THREAD
Is the Kremlin marveling at how the U.S. elections are turning out? Well, it's nuanced, and Moscow isn't sure which candidate is worse for 🇷🇺 interests: @JoeBiden or @realDonaldTrump, as I argue in my @ForeignPolicy blog. Some observations 👇 foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/03/tru…
Is the Kremlin marveling at how the U.S. elections are turning out? Well, it's nuanced, and Moscow isn't sure which candidate is worse for 🇷🇺 interests: @JoeBiden or @realDonaldTrump, as I argue in my @ForeignPolicy blog. Some observations 👇 foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/03/tru…
2/ Before the election, the prevailing view in the Kremlin was that a victory for @JoeBiden would be bad for Russia, because a Democratic administration might impose new economic sanctions on Moscow as punishment for its bad behavior
3/ See this great dispatch from September by @meyerhenry4 & @world_reporter. My own conversations with some 🇷🇺 officials and executives mostly resonate with @bpolitics story (although nobody's sample of GOR contacts is fully representative, of course). bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
4/ Then, however, there is a more nuanced view on potential @JoeBiden presidency, particularly among some professional U.S.-watchers in @mfa_russia. Key point is that Russia will not be a high priority anyway because of the pandemic, economic recovery, racial issues, China...
5/... and that's why a president who is not tainted by suspicion of being a Russian asset—and who knows how to organize a normal bureaucratic process for national security discussions—will be able to restore some guardrails to 🇷🇺🇺🇸 relationship.
6/ This view is pretty well summarized by @Russian_Council's CEO Andrey Kortunov, one of the most well-informed and nuanced analysts of 🇷🇺 foreign policy: russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-a…
7/ For a broader context of 🇷🇺 discussion on a possible pragmatic approach towards 🇺🇸, look no further as this excellent piece by @CarnegieRussia's very own @DmitriTrenin: carnegie.ru/commentary/816…
8/ There is also a minority view in Moscow that @JoeBiden's team could be clear-eyed about the side effects and efficiency of sanctions as 🇺🇸 major tool in 🇷🇺 policy. For context see this fine and nuanced paper by @andrewsweiss & @JarrettBlanc carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/03/u.s…
9/ Now to @realDonaldTrump. After 🇷🇺🇺🇸 relations nearly hit rock bottom on Trump’s watch, nobody in Russia believes that four more years of Trump could help improve bilat ties. This @kommersant Q&A with some 🇷🇺senators, MPs and experts is indicative: kommersant.ru/doc/4556787?fr…
10/ This view is shared by the general public. 65% of Russians polled by credible @levada_ru (oh, yes, I know, but we don't have other instruments) said that it doesn't matter for 🇷🇺 who wins the election (4 years ago 60% believed that Trump is better). levada.ru/2020/10/21/pre…
11/ If Trump is reelected, the silver lining will be the even deeper level of U.S. domestic polarization and disengagement from its partners. For the Kremlin, Schadenfreude over the gradual demise of Pax Americana would sugarcoat the risks and downsides of Trump's second term.
12/ If Trump is to win, another upside for the Kremlin will be the opportunity to shame&troll Western democracy, and to use Trump's victory as a talking point for domestic&global propaganda advertising "efficient authoritarianism" à la Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping.
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