Given the massive drop in JOE listings on the econ JM, here is some source of hope: if you are a candidate that goes into the private sector this year and you apply to return to academia next year, I will take that as a strong signal of your commitment to research #econtwitter
Last year, I did the job market interviews for my university (@kingsatwestern) and it was painful because I had to say "no" to very decent candidates. One of the main deciding factors for us was the commitment to research and teaching abilities.
Sorting research potential is *particularly* hard and so we looked for signals regarding persistence of efforts in the future. Personally, if somebody accepted a job during the market in the private sector and then tried to return, I would see that as a strong signal.
Indeed, it would tell me a) your trade-off between $$$$/research-fun; b) you probably spent doing research outside work hours; c) you are probably a grinder. Three great signals.
I say this because everyone is piling on the bemoaning about the state of the market (and they are right) but I want to give out hope.
Thread: Now forthcoming in Public Choice: how rent-seeking explains asylum expansion in America between 1870 and 1910 (co-authored with Ray March). #econhist#econtwitter
Few people know that the asylums in American asylums expanded 10x in terms of absolute numbers and close to 4x in per capita terms between 1870 and 1910.
Most works in social history attribute this to broadly defined contemporary understandings of public interest (some of which are less savoury than others). Very few works have tried to see if there was a rent-seeking component. Ray and I argue there was one!
People have heavily debated whether markets/states can/need provide public goods. Essentially, people have debated whether public goods are market failures and (if they are) how frequently do these failure happen.
The most frequently used example is that of the lighthouse which has many characteristics that make it a public good (non-excludable and non-rivalrous).
I do not do rant. But, following @TomPhilipson45's resgination from CEA, many people on #econtwitter have taken digs at the acting chair, Tyler Beck Goodspeed. Why? Because his PhD is not in economics and he has few citations. These are cheap shots!
So let me do what I do best which is to simply state some facts about Goodspeed. Obviously, you can dislike his work. You can dislike his politics. You can dislike who he decided to work for. However, his work as an academic is *off-limits* if you want to say he aint an econ
First, if that is your benchmark, get ready to cross out some big names from the field: Roth, Tullock, Kahneman, Ostrom, Herbert Simon, Nash, David Friedman.
Recently, I was thinking about Joel Mokyr's classic "Why Ireland Starved" which basically argued that overpopulation was not a thing in 19th c. Ireland. Loved that book. I decided to google some follow-ups and found this neat piece in "Land Economics" #econhist#econtwitter
The piece is elegantly simple and instructive. It does a simple econometric trick -- add a land quality index to see if overpopulation (proxied by land/pop ratio) was a thing. The author used pretty simple tools to make the adjustment. jstor.org/stable/3146668…
In the end, he found that there were signs of overpopulation.
People are making a fuss over the Cuba statements of @BernieSanders. Yes, Cuba is a dictatorship but there is good healthcare and good education. Can we sort the wheat from the chaff! The answer is "No" #econtwitter -- lets do the economics of dictatorships here
Dictators are utility-maximizers like you and I. What they maximize is the rents they extract from acquiring and holding on to power. They select the public goods to produce as a willful decision to continue rent extraction jstor.org/stable/4072669…#econtwitter
My paper with @PhilWMagness on income inequality 1917-1945 in Economic Inquiry has now been assigned an issue. In that paper, we show that (on average) the IRS data for the US overstates income inequality by a factor of 1.18. #econtwitter#econhist
We explain that weak enforcement and highly volatile tax rates reduce the economic quality of the tax data from the IRS used to measure inequality for the pre-1943 (pre-withholding). We compared with states that had strong enforcement (Delaware, Wisconsin) that had data.
We found this : lower levels of inequality throughout the period.