1. Great article on state aid and subsidies after the transition period by @GeorgePeretzQC , In Competition Law Insight. See competitionlawinsight.com/incoming/state…
2. In @GeorgePeretzQC incisive article, he makes the often overlooked point in the UK debate that without a serious & enforceable UK state aid regime, the UK will be able to free-ride on the EU state aid regime...one cannot really expect the EU-27 to accept such a result
3. He also hones in on another overlooked point in the UK debate (at least political debate, the lawyers have noticed) that the effect of Arts 10 &12 of the Protocol where any UK measures that have an effect on trade between NI and the EU is still subject to EU State Aid regime
4. As he indicates it is not wholly clear that HMG understood what it had signed up to. Despite leaving the EU and even the SM, the UK will still be bound by EU state aid law. Any UK measure not just measures of the NI administration will be affected.
5. Given the threshold for effect on trade in state aid cases is very low, bringing in much of Great Britain aid measures within the jurisdiction of the Protocol. @GeorgePeretzQC , gives an example as the UK wide support measures granted as a result of Covid-19
6. This leaves us with the prospect of post-transition of the European Commission still clearing UK wide aid measures on the basis of the Protocol, which are subject to the ultimate scrutiny of the CJEU & UK courts relying on EU state aid law to issue injunctions & award damages
7. HMG's current response can be found in Cl 45 of the Internal Market Bill which gives Ministers the power to remove the direct effect of Article 10 of the Protocol, despite the fact that this clause conflicts with Article 4 of the WA which grants Art 10 direct effect
8. @GeorgePeretzQC argues that while recognising that Art 10 is intrusive in a context where the UK has left the EU & the SM, the better approach than seeking to undermine Art 10 via the Internal Market Bill is to seek to re-negotiate the scope of Art 10.
9. Such a negotiation could work in the context of the UK being willing to establish its own robust state aid regime. However, if HMG cannot get the IM bill through the Lords and will not agree a subsidy regime, then the EU state aid regime will continue to apply post-transition.

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More from @profalanriley1

15 Feb
NS2 a response to Mr Wolfgang Munchau. Although I agree on a number of points with WM in his recent @spectator piece-I disagree with his central contention that NS2 is about more gas for Germany. There is no more gas & what gas there is not for Germany. Lengthy thread to follow.
1.WMs @EuroBriefing article has swallowed a huge dose of Russian (and indeed German) propaganda. Throughout the article WM refers to Nord Stream 2 as being vital to Germany because of the need for more Russian gas. This is incorrect.spectator.co.uk/article/biden-…
2.The key point about NS2 is that it is a diversionary pipeline. There is no new gas. This huge political effort by Russia and Germany to deliver NS2 will not bring a single extra molecule of gas to Germany.
Read 38 tweets
18 Jan
1.The European Commission’s commitment to the energy transition is not in doubt. However, some of its proposed green measures are counter-productive. One good example is in respect of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). see my latest CIDOB article here: cidob.org/en/publication…
2. The ECT is the only multilateral investment treaty. It is a key mechanism to mobilise the immense amount of private capital necessary to deliver the global energy transition.
3.Yet the Commisson has indicated that unless its own green 'reforms' are accepted it will seek to withdraw the EU & its MS. This is positively counter-productive to the energy transition. The EU should be seeking to increase the number of states joining the ECT not reduce them
Read 29 tweets
6 Jan
1. What do the latest sanctions contained in Section 6231 of the National Defence Authorisation Act 2021 mean for Nord Stream 2? What are the likely next steps for the US & EU in protecting European energy security?
2. As I explained recently in my CEPA article the new sanctions are likely to prove fatal to the pipeline. Laying undersea pipelines requires scarce technical skills & services-the sanctions target those skills & services. cepa.org/eu-us-energy-s…
3. The new sanctions target a broad range of pipe-laying services on which NS2 needs to rely for the delivery of the pipeline, including tech upgrades, insurance & certification. The key point here is that they focus on services where there are only a small number of suppliers
Read 24 tweets
21 Dec 20
1. Digital Markets Act: I wonder in my latest Competition Law Insight article whether the US and EU should consider adopting a digital markets treaty. competitionlawinsight.com/competition-is…
2. One of the problems with the Digital Markets Act (DMA)is asymmetry. In essence the 'gatekeeper' platforms are likely to be all or substantially American. This does raise the issue of at least perceived bias. It also makes it unlikely the EU would ever use its break-up powers
3. However, it is clear that US opinion has shifted over the last few years in respect of the operation of the markets, culminating in the last few weeks in series of FTC, DOJ and state-initiated suits against the main US tech platforms.
Read 8 tweets
25 Sep 20
1. Nord Stream 2: The supposed liability issues. ft.com/content/c83d28…
2. There is a lot of wailing from Gazprom lobbyists about the prospect of huge liabilities for Germany if the project is cancelled. However, it almost inconceivable that the Western energy companies financing NS2 did not receive direct or indirect forms of indemnification
3. If they did not do so it was wholly irresponsible for them to no to do so given the controversy and scale of opposition to NS2 across the EU, from 8 EU heads of gov opposing it to resolutions for cancellation in the European Parliament supported by large majorities.
Read 6 tweets
8 Sep 20
1. Nord Stream 2: Can the EU or Germany (or indeed US, UK) be sued if sanctions are imposed on the pipeline? The short answer is no. The longer answer is below.
2. G lobbyists have said that if sanctions are imposed on NS2 there is not going to be a ‘snowball’ of litigation..no doubt the lobbyist team will be making all sorts of blood curdling noises of billion dollar claims
3. If damages claims were to be brought by NS2 they would either be direct actions the EU (as Germany is almost certainly going to seek sanctions via EU measures). Or damages claims under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) against the EU.
Read 21 tweets

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