grounds that the OECD had it covered. (Discuss.)
I can state categorically that this didn't play a serious role. Remember that we're talking about 2015 when the pushback begins, perhaps a bit in 2014. There was no shortage of outrage about corporate tax abuse, whether it was part of 16.4 or not.
Indeed, for some of us, there was a danger here - because we knew that the numbers on corporate tax abuse were more solid than those on other IFF, there was a risk of them being lumped together as not very robust
Was there unanimity? In the key policy discussions, pretty much. The Mbeki panel focused on corporate tax above all else, and it was the only reason 16.4 existed. The UN SG's High Level Panel followed on, and refers to corp tax abuse throughout
There was no public attempt that I've seen - literally not one, from any party - attempting to unpick this before the SDGs were agreed. I've seen attempts since to say that there were different views in the UN SG's HLP, and perhaps there were. But (this from Uncounted):
I agree with Matt that there were people with different views at the World Bank. I just don't think they had a significant role in the decision of the united nations of the world to set target 16.4. And nor should they have had.
Right. We are here now and should act to make the target work well. Following our proposals and others, it seems clear that the indicators will reflect precisely the difference between corporate tax abuse and other elements, so we get precision for each.
Yes: those who opposed this outcome, based on a genuine desire for effectiveness against corporate tax abuse and other IFF, will presumably now swing in behind as Matt says. Those who were disingenuous on this point and preferred no (UN) progress - won't.
It's not every day that a niche question of statistical definition represents a significant step forward for global policy. But today... is that day!
(Excessively long thread follows)
A little background. Since the Millennium Development Goals overlooked non-aid finance, pressure has been building to recognise the centrality of tax, and for global policy measures against the broad threat posed by 'illicit financial flows'...
Illicit financial flows, or IFF, is an umbrella term for cross-border capital movements covering corporate and individual tax abuse, the laundering of the proceeds of crime, abuses of market regulation, and the theft of state assets, first popularised by @Raymond_Baker
Their discussions can be seen as part of a scattered history extending over decades, centring on attempts to require transparency from multinational companies about their global operations, including path-breaking work by the G77 countries @UNCTAD - unctad.org/en/Publication…
Those decades of work seemed to have ended in failure. UNCTAD had been pushed by OECD countries into focusing on 'investment promotion' rather than national sovereignty and corporate accountability; and the big 4 had seized the accounting standard setting agenda for themselves.
Boom. The US has blown up BEPS 2.0: "unable to agree even on an interim basis changes to global taxation law that would affect leading US digital companies." ft.com/content/1ac262… via @financialtimes
Where does this take us? The process was already in disarray, with the non-OECD members of the Inclusive Framework openly calling out the institution's failure to take meaningful account of their views.
More than that, the OECD had already abandoned - at the behest of the US - most of the original ambition. While still paying lip service to the pledge to go 'beyond the arm's length principle', the secretariat had tried to impose a US-French deal that did little of this at best.
1. Does the corporate group have one or more subsidiaries in one of the top ranking jurisdictions on the Financial Secrecy Index or the Corporate Tax Haven Index?
If yes - bailout may still be possible but only with full transparency via public country by country reporting
2. Has the corporate group participated in any financial scandals or tax scandals such as the LuxLeaks, Cum-ex or been judged to have received illegal state aid?
If yes - it's bye bye bailout. This is a company that has shown its attitude to public funds all too clearly.
Disappointing but not entirely surprising - the 'Inclusive Framework' has been forced to accept the OECD secretariat 'unified proposal', in place of the IF's agreed work programme. A range of implications flow from this... oecd.org/tax/internatio…
In terms of the OECD process, there is an insistence that things stay on schedule - all to be wrapped up by end-2020. But there are so many, quite large things still open in pillar one, from the scope of industries to be covered to the range of financial thresholds
The 11 elements of work remaining on pillar one demonstrate how much is still open, even after the Inclusive Framework has been forced to drop its own work programme
In Paris, more than 400 people have gathered at @OECDtax for the public consultation on international tax rules that is normalising the idea of unitary tax approaches, moving beyond the arm's length principle #OECDP1
@OECDtax In London, the #LabourManifesto marks the first commitment to introduce unitary taxation for multinational companies from a leading political party in a leading (G7, G20, OECD) economy