Thread by @stefwalter__

One of my favorite papers, "Noncooperation by popular vote", co-authored with @IgnacioJurado, @EliasDinas and @nikkon7, is finally out in print:
cambridge.org/core/journals/…

Here’s what it is about (Thread):

2.We examine voting behavior in national referendums that reject international cooperation and thus creates strategic incentives for foreign governments to get involved.

3. Our key research questions are:
a) How do voters’ expectations about foreign reactions to a noncooperative referendum outcome shape their vote intentions?
b) To what extent can foreign policymakers influence those expectations?

4. How a noncooperative referendum vote ultimately plays out for the referendum country depends on the reaction by governments abroad – will they accommodate such a vote or not? Expectations about this reaction should influence voting decision.

5. Expectations about the likely foreign reactions to foreign policy referendums with large spillover effects abroad vary widely, with anti-cooperation voters usually more optimistic about the foreign response.

6. This creates strategic incentives for foreign governments to signal that they won’t accommodate a noncooperative vote. Costly signals are likely to more effective in influencing voters’ expectations and voting behavior.

7. To test our argument, we leverage a foreign policy referendum in which the stakes of other countries were particularly high: the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, using original data collected one day before the vote.

8.We find that expectations about whether a No-vote would lead to Grexit or new negotiations for a better bailout deal mattered greatly for individuals’ voting decisions – the more optimistic, the more likely Greeks were to vote no (against cooperation in form of bailout deal).

9.What about costly signals? During the Greek referendum campaign, Eurozone policymakers signaled resolve by not increasing emergency liquidity assistance for Greek banks. As a result, the Greek government had to close the banks and to impose capital controls.

10.Did the bank closure affect expectations and vote intentions?
We find that the bank closure made voters more pessimistic about the foreign response and induced an increase in the cooperative vote in the order of about 10 percentage points – but not enough to sway the result.

11. Overall, our paper contributes to better understanding the mass politics international cooperation - something that appears imperative in times when national democratic decisions increasingly have significant consequences not just at home, but also abroad.