If you have ever wondered…
– why crisis resolution cost were so unequally distributed in the Euro crisis
– why no country left the Eurozone
– who supported and opposed different Euro crisis policy options domestically
this book is for you.
I will do a longer thread on what the book is about, but for now let me say thank you to all the people who helped along the way.
Special thanks go to @RaphaelJReinke, who co-authored two chapters, @jafrieden, @SiljaHausermann, and @EveHubscher who gave detailed input, our RAs, who helped with data collection, and so many people @IPZ_ch – the best place for writing such a book.
“The Politics of Bad Options. Why the Eurozone’s problems have been so hard to resolve”, co-authored with @ariray and @niredeker, is out at @OUPPolitics.
As promised, here is a thread on what it is about:
Why was the Euro crisis so hard to resolve? Why were crisis resolution cost so unequally distributed? Why did no country leave the euro? And who supported and opposed different policy options domestically?
Our book sets out to answer these questions.
To this end we study the crisis in both deficit-debtor and surplus-creditor countries and consider distributive concerns associated with all policy options, including those that were not chosen: external adjustment, internal adjustment, and financing.
1.Lots of surprise in UK media that EU member states were not more accommodating in the Brexit negotiations in Salzburg. Much less on continent, it’s what the EU-27 has been saying all along.
But importantly, it’s also what the EU public supports. Here’s the evidence:
Thread
2. Some context: This data is from an online-survey of 9423 EU-27 citizens run by @daliaresearch in June 2018 (I designed the questionnaire, it’s from a larger research project I am conducting on EU-27 responses to Brexit).
3.Asking EU-27 Europeans about how the EU should approach them, 44% say that the EU should take a hard or very hard line.
2.We examine voting behavior in national referendums that reject international cooperation and thus creates strategic incentives for foreign governments to get involved.
3. Our key research questions are:
a) How do voters’ expectations about foreign reactions to a noncooperative referendum outcome shape their vote intentions?
b) To what extent can foreign policymakers influence those expectations?